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ABSTRACT 
 
Since 1989, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone a tremendous 
amount of societal and political change. While previous studies have noted the importance of 
citizen support for democracy in providing a base for regime stability in these new democracies, 
there is considerable debate in what influences these values. One possible mechanism of attitude 
change is mass media. Previous studies in political science have noted the importance of mass 
media in influencing citizen attitudes and behavior. Though this research has uncovered a 
plethora of effects that the media can have, the extant literature has mostly focused on this 
relationship in older, established democracies. This study seeks to advance literature on political 
communication by extending this research to new democracies and new media. Specifically, it 
explores the effects of the internet on support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
main hypothesis is citizens who use the internet will be more supportive of democratic 
governance and the norms of a democratic society because the internet offers immediate 
feedback loops between citizens, media outlets, and politicians, as well as the opportunity to 
diffuse democratic norms through social interaction online. To test this prediction, the study 
utilizes data from Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey. The findings show that 
internet use does increase support for the political regime and democratic norms in the region’s 
democracies, while only increasing support for democratic norms in the non-democracies. 
Furthermore, the findings show that social interaction online tends to be a driving mechanism in 
producing support for democracy, while online news increases the chances for citizens to hold 
political elites accountable by providing an open space for healthy political opposition to 
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coalesce. These findings provide evidence that the internet can be a particularly helpful 
mechanism in supporting democratic consolidation in these new democracies because it provides 
unique opportunities to influence support for democratic norms and hold elected leaders 
accountable to the mass public.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the fall of communism, Central and Eastern Europe have seen a wave of 
democratization sweep across the region. While many countries in the region have become stable 
democracies, other countries have not been so lucky. In recent years, we have seen examples of 
democratic regression, and even failure, in the region. We have seen a failed democratic 
“revolution” in Ukraine and the consolidation of power in Russia by Vladimir Putin and the 
United Russia party. Even more surprising, is the democratic backslide in Hungary under the 
leadership of Viktor Orban, whose administration has been deemed a threat to human rights and 
media freedom by several non-profit organizations. Additionally, questions about the quality and 
inclusiveness of democracy still remain in the consolidating democracies due to high levels of 
intolerance and low levels of trust in political actors and institutions. While much of the study of 
democratization in the region has focused how political institutions or civil society shapes 
democracy, many researchers have overlooked the role mass media plays in the process. By 
choosing to focus on some factors that contribute to a healthy democracy while ignoring others, 
political scientists have, for the most part, missed an opportunity to evaluate the media’s ability 
to carry out functions that have led democratic theorists to dub it the “fourth estate” of 
democracy.  
If we were to conceptualize democracy as a patchwork quilt made up of institutions, 
political actors and the mass public, then mass media would be the thread holding these groups 
together (Lippmann 1922; Ball-Rokeach and DeFluer 1976; Diamond 1999; Gross 2002). In this 
conceptualization, the mass media is not an actor that is not directly involved in making public 
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policy, but rather an intermediary through which messages and ideas flow between political 
elites and the mass public. Through this function, the mass media has been shown to have a 
number of psychological and behavioral effects on citizens in democratic countries. Despite the 
research devoted to the mass media’s influence, Mughan and Gunther (2000) point out that 
political communication research falls short of true comparative standards by consistently 
focusing on the United States or other advanced democracies. While there are a number of 
studies that discuss the general functions of mass media in countries outside of the United States 
and other advanced democracies, these studies are mostly qualitative in nature and deal with 
traditional mediums (see Jebril et al. 2013).  
The failure to expand the study of political communication beyond stable democracies 
leaves a large gap in our understanding of how the mass media can influence attitudes and 
behavior. This study seeks to expand our understanding of media effects by exploring the effects 
of mass media in new democracies. Furthermore, it will look at new media in these countries in 
an attempt to understand how new technology socializes support for democracy in new 
democracies. By focusing on the interaction of societal and technological change, this study will 
posit a new theory to explain how new technology can diffuse regime support in consolidating 
countries. Beyond the theory presented, this study will empirically test this theory and provide an 
understanding of the internet’s role in politics in consolidating democracies. Finally, this study 
will explore the theoretical and empirical differences between the internet and traditional 
mediums, which enables us to compare how the effects produced by using the internet compares 
to the effects from traditional media. 
While this study focuses on empirical evaluation of the internet’s effects on support for 
democracy, the findings do contain substantive implications for the consolidation of democracy 
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in Central and Eastern Europe. Since citizen support for democratic norms provides legitimacy 
and stability for well working democracies (Lipset 1959; 1994; Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 
1975; Booth and Seligson 2009), it is imperative that we examine whether or not the internet can 
aid in the socialization of democratic values. This study specifically focuses on the internet 
because of its unique interactive capabilities that differentiate it from traditional mediums. 
Furthermore, recent scholarship has discussed that the internet may be able to increase citizen 
demands for democracy in authoritarian and illiberal regimes (Nisbet et al. 2012), and may be 
used by protesters as a means to mobilize and express political dissent (Eltantawy and Wiest 
2011; Kyj 2006; Matay and Kaposi 2008). While this may serve for calls to democratize in 
authoritarian or illiberal regimes, it could serve as a double-edged sword in new democracies. 
While open communication could provide the opportunity to hold leaders accountable and keep 
would be autocrats from fixing the rules of the game, it could also serve as a place where small 
extremist parties use a mode of open communication to build support for their anti-democratic 
policies (Downey and Fenton 2003; Matay and Kaposi 2008). Therefore, it is important to 
understand what influence the internet has on support for the government as well as support for 
democratic norms such as trust and tolerance in these new democracies.  
Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989: History and Attitudes Toward Democracy 
 
 To aid in our understanding of how the internet shapes support for democracy in post-
communist societies, we will first look to understand the unique history of Central and Eastern 
Europe. This section will discuss the institutional and societal changes that have occurred since 
1989 as well as changes in citizen attitudes toward democracy in the region. This discussion is 
valuable as it provides the basis for why these countries cannot be considered wholesale with 
their Western European counterparts. In doing so, this section will provide a backdrop of some 
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of the changes that have taken place in the region, and some of the difficulties in consolidating 
democracy that some of these countries face.    
 Previous research has argued that the pace and totality of change in Central and Eastern 
Europe, along with its totalitarian past, creates a set of issues that make regime change in the 
region distinct from transitions elsewhere (Wolchick and Curry 2011; Balcerowicz 1994; 1995). 
Institutionally, the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe differed from transitions 
elsewhere because the scope of change was exceptionally large, and the speed of transition was 
extraordinarily quick (Balcerowicz 1994; 1995). While the speed of transition across the region 
shocked politicians and publics alike, the totalitarian nature of communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe necessitated such a move (see Linz and Stepan 1996). A quick break with the 
communist party-state allowed sweeping reforms to take place by creating democratic 
institutions, which in turn instituted market capitalism. Once again this sequence makes the 
democratic transition in the region different from others we have witnessed historically 
(Balcerowicz 1995). Most democratic transitions occur with market capitalism already in place 
and then institute democracy. The communist regime, however, necessitated a break with the 
political past before engaging in privatization of the economy.  
 Another distinction that separates democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe 
from other regions is the influence of international actors in democratization. While international 
actors certainly have played a role in regime change elsewhere, the Eastern European experience 
with said international actors was particularly important. From 1945 onward, political actors 
who, at the end of the day, had to answer to party officials in Moscow for their actions governed 
most of Eastern Europe. We can see the USSR’s influence and domination over other countries 
in Eastern Europe play out as early liberalizing attempts in places like Hungary and 
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Czechoslovakia were ended in bloody altercations with Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces. 
However, by the late-1980’s Soviet power had waned and Mikhail Gorbachev was tabbed with 
restructuring communism in the Soviet Union. Because of this difficulty, the Soviet Union 
looked inward and no longer offered military support to satellite governments. This left an 
opening for political liberalization and regime change in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 While the withdrawal of Soviet influence left an opening for regime change in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the incentives offered by democracies, namely the European Union, added 
reason to democratize. These incentives provided a chance for political elites to strive toward 
working democracy and a market economy. As Kopstein and Reilly (2000) note, proximity to the 
west helped in post-communist transition as trade liberalization and direct investment helped 
reward countries such as Hungary for their break with communist governance. Furthermore 
research has shown that credible, conditional rewards, such as European Union ascension 
programs, have aided in strengthening elite commitment to democracy (Schimmelfennig 2007). 
 While the style of institutional change and importance of international influences both 
make the Central and Eastern European experience with democratization different from other 
regions, these processes did not play out the same way in all countries. Wolchick and Curry 
(2011) note that Central and Eastern European transitions to democracy developed in four 
patterns based on speed of the process, the amount of citizen involvement and amount of 
violence involved. Therefore, countries, such as Poland and Hungary, where the end of 
communism was negotiated by political elites form a much different transition than countries 
that endured civil violence or protracted transitions. Also, international pressures to democratize 
were not static across the region. As mentioned before, those countries that were closer to 
Western Europe received greater incentives to democratize than those farther from the west 
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(Kopstein and Reilly 2000). Because of the differences in geography and mode of transition, we 
can see significant variation in level of and commitment to democracy.   
 While the institutional and economic transitions along with the impact of international 
actors has helped distinguish Central and Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy, civil society 
also played a unique role in shaping democracy in the region. Even at the outset of transition, 
mass society was active in bringing about the end of communism (see Wolchik and Curry 2011). 
Despite mass protests leading to regime change in some countries, pluralist society was not easy 
to come by in the region. In fact, due to the communist regime’s imposition of civic attitudes and 
memberships, some even went as far as predicting that political cleavages would not exist in 
post-communist Europe1. While this theory was incorrect, it correctly notes that initial civil 
society was weak and unorganized in most of the post-communist world due to its suppression, 
or incorporation into the party-state during communism (Bernhard 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Wolchik and Curry 2011). The control of civil society under the totalitarian regime is once again 
in contrast to authoritarian regimes elsewhere. While authoritarian regimes in Latin America and 
Southern Europe often suppressed civil society, they did not directly run civic organizations as 
communist governments did in Central and Eastern Europe (Linz and Stepan 1996).  
 Though the institutional and societal change that occurred during the transition to 
democracy is certainly important, this study’s focus on citizen attitudes toward democracy and 
the free market necessitates that we review how these have changed over time as well. One of the 
first things to notice when discussing the region is that trust in governing institutions is 
exceedingly low (Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose et al. 1998). Furthermore, while many supported 
democracy from the time of regime change, there was a significant amount of the public who 
either still supported the previous regime, or was, at best, apathetic towards democracy as a 
                                                 
1 See Whitefield (2002) for a critique of this argument. 
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system (Rose and Mishler 1994). While this was certainly the case for the 1990’s, the argument 
could be made that there is little difference in attitudes between the new democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe and their older counterparts. The main reason for this argument is that 
several of these countries are now part of the European Union, and could be considered 
democratically consolidated. To try to get a better view of how contemporary attitudes toward 
democracy and other forms of governance in Central and Eastern Europe compare to those in 
Western Europe this study will employ descriptive statistics from the European Values Survey’s 
latest survey wave in 2008 
Table 1.1: Attitudes Toward Political Systems:  Percentage Answering Fairly Good or Very 
Good 








     
Strong Leader  25% 36% 29% 
     
Experts Making 
Decisions 
 48% 74% 78% 
     
Military Rule  6% 8% 8% 
     
Democracy  93% 83% 85% 
 
                                                 
2 Western Europe is defined as the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom. 
3 Eastern Europe is defined as the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  
4 Eastern European Democracies is made up of the same countries as Eastern Europe sans Russia and Ukraine.   
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Table 1.2 : Attitudes Toward Political Systems: Percentage Answering Very Good 
Views on Political 
System   Western Europe Eastern Europe 
Eastern European 
Democracies 
       
Strong Leader 
 
6% 11% 7% 
       
Experts Making 
Decisions   
10% 23% 25% 
       
Military Rule  1% 2% 2% 
       
Democracy   54% 26% 27% 
  
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide us with insight on how Eastern Europeans view several 
different political systems in relation to their Western European counterparts.  One of the first 
things to note is that Central and Eastern Europe seems to have a substantially larger percentage 
of respondents answering that think having experts instead of government making decisions is at 
least a fairly good way to run the country. This is worrisome as it does not show support for 
democratically elected leaders, but rather support for another way of government. Furthermore, 
this could even possibly be tied to communist nostalgia, as some nations such as the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia emerged from communist systems that featured large bureaucracies. 
Because of this, we could possibly tie support for expertise in government as nostalgia for a 
system in which perceived experts were making political and economic decisions. However, 
there is also the possibility that this attitude is innocuous and simply shows citizen support for 
political leaders who are experts in their field.  
Despite the concern that Central and Eastern European publics have a high level of 
support for technocratic leadership, they also have a high percentage of respondents answering 
that democracy is a fairly or very good way to run a country. Certainly this is one area that 
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publics in these young democracies look similar to Western Europeans. While Table 1.1 makes it 
seem that Western and Eastern European publics are similar in support for democracy as a 
political system, Table 1.2 shows that the support may be stronger in the West than in the East. 
As the statistics show, there is over 25-percentage points worth of difference in the amount of 
Eastern and Western Europeans that believe democracy is a very good way to run a country. This 
statistical difference remains even when we take out autocratic and semi-democratic regimes 
such as Russia or Ukraine. While it seems that the mass public in Central and Eastern Europe 
does remain committed to democracy, it doesn’t seem to have as strong of support for democracy 
ass is found in Western Europe. These sentiments are echoed in Tables 1.3 through 1.5, which 
point out once again that Eastern Europeans are very similar to Western Europe in that the 
overwhelming majority believes that democracy is the best political system. However, Table 1.4 
shows that there is a substantial gap between Western Europe and Eastern Europe regarding the 
percentage of individuals who strongly agree with that sentiment. Additionally, Table 1.5 shows 
Western Europeans are also more likely to be satisfied with democracy than their Eastern 
European counterparts. While this analysis does not show cause for alarm over the difference in 
democratic attitudes between Eastern and Western Europe, it does show that the two sets of 
countries are different in their support for and satisfaction with democracy. While both sets are 
made up a majority of well-working democracies, it seems that countries in Eastern Europe may 
lack the same level of diffuse support in the citizenry that is found in Western Europe. Therefore, 
it is necessary to study the causes and effects of such differences as the long-term health of 
democracy hinges on such support (Easton 1975).  
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Table 1.3: Attitudes toward Democracy: Percentage Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing 
Democracy:   Western Europe Eastern Europe Eastern European Democracies 
       
Is Best Political System 
 
94% 85% 87% 
       
Causes Bad Economy  28% 40% 40% 
       
Is Indecisive  
53% 57% 55% 
       
Cannot Maintain Order   
26% 47% 45% 
 
Table 1.4: Attitudes toward Democracy: Percentage Strongly Agreeing 
Democracy:   Western Europe Eastern Europe 
Eastern European 
Democracies 
       
Is Best Political System 
 
50% 25% 26% 
       
Causes Bad Economy  4% 6% 5% 
       
Is Indecisive  10% 12% 10% 
       
Cannot Maintain Order   4% 9% 8% 
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Table 1.5 Attitudes toward Democracy: Satisfaction With Democratic System 
Satisfaction With 







       
Very Satisfied  
7% 2% 2% 
       
Rather Satisfied  
49% 32% 34% 
       
Not Very Satisfied  
34% 48% 48% 
       
 Not at All Satisfied   
10% 18% 16% 
 
The Media in Central and Eastern Europe  
 While it is certainly important to understand the unique transition to democracy that these 
countries have undergone, it is also important to understand the influence that mass media has 
had on politics and society in Central and Eastern Europe. As Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) 
describe, this is an important step for any study of media effects because as technology or society 
changes we may see mass media produce different effects. Thus it is paramount for researchers 
of mass media effects to understand the “political communication culture” of the country or 
region they are studying (Pfetsch and Esser 2004). This is an essential step in this study as it 
provides a basic understanding of the political role of media and internet in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This will enable us to begin theorizing how new technology could increase citizen 
support for democracy in the region.  
Qualitative studies of the mass media during the 1990’s and early 2000’s often described 
the difficulties that the media and journalism had during the early stages of transition. 
Specifically, much of the research questioned whether the media in the region could perform the 
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normative functions ascribed to media in a democracy (see Gross 2002; Sukosd and Bajomi-
Lazar 2003). This research identified several areas of concern including political pressure on the 
media as well as a focus on sensationalism in an attempt to attract the largest audiences possible 
(Sukosd and Bajomi-Lazar 2003). Furthermore, Gross (2002) describes the mass media in the 
region as a race to the bottom in which journalists present information in a highly partisan and 
contentious manner (see also Coman 2000; Charles 2009). Others noted that during the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s media in the region tended toward direct political propaganda5 rather than open 
and pluralistic communication (Bajomi-Lazar 2012). These difficulties lead other researchers to 
posit that news media in the region may be unable traditional roles of democratic media such as 
holding political leaders accountable (Sukosd and Bajomi-Lazar 2003).   
 Despite these early difficulties, the media has been able to serve as a key component of 
the democratization process. Bajomi-Lazar (2012) notes that over the past decade, direct political 
pressure on the mass media has declined in many countries and political propaganda presented as 
information has declined. In doing so, political elites have used more targeted efforts in an 
attempt to mobilize supporters and have turned to soft news and entertainment to reach members 
of the public that are largely inattentive to hard news. Furthermore, research has also noted that 
the mass media has indeed played a significant role in aiding democracy despite its early 
shortcomings. As Gross (2002) notes, the mass media has served as an effective aid to 
democratization mainly because of its ability to serve as an open public sphere. In doing so, it 
has supported the formation of national and civic identity (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008). 
Furthermore, empirical research notes that people who consume news from national news outlets 
have higher levels of efficacy, something that is often viewed as a precursor to political 
                                                 
5 Bajomi-Lazar (2012) defines political propaganda as applying techniques such as stereotyping, using double 
standards, substitution of names, lying, assertion, repetition, pinpointing the enemy, the appeal to authority. The 
term is often associated with censorship and brainwashing. 
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participation (Loveless 2008).  
 While the political uses of mass media have shifted over the last decade or so, there are 
still some elements of the early-1990’s media system that have persisted in the new media 
environment. First, the emphasis on tabloid style presentation has continued as political elites 
seek to reach larger audiences (Bajomi-Lazar 2012). Furthermore, politicians in some countries 
still put political pressure on journalists often use public service broadcasting for purposes of 
political gain (see Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Bajomi-Lazar 2012). Another potentially 
troubling development is the new trend of local business tycoons buying many news outlets in 
the region. While this seems unproblematic, the issue lies with exactly how these purchases will 
affect journalistic freedoms. As Stetka (2012) notes the business tycoons making these purchases 
are often well connected politically, and this process can lead to an oligarchization of the 
political sphere. In doing so, corporate owners may have vague rules about who and what their 
media outlet can cover leading to confusion and hesitance to publish certain articles among 
journalists and editors (Stetka 2012). However, the processes noted here are not static from one 
country to the next. While some countries in the region enjoy a free and pluralistic media, others 
have succumbed to processes of media capture6 or outright censorship (see Bajomi-Lazar 2013; 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2012; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008). Because of these differences, we must 
take care to look at the underlying causes that could make media effects vary from country to 
country.  
To be sure, traditional media outlets have garnered most of the focus of research 
examining the relationship between media and politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Because 
of this, there has been far less research in general on the effects of the internet in these societies. 
                                                 
6 Bajomi-Lazar(2013) describes media capture as “media’s influence on public opinion and voting behaviour, that is, 
capturers’ ability to articulate their views and to assert their ideologies, whether it is political parties or related 
business interest groups that exert pressure on the media” (72). 
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The main studies that have occurred to date often describe the intersection of the transition to 
democracy with the increased prevalence of internet technology in the region. In doing so, some 
have described the cultural change within countries based on the ability to communicate with 
others around the globe (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). Others look at the structure of the online news 
media and describe the ways it compares news media on other outlets (Salovaara-Moring 2012). 
While Salovaara-Moring’s (2012) main focus is on the societal effects of online news, her study 
does note some interesting findings pertaining to what types of websites are most visited in the 
region. Using descriptive statistics, she shows that people tend to use social media for greater 
time periods each day than commercial or public service news online. Furthermore, she notes 
that the most popular news websites in the region are news portals. While news portals all fit into 
a singular category by being commercial news outlets, the content can vary widely between 
websites. As Salovaara-Moring (2012) mentions, the content can range from hard news, to 
tabloid style journalism, or entertainment. Furthermore, there may be variation within news 
portals as they might feature a mixture of all three and contain social media and video 
components.  
 Aside from the content found online in Central and Eastern Europe, researchers also note 
the unique intertwining of the political, social, and technological change in the region. As 
Parrish-Sprowl (2012) discusses the new technology may bring on a new cultural change at the 
heels of eat political and societal transitions of the late 20th Century. While he notes that the 
internet could reduce the time that people spend engaging in traditional activities, he also 
mentions that new media has the ability to increase interpersonal interaction. By allowing people 
to receive real time updates on information that is important to them, and allowing them the 
opportunity to discuss these events with people they would likely never meet without the new 
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technology, the internet offers a new dimension to culture (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). Seemingly this 
added dimension would extend beyond the socio-cultural realm and into political society as well. 
Indeed, Bajomi-Lazar (2012) notes that politicians and public officials have taken to social 
media and other new media outlets as a means to directly contact voters. By increasing the 
opportunities for people to discuss political and social matters with other members of society, 
and offering political elites direct communication with the public, the internet provides distinct 
opportunities that are not available through traditional media.  
Plan of the Study 
 In the following chapters, we will look to better understand the influence that the internet 
may have on a person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In Chapter Two 
we will review literature relevant to this study and posit a theory of how internet use can 
influence support for democracy. Chapter Three will begin the empirical investigation and 
explore what effect internet use has on a person’s support for democracy. In doing so it will not 
only look at the direct effects of internet use, but also at how several conditional factors could 
influence how internet effects support for democracy. Chapter Four will continue the empirical 
investigation by investigating what effects using social media or consuming online news have on 
a person’s support for democracy. In Chapter Five, we will further investigate the effects of 
internet news by exploring the effects of using internet news as a main source of information. 
Chapter Five will continue by also looking at the effects of consuming information from 
different types of internet news outlets and how country level differences can effect this process. 
Chapter Six will build off of the findings in Chapter Five and examine how a country’s level of 
democracy and freedom of traditional media condition the influence that internet has on support 
for democracy.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
 
While Chapter One discusses how life and mass media have changed since the fall of 
communism in the region, Chapter Two will discuss how the previous literature has detailed the 
concepts and key points related to this study. Following this discussion, the chapter will proceed 
by introducing a theory describing how internet use can influence citizen views of democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This theory will be used to establish what effects we expect to see in 
the empirical investigation in the chapters that follow.  
Democracy and Democratic Consolidation 
 Since the main focus of this project is to observe how the internet influences support for 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the discussion will begin by conceptualizing the key 
terms such as democracy and democratic consolidation. While this study does not directly test 
democracy and democratization in the region, democracy, and its stability, is very much at the 
core of this study. Because of this, this section will discuss how the previous literature has 
defined what democracy is as well as key components to regime stability such as consolidation. 
While there are many causes of democracy and its stability, this section will mostly focus on 
how society can influence these processes through support for the regime and its principles. 
While economic and institutional causes of democracy are certainly important, the focus of this 
study lends itself to more discussion of mass politics rather than elite and structural explanations 
of democracy.  
 However, before we focus on the causes of democracy and regime stability, we must first 
define what democracy is. One of the most cited conceptualizations of democracy actually notes 
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that true democracy may actually be an unattainable ideal. In Polyarchy: Participation and 
Opposition, Dahl (1971) argues that democracy is not simply reliant on institutions of 
governance, but rather is a function of the non-electoral guarantees made by a state’s 
government. He asserts democracy is a political system in which governments and public 
officials are completely, or almost completely, responsive to all citizens. Since the author notes 
this formulation is an ideal type of regime, he asserts that regimes that come close to the ideal of 
democracy should be called polyarchies. For Dahl (1971), democratization is not conceptualized 
as movement along a continuum, but rather as movement along a two-dimensional space based 
on the competitiveness and inclusiveness of a regime.  
 In a similar fashion, Schmitter and Karl (1991) define democracy as, “a system of 
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, 
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (115). 
Both of these definitions note that democracy has several key components, and chief among 
them is the responsiveness to public will. This is indeed important to this study as we look at 
how internet use influences the way citizens feel about democracy. By influencing public 
attitudes, the internet and mass media can serve as a complement to working democracy.  
While this study is concerned with how the literature characterizes democracy, it is also 
interested in the consolidation of democracy. Schedler (1998) defines democratic consolidation 
as the survival of democracy against the threat of authoritarian regression. He elaborates that this 
can happen through the quick breakdown of democracy or slow decay of democratic norms and 
institutions both can be problematic for new democracies. Certainly both of these modes of 
authoritarian backslide could explain the failure of democracy in certain Central and Eastern 
European countries. Furthermore, the latter is a distinct concern in Hungary, where organizations 
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such as Freedom House and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee have both expressed concerns 
over the recent changes to media freedom in the country.  
While Schedler provides a basic definition of democratic consolidation, Linz and Stepan 
(1996) conceptualize democratic consolidation as an elite driven phenomenon where political 
elites recognize democracy as the only game in town. The authors elaborate on this point and 
define democracy as the only game in town when “no significant political groups seriously 
attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state” (Ibid., 5). Once this 
process is completed the democratic regime no longer has to worry about an authoritarian 
breakdown. While political elites drive this model, there is plenty of room for influence from the 
mass media and civil society. As Linz and Stepan note, the interests and values of civil society 
are major determinants of what happens at the elite level. Furthermore, an active civil society can 
keep tabs on the state apparatus for potential abuses of power (Ibid.). If we consider the media’s 
ability to socialize democratic values (Chafee et al. 1970; Adoni 1979; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 
2008) and be a watchdog for a largely inattentive public (Graber 2003; Curran 2005; Martin 
2008), then there is an opportunity for mass media to directly impact democratic consolidation.  
Citizen Support for Democracy 
While democracy and democratic consolidation are important aspects of this study, the 
main goal of this study is to explain how using the internet influences a person’s support for the 
regime. Therefore, we must explore the ways that legitimacy has characterized by the previous 
literature. Specifically, we must seek to understand what influences legitimacy and how using 
the internet could theoretically influence these pathways.  
One of the most important discussions of how legitimacy should be measured comes 
from Easton (1975). He claims support for regimes comes in two distinct forms, specific and 
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diffuse, which measure two distinct concepts relating to support for the government and the 
regime. He notes that specific support can be seen in citizen evaluation of government and 
government outputs. This is because specific support is gained by regimes in the short term and 
relates to citizen views of government effectiveness in producing goods and services. As he 
describes, when citizens believe that their needs are being met, they are willing to extend at least 
limited support to those in office. Thus specific support is volatile and can easily be lost in times 
of economic or political crisis. On the other hand, diffuse support is more durable than specific 
support and is gained through socialization of regime norms and experience with institutions. 
This type of support can be characterized by citizen support for the regime and the principles 
associated with it such as trust and tolerance of other points of view.  
Booth and Seligson (2009) build off of Easton’s (1975) concept and show that there are 
several distinctive areas of political support. The authors note that support for democracy hinges 
on support for regime performance, political institutions, and democratic principles. 
Furthermore, legitimacy also encapsulates citizen evaluation of national and local politics and 
political actors. From Booth and Seligson’s (2009) research, we can begin to conceptualize the 
values and attitudes that lead to citizen support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Given Easton’s (1975) distinctions of diffuse and specific support, this study will use questions 
of support for democracy and democratic principles to measure diffuse support and survey 
questions regarding support for and trust in national political institutions and political actors to 
measure specific support.  
While Easton (1975) and Booth and Seligson (2009) help us to conceptualize how 
support for democracy should be measured in this study, there is still considerable debate in the 
field regarding the how these attitudes and values are formed. In one of the classic research 
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projects on the formation and importance of citizen attitudes and engagement, Almond and 
Verba (1963) show that a participant culture, one in which mass society is accepting of the 
norms of civic duty and has positive orientation toward democratic institutions, is necessary for 
democracy to work in a country. Studies such as Inglehart (1988) have furthered this argument 
by insisting that cultural values and norms can exert influence on economics and government 
structure. Inglehart (1988) contends that this influence remains even after controlling for growth 
and development (see also Inglehart and Baker 2000), The persistence of cultural zones in this 
research suggests that political attitudes are path dependent and therefore not easily changed 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000). Further examples of cultural path dependency come from Banfield 
(1958) and Putnam (1993) who show that governance in Italy is dependent on cultural norms that 
have been established and socialized over centuries.  
Although culturalist theories see regime support as exogenous and rooted in cultural 
norms that are socialized early on in life, other theories of citizen support for the political regime 
posit that support for the regime is endogenous and based on institutions performing 
satisfactorily (see Mishler and Rose 2001).  For instance, Muller and Seligson (1994) 
demonstrate continuous democratic governance has a positive and significant effect on cultural 
values rather than the other way around. Finkel and Smith (2011) also show that citizens in new 
democracies can have their attitudes and engagement influenced by civic education. 
Furthermore, Jackman and Miller (1998) note that social norms of interaction and trust are 
malleable and based on interaction with the state and other members of society (see also 
Coleman 1988).  Mishler and Rose (2001) build off of these findings and posit a theory that 
attempts to merge cultural and institutional theories of regime support. In their study, Mishler 
and Rose (2001) hypothesize that regime support is derived from a lifetime of learning about 
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politics. The authors note that interpersonal trust is developed through socialization in a person’s 
youth. The trust gained through youthful interaction is then projected onto political institutions 
and it is revised throughout a person’s lifetime as the performance is evaluated. Given this 
theory, this study views regime support as a malleable process in which socialization and 
institutional performance combine to influence support for democracy. In doing so, we can begin 
discussing the ways that mass media and the internet can influence these processes.  
Political Effects of Mass Media 
 Now that we have an understanding of the relationship between citizen attitudes and 
democracy, we can begin to explore how mass media can influence a person’s attitudes and 
opinions. Scholars of political science have devoted a great deal of research to understanding the 
political effects of mass media. Beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s advanced surveys and 
experimental research began to uncover a plethora of effects that the media has on political 
attitudes and behavior (see Robinson 1976; Erbing et al. 1980; Iyengar and Kinder 1989). In 
these studies, and the ones that followed, scholars showed that the media could influence what 
people think about (Erbing et al. 1980; Iyengar and Kinder 1989) how people consider societal 
problems and evaluate their representatives (Nelson et al. 1997; Druckman 2001; Chong and 
Druckman 2007; Iyengar and Kinder 1989; Schaffner 2005; Mendelberg 2001), their likelihood 
of participation (Martin 2008; McLeod et al. 1999), their knowledge of political events 
(Kleinnijenhuis 1991; Chaffee and Kanihan 1997), and even their attitudes and opinions (Zaller 
1992; Robinson 1976; Mutz and Reeves 2005). Despite these advances, much of the empirical 
research is devoted to studying the effects of mass media in older, more stable democracies. This 
lack of research can create difficulties in understanding the exact effects that mass media has on 
citizens in new democracies. Despite these deficiencies, this section will continue by detailing 
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the applicable literature on media effects in both new and older democracies in an attempt to 
better understand the psychological processes that allow the mass media to influence support for 
democracy.  
 From the areas outlined above, the most relevant findings from previous studies revolve 
around the media’s ability to increase political knowledge and influence their attitudes towards 
political actors and institutions. Mass media and news programming have long been considered 
as a means to increase political knowledge. As Lippmann (1922) notes, news and mass 
communication gives audiences insight into events that they cannot experience in their everyday 
lives. Furthermore, Chafee and Kanihan (1997) note that news from both newspapers and 
television can increase political knowledge. Kleinnijenhuis (1991) also shows that news from 
multiple outlets can increase political knowledge. However, in his findings, Kleinnijenhuis 
(1991) notes complex broadsheet newspapers have the greatest effects on people with more 
education, while television increased political knowledge better for people with less education. 
Other studies note that even watching soft news, or simply news that does not focus on politics 
and public policy, but rather celebrity gossip, crime dramas, disasters and other human interest 
stories, can increase political knowledge (Baum 2002; 2003) as well as political efficacy 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006). 
 While research in new democracies shows that citizens can indeed learn from mass 
media, there is concern that significant gaps in political knowledge and engagement can occur. 
For instance, McCann and Lawson (2006) show that while all citizens in new democracies 
become informed by paying attention to election campaigns, people with higher socio-economic 
status are more likely to pay attention to campaigns. Thus, people of higher socio-economic 
status are more likely to be politically knowledgeable and engaged than people with lower socio-
  23 
economic status. Furthermore, Nisbet (2008) finds that people with higher socio-economic status 
who paid attention to political media had higher political knowledge.  
 As for media’s effects on citizen engagement and attitudes, research in older democracies 
notes that mass media is not cultivating citizen engagement and fostering citizen support as it 
should be (see Blumler 1997). Beginning with Robinson (1976) media studies have debated 
whether mass media can engage citizens or if it causes malaise. In his study, Robinson (1976) 
found watching television programs that present government actions in a negative tone cause 
consumers to become less efficacious and more cynical towards political actors. He hypothesizes 
that these characteristics began with broadcast television because television tends to attract a 
large audience, and television journalists, who tend to interpret rather than present news, have a 
penchant for presenting government institutions and actors in an unnecessarily negative light. 
This negativity then spreads to other mediums, such as newspaper and radio, as they attempt to 
compete with television for audiences (Robinson 1976). Other research such as Mutz and Reeves 
(2005) finds that argumentative and contentious portrayals of political disagreement on 
television decrease efficacy and increase cynicism towards political actors and institutions. 
Furthermore, the rise of political news portrayed in a satirical manner has been shown to have 
similar effects (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).  
 Despite the amount of research devoted to media malaise, other research shows that these 
claims may be unique to the United States. Newton (1999) finds television in the United 
Kingdom has no special influence on individuals’ feelings toward government, relative to other 
mediums. He accomplishes this by showing people who use media to gather information may 
acquire different attitudes toward government than those who use mass media for entertainment 
purposes. In his findings, he notes that people who use media to seek out information are more 
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likely to have positive feelings toward government while others who use media for entertainment 
are prone to malaise, albeit weakly. Furthermore, in an analysis of five European democracies 
and the United States, Aarts et al. (2012) show that the United States is generally an outlier when 
discussing media effects in older democracies. Their study notes that the United States “stands 
out as a low-trust, low-knowledge, and low news consumption country” (Aarts et al. 2012: 117). 
Furthermore, Blumler (1997) notes that a portion of the reason that we see these findings in the 
United States is specifically due to social and political transformation in the country. Therefore, 
the findings of malaise seem to be very country and region specific and findings in the United 
States are likely to have little influence on media’s ability to socialize democratic attitudes in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
 Indeed, existing research shows that the mass media can influence citizen engagement 
and support for democracy in new democracies. While Nisbet (2008) found that attention to 
political media reinforced knowledge gaps in Mali, the exact opposite happens when he tests the 
effects of media on support for democracy. That is to say, political media increases regime 
support for people of both higher and lower socio-economic status at roughly the same rate. This 
might happen because mass media in new democracies is able to socialize “a new way of 
participating in politics and socioeconomic life, as well as encourage nationalistic pride and 
aspirations (Gross 2002; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008).  Furthermore, mass media in Central 
and Eastern Europe has been found to increase citizen engagement and efficacy (Voltmer and 
Schmitt-Beck 2006; Tworzecki and Semetko 2012; Loveless 2010).  
 While these studies offer hope that political media can socialize democratic values in 
Central and Eastern Europe, all of the above studies in new democracies look at using a medium 
to consume news rather than simple exposure. While exposure to political media can increase 
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support for the regime, it might fail to reach broad segments of society and thus only engage and 
socialize the politically interested. As Prior (2007) explains, the explosion of media choices due 
to technological innovation can lead to a large contingent of society tuning out of politics 
completely and focusing on other areas of interest such as sports and entertainment. Because of 
self-selection, it is difficult for news programming to reach broad audiences and influence their 
socio-political attitudes and political engagement. This is because news loses audiences that once 
watched political media when there was  less choice in what could be viewed on television (see 
Prior 2007; Bennett and Iyengar 2008). While some might question the relevance of these studies 
in Central and Eastern Europe, qualitative studies do note that people are checking out of 
political media in the region. Bajomi-Lazar (2012) notes that political elites have begun showing 
up on soft news and entertainment programming such as game shows and soap operas in an 
attempt to reach broader audiences. Furthermore, Salovaara-Moring (2012) shows that 
newspaper readership in the region has dropped perceptibly in recent years. Because of these 
developments, it leads us to question the effects of traditional media on large segments of 
society.  
Internet Usage and Political Attitudes 
Even though traditional mass media has been widely studied in political science, the 
political effects of the internet are relatively unknown. This is especially true in new democracies 
where survey data is sparse and experimental designs are more difficult and costly to undertake. 
As with the previous section, we will look at how the study of the political effects of the internet 
has evolved in older and new democracies. In doing so, we can begin to understand how the 
internet can influence a person’s support for democracy.  
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Although many have hoped that the internet would democratize media, thus allowing 
citizens to become more aware or, produce, and disseminate political news (see Gross 2002), 
several studies show that this has not occurred. These studies point out that while the internet 
provides the technology for a democratization of media to occur, media elites still produce the 
most politically relevant information (Hindman 2008;Farrell and Drezner 2008). In an effort to 
get noticed, some websites may focus on a more sensationalized portrait of the political world, 
producing news that is ideologically extreme in nature and focused on political scandal 
(Hindman 2008). Also of note, internet technology has been found to increase gaps in political 
knowledge. Bonfidelli’s (2002) study in Switzerland shows that the internet tends to widen the 
knowledge gap as young, well-educated males are the most likely to use the medium. While the 
internet provides an opportunity for people to become involved in politics, these studies show 
that it may have actually expanded the differences between the political haves and have-nots as 
gaps in knowledge and engagement are prominent. 
 Despite these concerns, Xenos and Moy (2007) show that online news can increase civic 
and political engagement. These findings are especially robust for people who are politically 
interested. Norris (2001) echoes this sentiment and shows that internet use increases engagement 
and trust in the politically interested. Mossberger et al. (2008) also show that online news fosters 
political discussion, increases political knowledge and stimulates political interest. Furthermore, 
while Hindman (2008) discusses that online news might skew toward the sensational in an effort 
to gain attention, Curran et al. (2013) find that this is not the case. In a comparative study, the 
authors note that online news is very similar to news in the newspaper or on television because 
media conglomerates have been extended their reach across mediums. While these findings show 
that online news could possibly increase engagement and support for the regime, they still lead to 
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the same problem discussed with news from other mediums. Once again, the explosion of 
available media allows the politically interested to become extremely informed on politics while 
others use the technology to avoid politics altogether (Prior 2007).   
However, inadvertent exposure to soft news on email hosting and social media websites 
could also provide opportunities for people to be exposed to political information when they are 
not necessarily seeking it out. In older democracies, soft news has been shown to increase 
political knowledge and help inattentive citizens vote for the political candidate that best 
represents their interests (Baum 2002; 2003; Baum and Jamison 2006). Both of these outcomes 
from soft news can aid in increasing support for democracy and democratic engagement. By 
providing citizens with the necessary information to elect leaders that represent their interests 
people can become more supportive of the regime and democracy (Anderson 2005). In Eastern 
Europe, this adds opportunity for the internet to politically inform and engage citizens as news 
portals, which garner large audiences in the region, often provide a mixture of soft news, 
political information, and entertainment along with embedded video and social networking 
features (Salovaara-Moring 2012). Given the mixture of interests on these websites along with 
direct feedback mechanisms through social media content, these websites have the opportunity to 
increase political knowledge and deliberation.   
 Though much of the extant literature has focused on how online news influences citizen 
engagement and attitudes, the internet offers far more opportunities to influence these variables 
than just news consumption. Faris and Etling (2008) discuss that the internet is unique from other 
mediums due to the interactive capabilities it possesses. Because people have the ability to 
communicate with each other online, the internet can change ties between people in society, as 
well as ties between citizens and the government (Coleman and Blumler 2009). As Parrish-
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Sprowl (2012) notes, the internet offers the unique ability for people to keep in contact with 
people that they would otherwise lose contact with, or meet people that they would have never 
met without the help of interactive technology. These findings are supported by research on the 
uses of internet, which find that people use social media to keep in touch with new friends as 
well as make new ones (Raacke and Raacke 2008; Park et al. 2009).  
  While social interaction online may seem wholly uninvolved with political engagement 
and attitudes, there are a variety of ways that this interaction can increase engagement and 
socialize democratic attitudes. By building relationships with other members of society, the 
internet may allow people to build social capital and socialize democratic norms of trust and 
tolerance Burke et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2010; Steinfield et al. 2008; Paxton 2002). This is 
important for new democracies, because social capital, once created can increase trust between 
the actors involved. Therefore, by interacting with other members of society, the internet could 
increase interpersonal trust and increase social capital, which can create open-mindedness, 
tolerance, respect for other views, and a reasoned and educated public through creation of an 
open public sphere (Paxton (2002).  
Social interaction online provides another way internet use could possibly influence 
democratic norms without people actively seeking political information. As Wojcieszak and 
Mutz (2009) note political discussion often takes place on message boards and other socially 
interactive websites where political discussion happens incidentally. Furthermore, political 
discussion on these websites are more likely to lead to political disagreement than discussion on 
message boards that are designed specifically for political discussion. This is important because 
interpersonal discussion and deliberation makes citizens informed and more likely to “agree 
about the dimensions over which they disagree” (Teorell 2006). Therefore, interaction on non-
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political message boards could increase certain democratic norms even though people are not 
searching for political information.  
 While the above studies note the theoretical ways that internet use could possibly 
influence democratic attitudes and political engagement, a few studies have directly tested the 
effects of the internet on democratic attitudes in new democracies. Most notably, Nisbet et al. 
(2012) find internet use increases demand for democracy in Africa and Asia. However, they also 
find that this effect disappears once democratization occurs. Therefore, in their study, the internet 
could be seen as increasing support for democracy during democratization, but not during 
consolidation. This is an interesting finding considering most democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe are consolidating democracy as the quick social and political upheaval occurred in the 
1990’s. While the findings from Nisbet et al. (2012) provide this study with examples of the 
internet increasing demands for democracy, there is still an absence of findings in countries 
attempting to consolidate democracy.  
 From the above discussion we can see that the internet has several pathways to influence 
support fro democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Most notably, we can see that the internet 
provides some different characteristics that are not available through traditional media. While 
news is available online as well as through traditional media, traditional media does not provide 
the interactive capabilities that make immediate feedback possible. Furthermore, traditional 
media do not allow for social interaction. The internet has the ability to change interpersonal 
communication through social media and other online communities. In doing so it allows people 
to retain communication with acquaintances that they would otherwise lose touch with, as well 
as meet people they never would if it were not for the internet (Parrish-Sprowl 2012; Coleman 
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and Blumler 2009). Because of these unique attributes the internet possesses, it has the ability to 
influence democracy in ways that traditional media does not. 
A Theory of Internet Use and Support for Democracy 
 The previous literature points to two possible pathways to influence support for 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The first is through providing increased political 
knowledge through online news. This is a familiar route of influence for studies of mass media 
and politics as studies have mostly focused on the ability of news to influence attitudes and 
behavior. While studies of the effects of news on attitudes are not new or novel, the internet can 
possibly influence attitudes toward democracy through its ability to inform the public. As 
Newton (1999) shows, people who consume news regardless of medium saw an increase in 
political knowledge and understanding, as well as trust in government. Specifically, by 
increasing political knowledge and perhaps interest (see Mossberger et al. 2008), the internet can 
provide the public with the knowledge and ability to elect leaders that best represent their 
interests. This should aid in increasing specific support for the regime as being supportive of 
politicians in office can change how people evaluate government performance (Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Anderson 2005). 
Additionally, the internet offers immediate feedback loops to media, politicians, and 
other members of society (Coleman and Blumler (2009). This increases the chances for the 
internet to increase support for democracy as it creates an open space for deliberation and 
competition. As Coleman and Blumler (2009) note, the most legitimate actions taken by 
government are the ones that are understood and accepted by the public. By providing an open 
space, which encourages public interaction and offers information on government action, online 
news could help individuals evaluate the best arguments for political action and express their 
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preferences relating to these options (Norris 2001; Coleman and Blumler 2009). By lowering 
costs to deliberation and providing information, it is possible that online news could increase 
inclusiveness and thus support for government action.  
Furthermore, online news can contribute to specific and diffuse support through teaching 
citizens about the norms and procedures of democratic society (Chafee et al. 1970; Adoni 1979). 
As Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) note, mass media can be tied to banal nationalism, which 
elicits feelings of community and provides information in national frames of reference. In doing 
so the media can aid in socializing feelings of political community and connectedness. As Booth 
and Seligson (2009) note feeling of political community is one of the most basic forms of 
legitimacy, and influences citizen demand for democracy. Thus through increasing feelings of 
interconnectedness, online news and its ability to socialize political attitudes can increase diffuse 
support for democracy.  
The other path that mass media has to influence support for democracy is through social 
interaction online. While the above discussed the ability of online news to increase deliberation 
through interactivity on news websites (see also Salovaara-Moring 2012), this section will 
outline how purely social interaction online can lead to increased support for democratic 
governance. As stated previously, the main distinguishing factor between the internet and 
traditional media is the interactive capabilities that are provided by internet technology. This is 
an important distinction as interaction online has the ability to transform how and with whom 
people interact. Studies of the internet have posited that the internet and social media can lead to 
the retention of old ties as well as the ability to interact with people who they never would have 
met if it were not for the internet (Parrish-Sprowl 2012; Raacke and Raacke 2008). Take for 
example the case of netmums.com as discussed in Coleman and Blumler (2009). The authors 
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describe the website as a meeting place for mothers in which they receive “parenting advice from 
others, can discuss personal problems, and possibly become friends” (Ibid. 129). This is simply 
one example of the manner in which the internet can provide a forum for discussion and create 
unique opportunities for people bound by common experiences to interact.  
While discussion on forums and social media may be apolitical in nature, it does provide 
the opportunity to socialize democratic values. Specifically, social media has the ability to 
socialize diffuse support through building social capital and socializing societal norms (Burke et 
al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2010; Steinfield et al. 2008). As Coleman (1988) notes, social interaction 
can increase trust through creating incentives for people to be trustworthy. Through this and 
building social interaction online, the internet could possibly build social capital. As Paxton 
(2002) notes, this can create open-mindedness, tolerance, respect for other views, and a reasoned 
and educated public. Thus by building social capital, social interaction online can increase 
democratic norms such as tolerance and trust in other members of society.  
Social interaction also has the ability to influence specific support for democracy through 
inadvertently exposing people to civic and political information online. Much in the same way 
that social media can revolutionize feedback mechanisms in online news, online political 
information can easily be shared through social media platforms. Furthermore, evidence points to 
the likelihood that political discussion and the dissemination of political information can occur 
on socially interactive websites that are made for other purposes (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). 
Furthermore, these websites lead to political deliberation (Ibid.), which can make people more 
tolerant of other viewpoints (Teorell 2006).  
Though much of the literature cited here comes from advanced democracies, this study 
believes that the internet can influence support for democracy in new democracies because many 
  33 
of the causal mechanisms remain the same regardless of region. Most importantly, the ability of 
the internet to offer both information as well as social interaction remains the same in new and 
old democracies. Therefore, through social interaction and increased information, it is expected 
that the internet will be able to disseminate social norms and direct the way that political 
interaction should occur in a democratic society.  
To test the effects of the internet on support for democracy in the following chapters, we 
will use common measures of specific support such as trust in and satisfaction with government, 
as well as prospective evaluations of the direction of the country. Furthermore, the available data 
allows us to test the effects of the internet on measures of regime performance such as current 
and prospective evaluations of the economy (see Booth and Seligson 2009).  As Rose and 
Mishler (1994) note, prospective evaluations are important in new democracies are important 
because they signal that people are committed to the democratic regime, even if the current 
conditions do not warrant specific support. Furthermore, evaluations of the economy may be of 
utmost importance in Central and Eastern Europe as those who are discontented with the market 
economy could become more nostalgic for communism (Eckman and Linde 2005). As noted 
above, the internet is expected to influence these measures of specific support through producing 
political information that people can consume. Also it is expected that social interaction and 
interaction with political elites can disseminate norms of political conduct in democratic 
societies.  
As for diffuse support, this study utilizes measures of trust in others, satisfaction with 
democracy and tolerance of homosexuals and immigrants. Trust in others is often seen as an 
important societal norm in democratic societies as it shows that trustworthy interaction and 
norms of reciprocity are present (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). Furthermore, measures of 
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tolerance show whether or not internet users are more accepting of social out-groups and 
different lifestyles. This is important in democratic societies as it shows citizen support for 
inclusiveness and minority rights, which is a key tenant of democratic governance and society 
(Dahl 1956; 1971). Finally measures of support for democracy can signal support for democratic 
governance in one’s country and can signal support for the regime and its principles. It is 
expected that the internet should increase these measures of diffuse support through social 
interaction online and the dissemination of societal norms. By fostering interaction between 
people, it is possible that the internet can facilitate trustworthy interaction, which has been shown 
to increase trust and social capital (Coleman 1988). Furthermore, this interaction can breed 
tolerance as social capital can lead to open-mindedness (Paxton 2002). As discussed earlier, 
simple interaction can disseminate democratic norms such as inclusiveness that can perhaps 
support tolerance. Because of interaction online, it is expected that the internet can indeed 
increase diffuse support for democracy.     
Conclusion 
The previous sections outlined several distinct areas of political science that are relevant 
to this study. In doing so, this chapter has outlined how this study builds off of previous studies 
relating to the effects of mass media, and presents a theory of how internet use can increase 
citizen support for democracy. The coming chapters will build off of these expectations and 
empirically test them using data from Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey. Through 
these empirical tests, this study hopes to provide insight into how the internet can aid democratic 
consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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CHAPTER III: INTERNET USE AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the technological change in communication 
offered by the internet comes at an interesting time in the history of Central and Eastern Europe. 
At a time when democracy is consolidating in the region, the internet provides a new way for 
citizens to seek information and interact with other citizens and political elites (see Faris and 
Etling 2008; Coleman and Blumler 2009; Parrish-Sprowl 2012; Bajomi-Lazar 2012). Chapter 
Three seeks to build off of the previous literature and theory outlined in Chapter Two, and 
empirically test five hypotheses. In doing so, it seeks to advance our basic knowledge of internet 
use’s impact on a person’s support for democracy. From what we learn in this chapter, we can 
further explore the relationships between the use of certain websites and support for democracy 
in later chapters. Thus, the findings in this chapter will help to hone the previous outlined theory 
into more nuanced hypotheses.   
 As Chapter Two explains, the variety of uses provided by the internet allows for a new 
theory of usage’s effect on attitudes toward government.  While studies of older forms of mass 
media focus on information seeking behavior leads to higher levels of trust, efficacy and support 
for the political system (see Newton 1999; Banducci and Karp 2003; Loveless 2010), this study 
posits that information seeking behavior is not necessary to see higher support for democracy in 
people who use the internet. This is because soft news and social interaction online can provide 
inadvertent exposure to politically relevant information. While later chapters will directly test 
this notion, this chapter looks to understand whether or not general internet use influences a 
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person’s support for democracy. Furthermore, this chapter looks to how internet use compares to 
consuming news using other mediums. Finally, this chapter looks at the conditional effects that 
education has on internet use’s effect on democratic values. 
 From the previous literature we can gather that people learn political preferences and 
attitudes, and that these preferences and attitudes can change through acquiring information 
(Downs 1957; Zaller 1992;Chaffee and Kanihan 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001; Coleman 1988). 
As Chapter Two notes, online news can provide political information and increase political 
knowledge (see also Kenski and Stroud 2006). Because of this, the internet has the possibility to 
increase internal efficacy (Kenski and Stroud 2006) through making political decision making 
less complex, and specific support by allowing citizens to hold elected leaders accountable and 
electing parties and elites that best reflect their interests. Additionally, news and mass media can 
also increase specific support through disseminating social norms of how political conflict is to 
be conducted (Gross 2002). This would allow the internet to build diffuse support through 
buildings ideas of political community and forming individual and national ambitions in 
democratic society (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Gross 2002).  
 While online news should influence efficacy and support for democracy through 
informing citizens, social interaction online should also increase regime support. Because the 
internet provides the ability to connect with other members of society, it provides a participatory 
form of media that leads to differences between it and other forms of media. One way that the 
internet differs from older media is that can alter vertical relationships of governance, between 
citizens and political actors, as well as horizontal relationships where citizens interact with one 
another (Faris and Etling 2008; Coleman and Blumler 2009). To understand how internet use 
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affects a person’s support for democracy, we must understand how social interaction makes the 
internet unique as a tool of political communication. 
The first relationship that internet use has the potential to alter is the vertical relationship 
between government and governed.  As Coleman and Blumler (2009) discuss, the internet can be 
used by political elites to better engage citizens and offer them the chance to voice their concerns 
and political preferences to others. This in turn produces feelings that citizens are better 
represented, which can increase system support (Booth and Seligson 2009). Furthermore, the 
decreased gap between preferences of citizens and the actions of representatives could help 
increase support for government action. As Coleman and Blumler (2009) note, democratic 
debate that includes both the mass public and political elites can produce democratically 
legitimate policies. By decreasing the costs of communication and participation, the internet can 
increase opportunities for the public to give feedback to political elites and for political elites to 
contact constituents. Thus, by creating a civic space to discuss politics and influence political 
decisions, online interaction should be able to increase specific support for the regime. 
As mentioned earlier, online interaction can also change the ways that citizens interact 
with one another. As Parrish-Sprowl (2012) notes interaction online is different than offline 
interaction because it can connect people who never would have met if it were not for the 
internet. In doing so, the internet may provide opportunities for people to expand their own 
political and social networks and worldview. Indeed, Brundridge and Rice (2009) note the 
internet allows for greater number of connections by weakening social, political and ideological 
boundaries. This weakening of social boundaries allows people to create weak ties in which they 
may be exposed to more heterogeneous political discussion (Ibid.; Granovetter 1973). Because of 
the inadvertent exposure from social connections, the internet makes it harder to tune out of 
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politics, even if a person is not actively seeking information. Furthermore, even for citizens who 
have ideological leanings, heterogeneous political discussion has been shown to lead to a greater 
understanding of their own beliefs, as well as the beliefs of others (Mutz 2002). This also leads 
to individuals who take part in these discussions to also become more tolerant (Ibid.)  
Furthermore, just through simple interaction people can be come more trusting of others. 
As Coleman (1988) notes, social interaction leads to incentives for being trustworthy. Even if 
social trust is simply inherent to democratic societies as some studies argue (see Muller and 
Seligson 1994), the internet can increase trust through disseminating this value through 
communicative channels. Because of the increased interaction between members of society, it 
seems likely that the internet can build social capital (Burke et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2010; 
Steinfield et al. 2008) or at the very least socialize democratic values by disseminating the norms 
of democratic society. From the above discussion, we can offer the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Individuals that use the internet will have higher levels of specific support for 
democratic governance than people who do not use the internet.  
Hypothesis 3.2: Individuals that use the internet will have higher levels of diffuse support for 
democratic governance than people who do not use the internet.  
 
To measure the effectiveness of the internet on increasing citizen engagement, we will 
also test the effect of the internet on internal efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to a person’s 
feeling of competence when considering political options or making political decisions. While 
increases in internal efficacy are usually associated with exposure to political information in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Loveless 2010), it is expected that general internet use will have a 
similar effect. This is because the internet once again offers several ways to increase efficacy. 
The most obvious is exposure to political information online. Several studies have shown that 
exposure to political information, regardless of medium, increases political efficacy, so we 
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should expect the internet to be no different (Loveless 2010; Kenski and Stroud 2006). 
Therefore, when people are exposed to new information online, they should see increases in 
political knowledge and become more comfortable with their political decision-making.  
Furthermore, it may be that the internet can increase political knowledge and efficacy 
inadvertently. As Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) discuss, political discussion can often occur on 
websites where politics are not the main focus. More evidence of inadvertent exposure to politics 
online comes from Salovaara-Moring (2012). She notes that Eastern Europeans spend an average 
of 30 minutes a day on social networking websites, while only 10 to 15 minutes seeking 
information from commercial media online. She iterates that most of the time on commercial 
news websites is spent in news portals, which emphasize a mixture of entertainment, gossip, and 
other soft news stories. While it may be troubling to think of citizens opting out of hard news for 
more entertainment based media, it has been shown that citizens can be socialized by, and 
actually learn from this type of media (Baum and Jennings 2006; Baum 2003). This is especially 
true for politically inattentive individuals (Ibid.). Because of the opportunities for the internet to 
increase efficacy for both the politically attentive and possibly the inattentive, we can offer the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.3: Individuals that use the internet will have higher levels of internal efficacy than 
people who do not use the internet.  
 
 
As Ball-Rokeach and DeFluer(1976) point out, a key aspect of witnessing media effects 
is the media system, which changes along with society and technological advancement. 
Therefore as new technology begins to take the role of information dissemination, we can see 
different cognitive, affective and behavioral effects than occurred from the use of previous 
mediums. As discussed throughout in this study, the internet offers a vast change in the 
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interaction between individual and medium. While individuals may attempt to tune out of 
politics by using the internet for entertainment, there are several ways in which democratic 
values can be socialized. Furthermore, the internet offers several ways to affect a person’s 
feelings of political community (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008), and evaluations of government 
through soft news (Salovaara-Moring 2013) and inadvertent exposure to political discourse on 
websites where political discussion is not the chief goal (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). Because 
of the internet’s ability to be used for an array of purposes, it should provide outlets to become 
socialized to political regimes, and provide a sense of community by allowing people who may 
never actually meet interact with each other in virtual spaces (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). Because of 
this interactive nature the internet should allow a variety of ways to have their views on 
government and democracy influenced by other people or political actors. As this literature 
shows, information seeking or news consumption may not be a necessary requirement for the 
internet to socialize support for democracy. This is in stark contrast from research on traditional 
mediums, as they take news consumption as a necessary condition for mass media to influence 
political attitudes and behavior (see Newton 1999; Loveless 2010; Nisbit 2008). Because the 
internet allows for inadvertent exposure to political and societal content, it is expected that 
people who use the internet will have similar levels of support for democratic governance as 
those who use other mediums to seek out political information.   
Hypothesis 3.4: General internet use will have similar effects on a person’s attitudes toward 
democracy as consuming news from other mediums. 
 
 While a null finding is not interesting in many circumstances, this study provides a rare 
occurrence when it is. The previous literature on how mass media use and education interact to 
influence citizen attitudes and engagement has often been portrayed in two ways. In the first 
portrayal the internet is able to close the knowledge gap and engage citizens regardless of 
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socioeconomic status (Mossberger et al. 2008; Dahlgreen 2005). In this conceptualization, the 
internet is seen as a great equalizer between the politically engaged and disengaged. The other 
portrayal disagrees with this notion, and depicts the internet as another medium that reinforces 
the previous structure between the political haves and have-nots (DiMaggio et al. 2001;Farrell 
and Drezner 2008; Hindman 2008; Bonfidelli 2002; Norris 2001). While each side has found 
support for their arguments, most of these studies have focused on the impact of political 
information on political engagement. What these studies miss is the ability of internet use to 
effect a person’s political preferences inadvertently. As discussed earlier this can happen through 
social discussion on websites not specifically meant for political discussion (Wojcieszak and 
Mutz 2009) or possibly through soft news (Baum 2002;2003). Because of this function, this 
study posits the internet can indeed close the gap between people with higher or lower 
educational attainment.   
Hypothesis 3.5:  People with more education that use the internet will not have greater support 
for democracy than people with less education who use the internet.  
 
Data and Methods 
 The data used for this chapter come from the European Social Survey. The data were 
collected across Europe in five bi-annual waves between 2002 and 2010. This study omits all 
countries in Western Europe and uses surveys collected from ten post-communist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe7. These time-series, cross-sectional data give us the opportunity to 
uncover the effects of internet use on democratic values across different time periods, as well as 
across regime type. The variation across time and country is important because patterns of use 
could produce different outcomes. Theoretically, we could see more pronounced effects as time 
                                                 
7 The countries included in the study are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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goes on due to more access to the internet as more people will be using the medium. 
Furthermore, we may see different effects in democratic values across countries, as the path to 
democracy has varied across the region (see Wolchick and Curry 2011). One of the key aspects 
to this dataset is that it contains the opportunity to test these effects on a variety of measurements 
pertaining to support for democracy. While other data in new democracies may have questions 
about support for democracy, or broad questions about media use, this data is distinct in that it 
contains data on a person’s use of specific mediums, including measures for news consumption 
and general use. Thus it offers the opportunity to test the effects of internet use on democratic 
values in new democracies in relation to consuming news from traditional media. 
Although survey data provides researchers the ability to directly test the effects of 
internet use on democratic values, it does present some methodological challenges. The use of 
survey data to test the effect of media use on democratic values can be difficult as socio-
economic status can influence whether or not a person uses a certain medium (see Bonfidelli 
2002). Since internet use is far from universal in the region, we can add robustness to the 
findings by performing entropy balancing before executing the Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) 
regressions. Entropy balancing, a statistical matching program developed by Jens Hainmueller 
(2012), allows researchers to control for confounding factors that may influence statistical 
findings by utilizing a maximum entropy reweighting scheme. The entropy reweighting scheme 
weights a treatment and control group whose mean, variance, and skewness are balanced based 
on the covariates specified by the researcher. This is an important distinction as entropy 
balancing allows researchers to not have to rely on the parametric assumptions of OLS to ensure 
that the regression results are valid. In doing so, entropy balancing fits the Rubin causal model, 
which provides insight into dealing with observational data where we cannot assume that 
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assignment of treatment is unbiased. By matching on observable data, we can thus add 
robustness to empirical findings as matching reduces bias that is inherent to survey research and 
provides an effective way to deal with outliers by giving them little to no weight in regression 
estimation.  
While entropy balancing is a new tool in statistical research, the concept of reweighting 
statistical models is nothing new to the discipline. As Jasjeet (2009) explains, such 
methodological approaches are useful for researchers when a laboratory or natural experiment is 
unavailable. By using survey-reweighting schemes, researchers can add robustness to their 
findings by controlling for exogenous factors beyond the simple specification of regression 
equations. This is because reweighting schemes, such as propensity score matching and entropy 
balancing, create equal treatment and control groups for a binary variable such as internet use. 
Specifically entropy balancing creates equalizes treatment and control groups based on variables 
that could influence a person’s likelihood of being in the treatment or control group before 
reweighting. For instance, it has been found that age may influence a person’s likelihood of 
using the internet. In a normal survey we may see the mean age of people who use the internet is 
significantly lower than the mean age of people who do not use the internet. By utilizing entropy 
balancing, we can statistically reweight the data so that the mean, as well as skewness and 
variance, of age are equal for both treatment and control group.  
 While entropy balancing is similar to other matching methods, it also contains several 
advantages over the competition. First of all, the process for using entropy balancing is more 
automated than that of propensity score matching. While propensity score matching presents 
researchers with the tedious task of propensity score modeling, matching, and balance checking, 
entropy balancing simplifies the process by directly incorporating covariate balance into the 
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weighting applied to the sample (Hainmueller 2012). Therefore, this process eliminates the need 
for balance checking and prevents the addition of new covariates from altering the balance of 
other covariates. In doing so, entropy balancing “effectively adjusts for systematic and random 
inequalities in representation” (Hainmueller 2012, 26). This leads to another advantage that 
entropy balancing has over other matching models. By balancing and reweighting based on the 
mean, variance, and skewness of the specified covariates, entropy balancing retains data that 
would be discarded in nearest neighbor matching methods. This is because entropy balancing 
reweights samples appropriately to achieve balance, but also keeps the match as close to the base 
weight as possible to retain valuable information (Hainmueller 2012). In doing so, entropy 
balancing allows researchers to effectively deal with outliers while retaining as much direct 
information from the survey as possible.  
 In the following empirical analysis this study will utilize entropy balancing and balance 
on internet use. This is to say that it will create a treatment group made of people who responded 
that they do use the internet and a control group of people who do not use the internet. This 
group will be balance on socio-economic variables that have been shown to influence a person’s 
likelihood of using the internet or other variables that could mediate the effects of the internet on 
support for democracy that are unlikely to be caused by using the internet. The variables that 
internet use is balanced on in the European Social Survey data are a person’s religiosity, political 
ideology, education, age, gender, and where applicable, income. The regression estimates of 
these socioeconomic variables are therefore meaningless in the subsequent tables, but by 
balancing on these variables the study can provide more robust estimations of the variables of 
interest to this study.  
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Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in this chapter are eight values that measure a citizen’s specific 
and diffuse support for democracy in their country as well as the respondent’s belief that they 
can make complicated political decisions within the system. All of the variables have been 
normalized on a 100-point scale to eliminate mathematical unit effects that can distort analytical 
results and interfere with comparability across dependent variables (see Booth and Seligson 
2009). This change is simply cosmetic in nature and is done to aid in comparison across datasets 
as measures of the same concept have different ranges.  Providing a stable measure for the 
dependent variables across chapters should aid in comparing the effects of the internet generally 
to the effects of certain websites in the subsequent chapters.  
 The measure for internal efficacy comes from two survey questions detailing a person’s 
feelings about the ease in which they making political decisions and how complicated politics is 
to them. These two questions are then added together to create a scale (alpha = .66). The 
measurement ranges zero for individuals who have the lowest efficacy and one hundred for 
individuals with the highest. For measuring diffuse support, this study relies on measures of 
tolerance of other members of society, support for democracy and trust in people. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, the measures regarding trust and tolerance relate to diffuse support in that they 
offer insights into how people view other members of society and how they relate these feelings 
to overall measures of political community (see Booth and Seligson 2009). Furthermore, the 
direct measure of satisfaction with democracy should directly tap into an individual’s views on 
democratic institutions and governance.  
  The measures of tolerance measure a person’s tolerance of homosexuals and immigrants. A 
respondent’s tolerance of homosexuals comes from one question in the survey that asks if a 
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person agrees with the sentiment that homosexuals should be free to live their lives as they wish. 
A person’s tolerance of immigrants comes from a scale of three questions detailing whether 
respondents felt immigrants made their country, its economy, and culture better or worse (alpha 
= .85). The scale measuring trust in people was also created from three original survey questions 
that asked whether people could be trusted, if other people try to take advantage of you, and if 
other people are helpful (alpha = .76). The final measure of diffuse support, satisfaction with 
democracy, comes from a survey question that asks how satisfied a respondent is with the way 
democracy works in their country. Together, these variables outline a person’s diffuse support 
for democracy by measuring support for democratic principles of freedom, tolerance, and 
political community, as well as a direct measure of a respondent’s views of the democratic 
regime in their country.  
While the above variables will allow us to analyze internet use’s effect on diffuse support 
for democracy, this study also employs several dependent variables of specific support for the 
regime. As other studies of regime legitimacy note, these variables measure citizen views of 
government performance (Easton 1975; Booth and Seligson 2009). The first measure of specific 
support this study utilizes is trust in government. This variable is a scale that measures a person’s 
trust in their country’s parliament, police, legal system, politicians, and political parties (alpha = 
.89). The other two measure of specific support deal with a person’s satisfaction with 
government and the economy. These two measures come from survey questions asking how 
satisfied a person is with their national government and economy.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
Deviation N 
      
Efficacy 46.89 23.14 46,526  
      
Trust in 
Government 32.94 20.58 56,712  
      
Satisfaction 
With 
Government 35.33 24.75 65,513  
      
Satisfaction 
With the 
Economy 34.19 ` 22.69 66,176  
      
Satisfaction 
With 
Democracy 40.35 24.42 63,547 
      
Trust in People 43.35 20.42 66,685 
      
Tolerance of 
Homosexuals 53.49 32.08 61,498 
      
Tolerance of 
Immigrants 46.1 21.63 56,781 
 
Independent Variables 
 The main independent variable used in this study is internet use. The variable comes from 
a survey question asking how often an individual uses the internet for personal use. The seven-
point scale of use was then recoded to a binomial measure detailing whether person uses or does 
not use the internet. Once again this is done because of constraints of measurement across 
datasets and across measures of media use in the European Social Survey. Although the 
European Social Survey measures internet use and use of other mediums on a seven point scale, 
the scale measures of time spent using the medium differently for the internet and traditional 
media. Traditional media are all measured in the amount of time spent using the media in a day, 
whereas internet use is measured in time frames such as once a month, weekly, etc. Because of 
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these discrepancies it is best to recode so that all measures of media use will be on the same scale 
so we can interpret the effects of the medium on support for democracy. Thus, when we look at 
how internet use compares to consuming news from other mediums, all measures of news 
consumption will be coded binomially.  
Table 3.2: Usage Summary of Mass Media In Central and Eastern Europe  
  Use  Do Not Use 
      
Internet 42,230 26,230 
  61.7% 38.3% 
     
Radio News 40,665  7,523  
  84.4% 15.6% 
     
Newspaper 38,593 9,027 
  81% 19% 
     
Television  61,244  4,509  
 News 93.1% 6.9% 
 
 
 While internet use is the main independent variable tested for many of the hypotheses, an 
interaction term will be utilized to test Hypothesis 3.5. The interaction term education*internet 
use was created by multiplying a person’s level of education with their internet use. By utilizing 
the interaction term, this study can observe the conditional effects of education on internet use’s 
ability to affect a person’s support for democracy.  
Aside from the main independent variables in this study, this study controls for a variety 
of factors that could also influence a person’s diffuse and specific support for democracy. The 
first group of control variables allows us to control for socio-economic status. This group of 
control variables control for the effects of a person’s age, age squared, gender, income, education 
and religiosity. A person’s age is measured using an interval variable that reports the age of a 
respondent, while age squared is the square of a respondent’s age. The variable women measures 
a person’s gender and is coded zero for men and one for women. Measurement for the variable 
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income is coded in two different ways. Between 2002 and 2006, survey respondents were asked 
to place their household’s annual income related to other families in society. In this measure, 
respondents place their income in a range of every tenth percentile resulting in a zero-to-nine 
scale. In 2008 and 2010, respondents were asked to identify their annual household income in a 
range of actual Euros that were earned, which results in an 11-point scale. Education is measured 
on a five-point scale detailing the level of education that a respondent has attained. Finally, 
religiosity is a zero-to-ten scale detailing how religious a person is.  
  The second group of control variables covers a person’s relationship with politics. These 
variables include measures of political interest, ideology, and whether or not a person is a 
member of a political party. The measurement for political interest ranges from zero to three 
where a coding of zero means that a person is not at all interested in politics and three denotes 
that a person is highly interested in politics. A person’s ideology is measured on zero-to-ten scale 
where an answer of zero means that a person’s ideology is far to the left and an answer of ten 
means their ideology is far right. Partisanship is a dummy variable in which a person belonging 
to a political party is coded as one and not belonging to a political party is coded as zero.  
The study’s third group of control variables covers country and year effects that can 
influence a person’s diffuse and specific support for democracy. These dummy variables cover 
each country and year in the study. By controlling for these factors, we can better view the true 







Table 3.3: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         
Internet Use 4.589*** 1.268*** 1.570*** 3.383*** 3.149*** 3.046*** 5.191*** 4.365*** 
 (0.270) (0.235) (0.273) (0.245) (0.269) (0.224) (0.349) (0.241) 
Political  9.040*** 3.049*** 2.260*** 0.799*** 1.808*** 1.205*** 1.130*** 1.858*** 
Interest (0.135) (0.116) (0.135) (0.121) (0.133) (0.110) (0.173) (0.120) 
Education 3.256*** 0.208** 0.376*** 1.052*** 0.489*** 1.371*** 1.563*** 1.714*** 
 (0.106) (0.0922) (0.107) (0.0963) (0.106) (0.0878) (0.139) (0.0958) 
Women -5.916*** 1.912*** 0.735*** 0.0849 0.157 1.373*** 5.658*** 0.276 
 (0.213) (0.186) (0.215) (0.193) (0.211) (0.176) (0.276) (0.191) 
Religion -0.557*** 0.881*** 0.705*** 0.481*** 0.610*** 0.378*** -3.265*** -0.0774 
 (0.0790) (0.0691) (0.0800) (0.0717) (0.0787) (0.0652) (0.102) (0.0713) 
Partisanship 3.294*** 3.666*** 2.360*** 0.00816 0.512 0.0814 -2.119*** -1.113** 
 (0.527) (0.453) (0.532) (0.476) (0.522) (0.436) (0.684) (0.468) 
Ideology 0.158*** 0.563*** 0.762*** 0.880*** 1.287*** 0.382*** -0.169*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0394) (0.0455) (0.0408) (0.0447) (0.0372) (0.0586) (0.0408) 
Age 0.123*** -0.408*** -0.326*** -0.501*** -0.524*** -0.229*** 0.0193 -0.115*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0297) (0.0343) (0.0308) (0.0338) (0.0280) (0.0441) (0.0305) 
Constant 37.41*** 21.41*** 31.02*** 26.44*** 30.69*** 31.22*** 66.25*** 52.03*** 
 (0.992) (0.830) (0.995) (0.893) (0.980) (0.813) (1.284) (0.893) 
         
Observations 35,604 43,591 50,166 50,473 49,664 50,438 47,776 44,856 
R-squared 0.232 0.116 0.083 0.122 0.091 0.065 0.136 0.122 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
8 Entropy balancing not used before this analysis. 
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 Table 3.3 shows us the impact that internet use has on democratic values in Central and 
Eastern Europe. One of the first things to notice is that internet use has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on all the dependent variables. Furthermore, we can see that internet use tends 
to have the most profound effects on measures of diffuse support for democracy. Internet use 
also tends to increase internal efficacy. Although the beta-coefficients reported for internet use’s 
effect on trust in and satisfaction with government are substantively less than the medium’s 
effect on other democratic values, the effect is still positive and significant. While these findings 
provide some insight into internet uses influence on a person’s feelings towards government and 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe we must delve deeper to understand how these effects 






Table 3.4: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy After Entropy Balance Reweighting9 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















         
Internet Use 4.940*** 1.187*** 1.562*** 3.333*** 3.120*** 2.836*** 5.352*** 4.266*** 
 (0.260) (0.229) (0.263) (0.239) (0.263) (0.216) (0.337) (0.234) 
Political  8.764*** 3.215*** 2.584*** 1.031*** 2.021*** 1.192*** 0.856*** 1.975*** 
Interest (0.150) (0.128) (0.149) (0.135) (0.149) (0.122) (0.191) (0.132) 
Education 2.573*** 0.595*** 0.662*** 1.551*** 1.063*** 1.414*** 1.275*** 1.762*** 
 (0.126) (0.107) (0.124) (0.113) (0.125) (0.102) (0.160) (0.111) 
Women -5.969*** 1.798*** 0.797*** -0.387* -0.464** 1.445*** 5.941*** 0.144 
 (0.227) (0.198) (0.229) (0.208) (0.230) (0.188) (0.294) (0.204) 
Religion -0.505*** 1.036*** 0.759*** 0.375*** 0.712*** 0.409*** -3.443*** -0.0192 
 (0.0902) (0.0786) (0.0906) (0.0822) (0.0907) (0.0742) (0.116) (0.0807) 
Partisanship 3.053*** 3.753*** 2.283*** 0.252 1.453** 0.0331 -0.362 -0.505 
 (0.602) (0.511) (0.600) (0.545) (0.601) (0.494) (0.771) (0.532) 
Ideology 0.199*** 0.677*** 0.894*** 0.960*** 1.319*** 0.399*** -0.241*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0453) (0.0522) (0.0474) (0.0523) (0.0429) (0.0671) (0.0469) 
Age 0.136*** -0.386*** -0.357*** -0.518*** -0.445*** -0.335*** -0.0460 -0.0935** 
 (0.0477) (0.0409) (0.0470) (0.0428) (0.0472) (0.0386) (0.0606) (0.0420) 
Constant 38.70*** 19.67*** 29.00*** 25.63*** 28.07*** 32.27*** 70.65*** 51.27*** 
 (1.151) (0.964) (1.141) (1.039) (1.144) (0.937) (1.467) (1.026) 
         
Observations 30,523 36,549 41,676 42,119 41,461 41,873 40,439 38,091 
R-squared 0.201 0.120 0.100 0.126 0.091 0.060 0.109 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
9 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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The findings in Table 3.4 add robustness to the findings from Table 3.3.This is because 
the data used was reweighted using entropy balancing before performing the OLS regression. As 
mentioned earlier, entropy balancing to add robustness to the study by adjusting for over- or 
underrepresentation of socio-economic groups that occur in survey samples. Entropy balancing 
achieves this by allowing researchers to create treatment and control groups within surveys by 
weighting each group based on covariates specified by the researcher (Hainmuller 2012). While 
this may not completely erase all doubt that internet use causes a change in a person’s views on 
democracy, entropy balancing does help by allowing researchers to add robustness to their 
regression estimates by controlling for outliers before performing a regression.  
In Table 3.4, the treatment and control groups were created based on whether or not a 
person uses or does not use the internet. As mentioned earlier, the sample was balanced on 
various measures of socio-economic status and political identity. After the survey groups were 
reweighted we still see very similar results as those in Table 3.3. Once again, internet use has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on all of the dependent variables. Internet use also has 
the most substantial effect on measures of diffuse support for democracy along with internal 
efficacy and satisfaction with the economy. While internet use has a positive and significant 
effect on trust in and satisfaction with government, these effects are once again, weaker than the 





Table 3.5: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy: Years 2002-200610 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 4.343*** 0.783 0.801 3.154*** 2.610*** 3.599*** 5.044*** 5.370*** 
 (0.450) (0.480) (0.496) (0.465) (0.498) (0.415) (0.627) (0.426) 
Income 0.579*** 0.184 0.744*** 1.181*** 0.902*** 0.758*** 0.392** 0.697*** 
 (0.135) (0.147) (0.148) (0.139) (0.149) (0.124) (0.188) (0.127) 
Political  8.139*** 2.824*** 1.334*** 1.578*** 1.785*** 1.060*** 0.918** 2.630*** 
Interest (0.297) (0.310) (0.326) (0.304) (0.327) (0.272) (0.411) (0.279) 
Education 3.062*** 1.086*** 1.366*** 2.205*** 1.412*** 1.207*** 0.876*** 1.633*** 
 (0.239) (0.254) (0.264) (0.247) (0.265) (0.221) (0.334) (0.227) 
Women -6.526*** 0.585 -0.690 -0.987** -1.816*** 0.630 6.733*** -0.933** 
 (0.441) (0.467) (0.487) (0.456) (0.489) (0.407) (0.615) (0.418) 
Religion -0.844*** 1.186*** 0.807*** 0.184 0.279 0.709*** -4.382*** -0.175 
 (0.169) (0.178) (0.186) (0.174) (0.187) (0.155) (0.235) (0.159) 
Partisanship 4.152*** 3.955*** 0.275 0.440 -0.935 0.274 1.104 -1.674 
 (1.211) (1.323) (1.348) (1.265) (1.354) (1.133) (1.714) (1.142) 
Ideology 0.0783 0.208** -0.0156 0.728*** 1.042*** 0.245*** -0.467*** -0.0219 
 (0.0985) (0.105) (0.109) (0.102) (0.109) (0.0909) (0.138) (0.0942) 
Age 0.195** -0.471*** -0.506*** -0.742*** -0.491*** -0.590*** -0.00437 -0.0536 
 (0.0974) (0.105) (0.107) (0.101) (0.108) (0.0899) (0.136) (0.0923) 
Constant 35.25*** 24.14*** 29.87*** 21.66*** 28.75*** 39.31*** 77.84*** 48.63*** 
 (2.408) (2.412) (2.633) (2.472) (2.638) (2.202) (3.326) (2.287) 
         
Observations 8,024 6,079 8,210 8,249 8,194 8,204 8,063 7,659 
R-squared 0.203 0.091 0.101 0.142 0.080 0.050 0.118 0.170 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 





Table 3.6: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy: Years 2008-201011 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 2.882*** 0.946*** 0.695* 1.361*** 2.322*** 1.027*** 4.692*** 2.901*** 
 (0.517) (0.313) (0.375) (0.336) (0.381) (0.322) (0.491) (0.341) 
Income 0.742*** 0.144*** 0.179*** 0.542*** 0.523*** 0.437*** 0.366*** 0.357*** 
 (0.0917) (0.0555) (0.0665) (0.0597) (0.0676) (0.0570) (0.0872) (0.0605) 
Political  8.587*** 3.009*** 1.831*** -0.0293 0.666*** 0.849*** 0.272 1.804*** 
Interest (0.286) (0.180) (0.215) (0.193) (0.219) (0.184) (0.282) (0.195) 
Education 1.467*** 0.412*** 0.620*** 0.964*** 0.346* 1.512*** 1.198*** 1.475*** 
 (0.243) (0.153) (0.183) (0.164) (0.186) (0.157) (0.240) (0.167) 
Women -5.479*** 2.363*** 0.683** 0.165 -0.995*** 2.139*** 6.289*** 0.991*** 
 (0.445) (0.280) (0.336) (0.301) (0.341) (0.288) (0.441) (0.305) 
Religion -0.362** 1.003*** 0.954*** 0.741*** 0.870*** 0.235** -2.267*** -0.00617 
 (0.184) (0.112) (0.134) (0.120) (0.137) (0.115) (0.176) (0.122) 
Partisanship 3.156*** 4.888*** 2.720*** 1.524** 2.747*** -0.566 -2.770** 0.403 
 (1.076) (0.687) (0.828) (0.744) (0.843) (0.712) (1.082) (0.746) 
Ideology -0.0400 1.002*** 2.148*** 1.297*** 1.841*** 0.293*** 0.122 0.316*** 
 (0.101) (0.0638) (0.0764) (0.0685) (0.0777) (0.0656) (0.100) (0.0700) 
Age 0.0328 -0.368*** -0.301*** -0.530*** -0.400*** -0.443*** 0.0286 0.0681 
 (0.0917) (0.0573) (0.0686) (0.0616) (0.0696) (0.0589) (0.0904) (0.0627) 
Constant 32.62*** 19.61*** 23.87*** 22.30*** 26.11*** 36.78*** 66.22*** 45.69*** 
 (2.028) (1.386) (1.656) (1.488) (1.688) (1.422) (2.191) (1.519) 
         
Observations 8,708 18,486 19,052 19,161 18,846 19,032 18,386 17,638 
R-squared 0.172 0.134 0.178 0.157 0.113 0.059 0.131 0.126 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
11 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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In Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, I split up the sample into two groups based on the year that 
the survey was taken. This is done for two reasons. First, the divide between 2002 to 2006 and 
2008 to 2010 provides us with an interesting test of how the internet functions in a high and low 
access environment. We can see this difference by looking at the difference between the mean of 
internet use between the two periods. Between 2002 and 2006 the mean of internet use is .31, 
while in 2008 and 2010 the mean rises to .47. Furthermore, the financial crisis that began in 2008 
provides us with an interesting case of how mass media can influence citizen views of 
democratic governance in new democracies during a crisis. While there are certainly theoretical 
reasons to split the sample as I have done, there is also a practical reason. Starting in 2008 the 
European Social Survey changed the way that it measured respondent’s incomes. Since people 
who have higher incomes are more likely to use the internet, it is necessary to include statistical 
tests where income is held constant among internet users and non-users. Since entropy balance 
weighting can accomplish this task, it is once again employed in before the OLS regressions in 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.  
 Table 3.5 shows a very familiar pattern concerning the effect internet use has on 
democratic values. Internet use has a positive and statistically significant effect on every measure 
of citizen support for democracy except for trust in and satisfaction with government. When we 
look to Table 3.6 for understanding of how the internet works in a high use environment as well 
as during economic crisis, we still see this pattern persist. However, it is noteworthy that the 
internet use does have as statistically significant effect on satisfaction with the government in the 
2008 to 2010 time period. This is an interesting finding when we consider that internet use’s 
effect the other measure of specific support, satisfaction with the economy, is substantially 
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weakened in the time period12. Of further note, we also see that, for the most part, the beta-
coefficients reporting internet use’s impact on democratic values are around one to two points 
lower in the 2008 to 2010 time period than they were in the 2002 to 2006 time period.  
 The findings in these four tables lend support for the hypotheses that internet use will 
positively influence a person’s specific and diffuse support for democracy. While these findings 
were expected, they are integral to this study as they show that the internet can influence 
attitudes toward democracy in new democracies. These findings are consistent with those from 
Nisbet et al. (2012) that show internet use increases demand for democracy in democratizing 
societies. However, the findings here also show that these effects continue while the country is 
attempting to consolidate democracy. This is important as we can see that the internet not only 
has the ability to increase citizen demands for democracy at the outset of democratization, but 
also may provide support for the regime after the honeymoon phase. While the internet’s effect 
on support for democracy is noteworthy, we must also see how it compares to the effects of other 
mediums.  
 
                                                 
12 While internet use’s effect on satisfaction with the economy is still statistically significant in the 2008 and 2010 





Table 3.7: Effect of Media Use on Support for Democracy13 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















         
Internet Use 3.782*** 1.455*** 1.743*** 3.344*** 3.102*** 2.823*** 4.768*** 3.989*** 
 (0.335) (0.305) (0.355) (0.321) (0.346) (0.287) (0.448) (0.303) 
Radio News -0.869** 1.310*** 0.693 0.599 0.328 -0.374 -0.577 -0.434 
 (0.429) (0.381) (0.445) (0.403) (0.435) (0.359) (0.561) (0.383) 
Newspaper 2.560*** 2.137*** 1.722*** 1.570*** 2.035*** 1.109*** 0.881* 1.551*** 
 (0.395) (0.356) (0.414) (0.374) (0.406) (0.333) (0.521) (0.356) 
Television  0.861 2.531*** 1.463* 0.776 1.461* 1.499** -0.870 0.682 
News (0.758) (0.665) (0.778) (0.702) (0.758) (0.626) (0.971) (0.666) 
Political  8.179*** 2.547*** 1.831*** 0.678*** 1.824*** 0.779*** 1.182*** 1.838*** 
Interest (0.187) (0.166) (0.195) (0.176) (0.190) (0.157) (0.246) (0.166) 
Education 2.973*** 0.289** 0.394*** 1.148*** 0.643*** 1.332*** 1.504*** 1.931*** 
 (0.139) (0.124) (0.146) (0.132) (0.142) (0.118) (0.185) (0.125) 
Women -5.987*** 1.757*** 0.496* 0.0736 -0.0621 1.324*** 5.791*** -0.0288 
 (0.269) (0.243) (0.284) (0.256) (0.277) (0.229) (0.358) (0.242) 
Religion -0.747*** 0.802*** 0.793*** 0.360*** 0.618*** 0.264*** -3.279*** -0.175* 
 (0.101) (0.0917) (0.107) (0.0966) (0.104) (0.0861) (0.135) (0.0916) 
Partisanship 2.653*** 3.841*** 2.034*** -0.110 0.303 -0.388 -2.847*** -0.790 
 (0.656) (0.577) (0.680) (0.615) (0.664) (0.550) (0.861) (0.576) 
Ideology 0.193*** 0.601*** 0.702*** 0.924*** 1.215*** 0.431*** -0.388*** 0.0988* 
 (0.0581) (0.0523) (0.0611) (0.0552) (0.0595) (0.0493) (0.0771) (0.0526) 
Age 0.0733* -0.374*** -0.350*** -0.475*** -0.513*** -0.195*** -0.00273 -0.0686* 
 (0.0444) (0.0399) (0.0464) (0.0421) (0.0453) (0.0375) (0.0588) (0.0398) 
Constant 40.55*** 15.30*** 29.24*** 24.87*** 27.98*** 30.47*** 68.55*** 50.47*** 
 (1.484) (1.270) (1.529) (1.385) (1.494) (1.236) (1.935) (1.321) 
         
Observations 20,820 23,742 27,664 27,867 27,589 27,834 26,661 25,280 
R-squared 0.217 0.116 0.081 0.121 0.081 0.064 0.131 0.123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 





Table 3.8: The Conditional Effects of Education and Internet Use on Support for Democracy14 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















         
Internet Use 5.326*** 1.135** 2.537*** 2.946*** 3.068*** 1.805*** 3.867*** 3.873*** 
 (0.642) (0.556) (0.639) (0.581) (0.641) (0.524) (0.821) (0.571) 
Education X -0.149 0.0199 -0.375* 0.148 0.0202 0.397** 0.572** 0.151 
Internet Use (0.226) (0.194) (0.224) (0.203) (0.225) (0.184) (0.288) (0.200) 
Political  8.764*** 3.215*** 2.584*** 1.031*** 2.021*** 1.192*** 0.855*** 1.975*** 
Interest (0.150) (0.128) (0.149) (0.135) (0.149) (0.122) (0.191) (0.132) 
Education 2.648*** 0.583*** 0.877*** 1.466*** 1.052*** 1.187*** 0.942*** 1.673*** 
 (0.171) (0.157) (0.179) (0.162) (0.180) (0.147) (0.232) (0.162) 
Gender -5.971*** 1.798*** 0.792*** -0.385* -0.464** 1.450*** 5.947*** 0.145 
 (0.227) (0.198) (0.229) (0.208) (0.230) (0.188) (0.294) (0.204) 
Religion -0.506*** 1.036*** 0.758*** 0.375*** 0.712*** 0.409*** -3.443*** -0.0192 
 (0.0902) (0.0786) (0.0906) (0.0822) (0.0907) (0.0742) (0.116) (0.0807) 
Partisanship 3.054*** 3.753*** 2.286*** 0.251 1.452** 0.0290 -0.365 -0.507 
 (0.602) (0.511) (0.600) (0.545) (0.601) (0.494) (0.771) (0.532) 
Ideology 0.199*** 0.677*** 0.894*** 0.960*** 1.319*** 0.400*** -0.240*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0453) (0.0522) (0.0474) (0.0523) (0.0429) (0.0671) (0.0469) 
Age 0.138*** -0.387*** -0.353*** -0.520*** -0.445*** -0.339*** -0.0515 -0.0949** 
 (0.0478) (0.0409) (0.0471) (0.0429) (0.0472) (0.0387) (0.0607) (0.0421) 
Constant 38.49*** 19.70*** 28.45*** 25.85*** 28.10*** 32.86*** 71.51*** 51.50*** 
 (1.193) (1.014) (1.188) (1.082) (1.193) (0.976) (1.530) (1.071) 
         
Observations 30,523 36,549 41,676 42,119 41,461 41,873 40,439 38,091 
R-squared 0.201 0.120 0.100 0.126 0.091 0.061 0.109 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
14 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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Table 3.7 presents the result of OLS regressions that include other forms of mass media 
use to see how internet use compares to consuming news on other mediums. The findings in 
Table 3.7 show the effects of internet use on most democratic values is greater than or equal to 
the effect that we see from consuming news on other mediums. The lone outlier to this pattern is 
trust in government. It is worth noting that this is the effect of general internet use, which does 
not control for information seeking behavior on the medium. This is an interesting discovery as 
scholars of political communication have often held that consuming news is more likely to have 
positive and statistically significant relationships with values of trust and satisfaction with 
government (see Newton 1999; Loveless 2010). In contrast, non-information seeking behavior 
should lead to distrust and cynicism or at the very least have a negligible effect on citizen views 
of democracy (Newton 1999; Bennett and Iyengar 2008). While the test above cannot tell us for 
sure what people are using the internet for, the findings show that internet use has similar effects 
to information seeking behavior on other mediums. 
Table 3.8 presents the results from statistical tests regarding the conditional effects of 
education and internet use on democratic values. As predicted, education and internet use, when 
interacted, has little effect on a person’s support for democracy outside of the exogenous effects 
of education and internet use alone. While this is true for many measure of legitimacy, there are 
three exceptions. As Table 3.8 shows, the interaction term of education and internet use has a 
negative and significant effect on satisfaction with government as well as a positive and 
significant effect on a person’s trust in others and tolerance of homosexuals. Because of these the 
mixed bag of findings presented here it is hard to find definitive support for or against the 
hypothesis presented earlier in the chapter.  
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While most of the findings support the notion that education does not have a significant 
conditional effect on support for democracy, there is a small pattern that begins to appear when 
we look in depth at the three measures of support for democracy that the interaction term does 
have an effect on. The interaction terms does have a positive effect on two of the four measures 
of diffuse support used by this study. While the findings are far from conclusive, it seems that 
more educated people may pick up on societal norms that are being disseminated quicker than 
people with less education. As mentioned before, it is difficult to really make this assertion from 
these findings because only two of the four measures of diffuse support are influenced. Because 
of the lack of consistent findings, it is best to err on the side of caution and note that further 
research is need in this area.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings in the previous section lend support for most of the hypothesis laid out at the 
outset of this chapter. As noted above, internet use increases both specific and diffuse support for 
the regime. Furthermore, when compared to consuming news from other mediums, internet use 
seems to have a similar influence on support for democracy. However, the empirical 
investigation provided mixed results regarding the conditional effects of education and internet 
use on support for democracy. While internet use has an effect on support for democracy, it is 
worth noting that the substantive effect on a person’s support for democracy is not very large. 
Despite the lack of large substantive effects on support for democracy, the fact that the internet 
produces any movement at all in a person’s support for democracy is interesting. It has often 
been noted that survey research can often underestimate the direct effect of mass media on 
political attitudes and opinions (Bartels 1993; Bennet and Iyengar 2008). This is especially true 
of studies that focus on the internet. Many studies have posited that general internet use is not a 
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great predictor of the political effects of the medium, and that information-seeking behavior 
should instead be focused on (Xenos and Moy 2007; Mossberger 2008). These theoretical and 
methodological concerns make the findings noteworthy even if the substantive effects are small.  
While the findings that internet use tends to increase a person’s affinity for government 
and others in society is interesting in its own right, we must of course look at these findings in 
the broader context of the relationship between mass media and democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe. One of the most striking findings from the previous section is that internet use 
tends to increase both diffuse and specific support for democracy in the region. These findings 
are both very interesting and important when we consider support for the young regimes in the 
region. One such finding is internet use’s effect on feelings toward others in society. This finding 
is interesting when we consider it in conjunction with other studies of legitimacy. As Booth and 
Seligson (2009) note, feelings of political community is an important concept for new 
democracies as it connects the person with the broader society that they are connected with. 
Furthermore, Kunioka and Woller (1999) find that tolerant individuals are more likely to support 
democracy in the region. With these studies in mind, the finding that the internet helps foster 
tolerance and trust in others should help to ensure democratic stability in the region.  
Another finding of note is internet use’s positive and statistically significant effect on a 
person’s satisfaction with democracy as well. This finding is meaningful for democracy in the 
region as it shows that not only does internet use increase diffuse support for democracy through 
fostering tolerance and trust of others, but also directly influences citizen views of the regime. If 
we refer to Table 3.6, we see that internet use’s effect on satisfaction with democracy does not 
waver in the face of economic adversity as other influences on democratic values seem to do. 
While internet use does not have the most substantial direct influence on diffuse support, it is 
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imperative to note that the technology is in its infancy relative to other modes of communication. 
Yet it seems that the effects that the internet has on diffuse support are reason for optimism as its 
effects remain stable even in the face of economic crisis.  
While the influence of internet use on diffuse support for democracy is certainly 
important, we should not overlook the finding that internet use is positively associated with 
specific support for the political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This is because new 
democracies rely on specific support while socialization and direct experience with democratic 
institutions build diffuse support for the regime (Easton 1975). The perception that democracy is 
working well and is better than other forms of government is important for a couple reasons.  
Specific support helps solidify the regime against the threat of immediate backslide, and also 
builds diffuse support which aid in regime stability during crises (Easton 1975).  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that internet use has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on trust in government in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the fall of communism, 
scholars have noted that distrust of political institutions is widespread in the region (Mishler and 
Rose 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001; Rose et al 1998; Miller et al. 1998). While trust in 
institutions may be low in older democratic societies such as the United States, distrust in newer 
democracies can be much more troubling. This is because, as Easton (1975) describes, newer 
democracies do not have the diffuse support to whether mass distrust in times of crises. 
Therefore, a regime’s legitimacy may be easier for citizens to question in new democracies, thus 
increasing the chance of democratic backslide. The very idea that internet use can increase trust 
in government is therefore important to regime stability. As internet use becomes more prevalent 
in the region, we can see where these positive effects may turn the tide against true distrust and 
towards a positive evaluation of democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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The pattern presented in the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe show that the 
internet provides some support for the growth of democracy in the region. As the descriptive 
statistics in previous chapters show, democracy may have institutional success in the region, but 
it is far from the “only game in town.” Therefore, citizen support for the government and its 
institutions are of the utmost importance as the direct support for these institutions and political 
actors provide regime stability during the early years of democracy (See Easton 1975; Lipset 
1959). The fact that internet use has a positive and significant effect on these values, sans 
satisfaction with government, shows that the new technology can influence societal support for 
the governing regime even during times of economic crisis.  
Maybe the most impressive part of these findings is that internet use influences both 
diffuse and specific support even when we do not control for information seeking behavior. This 
leads to the belief that the internet may provide an avenue for the reception of political messages 
inadvertently. To consider this assertion we must think about the internet and the broad choices 
that it offers its users. The internet can provide many outlets for politically interested individuals 
to seek out information and become informed on current events as they happen. However, some 
argue that the amount of choice involved in selecting what information to consume on the 
internet can allow people to completely tune out of politics and politically relevant current events 
(see Prior 2007). The findings in this section show that this may not be the case. We can see that 
even without controlling for information seeking, internet use still increases both diffuse and 
specific support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Furthermore, Table 3.7 also shows us the potential that the internet holds when compared 
to other mediums. The findings show us that general internet use increases a person’s support for 
democracy as well as information seeking in other mediums. This strengthens the argument that 
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the internet may be able to inadvertently effect a person’s attitudes toward democracy. While we 
cannot be sure of this due to the nature of the statistical tests provided here, the findings in 
Chapter Three do show is that this theory cannot be ruled out as general internet use does effect a 
person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.   
 This chapter began as an exercise in understanding whether or not general internet use 
could have an effect on a person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Through statistically testing survey data from the European Social Survey we are able to 
conclude that indeed general internet use does influence a person’s affinity for democracy and 
democratic norms. While the findings that internet use does increase a person’s support for 
democracy are statistically significant, it is worth noting that they are substantively modest. 
However, this is not a reason to disregard these findings, but rather an opportunity to expand on 
them to provide a better understanding of how internet use can change citizen attitudes toward 
democracy and government in new democracies. In doing, the findings presented in this chapter 
set the stage for the discussion in Chapter Four where the study will focus on how using the 
internet for entertainment or information seeking may effect a person’s attitudes toward 
democracy.   
 While the findings in Chapter Three set the stage for the rest of the study they are 
noteworthy in their own right. Of particular note is the finding that general internet use tends to 
increase a person’s support for democracy on par with information seeking behavior in other 
mediums. As discussed several times in this study, information seeking behavior has long been 
seen as the key factor in seeing political results from media use (Newton 1999; Loveless 2010; 
Xenos and Moy 2007). The similarity between internet use and information seeking using other 
mediums certainly provides an interesting look on the viability of the internet as a political 
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medium. As discussed before, while we do not know what type of websites, if any, are driving 
these findings, we can be sure that the internet has the ability to influence how citizens in Central 
and Eastern Europe feel about democracy, government, and others in society.  
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CHAPTER IV: ONLINE NEWS VERSUS SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
 While Chapter Three provides us with information about how we can broadly expect the 
internet to influence a person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Chapter 
Four moves beyond the simple measure of internet use and focuses on how different usage can 
influence a person’s support for democracy. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the effects that 
are produced by online news consumption and by visiting social networking websites. As 
previously discussed, it is expected that social media, through its ability to socialize ideas of 
political community and provide inadvertent exposure to political events, should be able to 
increase a person’s satisfaction with democratic governance. Furthermore, news consumption 
should conform to patterns we see from consuming news from other mediums and increase 
support for the democratic regimes in the region. 
 To begin this discussion, we must first explore how political interest can play a role in 
conditioning the effects of internet use on attitudes toward democracy. Political interest has often 
been described as the principle intervening factor that leads to political engagement online (Kaye 
and Johnson 2004; Xenos and Moy 2007). As Gronland (2007) finds, citizens who consume 
news online are highly interested and active in politics. While it may be the case that motivated 
citizens may actively seek news online and thus be exposed to political information through their 
own volition, this is seemingly not the only road to online democratic engagement. This is 
because the internet offers a variety of uses and could even lead to inadvertent exposure to 
political information through interpersonal discussion and soft news (see Wojcieszak and Mutz 
2009; Baum 2002;2003). 
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Furthermore, the internet generally allows for the formation of political community and 
civic engagement (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). By allowing individuals an online sphere in which to 
discuss matters that are important to their personal lives, they may be able to facilitate trust in 
others and tolerance for their points of view. If we consider social capital and trust to be 
endogenous to interactions with members of society and government (see Coleman 1988; 
Jackman and Miller 1998), then it seems possible that increased opportunities to interact would 
provide people with heightened social trust and acceptance. Because of these opportunities for 
inadvertent learning and for interaction with other members of society, it is predicted that 
political interest will not be a necessary component to see an increase in a person’s support for 
democracy.  
Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more politically interested and use the internet will not have 
greater support for democracy than people who are less politically interested and use the 
internet. 
 
 While it is predicted that political interest is not a prerequisite for a person to learn about 
democracy, this does not mean that online news will not increase a person’s support for 
democracy. Previous studies have shown that people who consume news have a higher 
evaluation of political actors and higher subjective efficacy (Newton 1999; Loveless 2010). 
Additionally, studies in advanced democracies have shown that online news does increase 
political knowledge, which is often seen as a key component of political engagement 
(Mossberger et al. 2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006). It has also been shown that political news can 
indeed socialize democratic norms in new democracies (Nisbet 2008). Furthermore, Nisbet et al. 
(2012) find internet use can increase support for democracy in new democracies. While Nisbet et 
al. (2012) do not specifically test whether or not news causes these evaluations, Norris (2001) 
finds that people who consume news online in older democracies are more trusting of political 
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institutions and satisfied with democracies. While it is impossible to directly extrapolate findings 
from older democracies to serve as expectations in new democracies, the findings from Nisbet 
(2008) show that mass media can socialize democratic norms in new democracies, and studies 
have shown that the effects of news consumption can have similar effects regardless of medium 
(Newton 1999; Loveless 2010). Because of this, it is expected that online news will be able to 
socialize democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Hypothesis 4.2: Individuals that consume news online will have higher support for democratic 
governance and political knowledge than people who do not consume news online.  
 
Furthermore, it is expected that social media websites will also increase a person’s 
support for democracy. Social media offers several distinct features that could theoretically allow 
it to influence a person’s support for democratic governance. This is because social media 
websites may epitomize the ability of the internet to transform the relationships between 
government and governed as well as the relationships between individuals (Faris and Etling 
2008; Coleman and Blumler 2009). Perhaps the most important is the latter, as it opens the door 
to the creation of social capital through interpersonal interaction (Burke et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 
2010; Steinfield et al. 2008). Furthermore, it is worth noting that social media is able to increase 
bridging capital (Ibid.) something that is imperative in diffusing information across groups 
(Putnam 2000; Granovetter 1973).  
As Coleman (1988) notes, social capital, once created, may be used as an information 
channel as information costs are lowered by the trustworthiness of those within the group. 
Therefore, by creating an open market of trusted ideas, social media websites may create a forum 
in which the public can discuss the regime and hold government officials accountable. This may 
enhance democracy and support for the regime as it offers a chance for democratic agenda 
setting and engagement. Paxton (2002) theorizes social capital should create open-mindedness, 
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tolerance, respect for other views, and a reasoned and educated public through creation of an 
open public sphere. Teorell (2006) further notes that through interpersonal discussion, citizens 
may “become more informed and more likely to ‘agree about the dimensions over which they 
disagree” (796). In doing so, social interaction can increase trust and tolerance for other 
viewpoints. 
Furthermore, through simple interaction it is possible that democratic values can be 
disseminated and socialized. As studies of democratization note, a key way that people are 
exposed to political and social values is through socialization (Mishler and Rose 1997;2001; 
Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Banfield 1958). Also studies of political 
communication note that people can be socialized through exposure to mass media (Chafee et al. 
1970; Adoni 1979). Because of this, it would seem that societal values could be disseminated 
through websites that offer interaction between people.   
It should also be noted that social media allows this attitudinal dissemination without the 
receiver having to search for information on the regime. This happens through the processes of 
social interaction that are discussed above. Furthermore, people who use social networks may be 
inadvertently exposed to political content or symbols that relate to political community. Because 
of this indirect political learning offered by social media, it is predicted that people who use 
social media will have higher political knowledge and support for democracy than people who 
do not use social media.   
Hypothesis 4.3: Individuals that use social media websites will have higher support for 
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Data and Methods 
 To understand the effect that online information seeking and social media use have on a 
person’s support for democracy, this chapter utilizes survey data from two sources. The data 
used to test the conditional effects of political interest and internet use on democratic values 
comes from the European Social Survey (ESS), and was collected in five bi-annual waves 
between 2002 and 2010. Once again, this dataset is utilized because it offers us the ability to test 
the effects of internet use on a person’s specific and diffuse support for democracy. The key 
aspect of this dataset comes from the breadth of questions that were asked cross-nationally. 
Specifically it allows us to test the conditional effects of political interest and internet use on a 
variety of measures of democratic support that are missing from data that contain more nuanced 
media use questions.  
The second source of data utilized in this chapter comes from Eurobarometer 78.1, which 
was collected in November 2012. This dataset contains several questions about internet use and 
differentiates between how the internet is used by asking questions pertaining to a person’s news 
consumption and use of social networking websites. This distinction in use of the internet 
provides the opportunity to dissect how different patterns of use influence a person’s support for 
democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. In relation to the ESS data, this data loses 
some of the breadth regarding measures of support for democracy. However, the dataset makes 
up for these shortcomings by adding measures of political knowledge, along with distinct 
variables that cover social media usage and online information seeking. These additions allow us 
to further the discussion of the internet’s effect on democratic citizenship in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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The methods used in Chapter Four closely mirror those used in Chapter 3. Once again, all 
of the dependent variables have been normalized on a 0 to 100 scales so that we can easily 
interpret the effects of internet use across different dimensions of regime support and across 
datasets. This chapter will also utilize entropy balancing as it did in Chapter Three. Once again, 
entropy balancing is a maximum reweighting scheme developed by Jens Hainmueller (2012). 
Entropy balancing helps researchers by reweighting survey samples across user selected 
variables so that the data fits with methodological assumptions of unbiased survey samples. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, entropy balancing is much like propensity score matching, genetic 
matching, and other techniques that attempt to make survey data more akin to a laboratory or 
natural experiment in which treatment and control groups are from unbiased subgroups of a 
population. While no statistical model can help us perfectly discern causation, entropy balancing 
helps researchers by offering the ability to increase the robustness of the findings. The variables 
that internet use is balanced on in the European Social Survey data are once again religiosity, 
political ideology, education, age, and gender, while the Eurobarometer data will be balanced on 
a person’s age, education, gender, social class, and their place of residence (urban or rural).  
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables in Chapter Four differ based on the survey that is used to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses. For the hypothesis pertaining to the conditional effects of political 
interest and internet use on a person’s support for democracy, this study will use data from the 
European Social Survey. As such, it will test the same eight dependent variables from Chapter 
Three. As in Chapter Three the measurement for all of these variables is on a 0 to 100 scale 
where zero relates to having the lowest efficacy or support for democratic governance and 100 
relates to having the highest efficacy or support for democratic governance.  
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If you recall, these eight variables capture two distinct concepts relating to democratic 
citizenship. The first of these concepts relates to a person’s diffuse support for democracy. The 
variables used to measure diffuse support come from several categories that measure a person’s 
satisfaction with democracy and attitudes toward other members of society. These variables are 
meant to measure a person’s underlying support for the regime, regime principles such as 
tolerance of other’s beliefs as well as feelings of political community. The second concept that is 
measured by the dependent variables is specific support, or direct support, which is based on a 
regimes efficacy or outputs (see Easton 1975).  As in the third chapter, the variables used to 
measure this concept are trust in government and satisfaction with the government and economy. 
Finally, to measure a person’s attentiveness and engagement with the political system this 
chapter utilizes a variable that measures a person’s internal efficacy.   
To understand the relationship using social media websites and consuming internet news 
has with support for democracy, this study employs data from Eurobarometer 78.115. While the 
study tests the same concepts of specific and diffuse support, there are different variables that are 
utilized.  The variable used to measure diffuse support for democracy is based off of a question 
asking how satisfied a person is with democracy. While the Eurobarometer data lacks many of 
the variables that measure diffuse support, it makes up for the shortcoming by allowing us to 
examine the effects of exposure to online news and social networking on a person’s political 
knowledge. This variable is a scale made from a person’s response regarding three true or false 
statements about the European Union.  
This study also uses four variables from the Eurobarometer survey to test the effects of 
internet news and social media on a person’s specific support for democracy. The first two 
                                                 
15 This survey contains data from the following 11 countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia.  
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measures are direct measures of specific support, while the second two measures measure a 
person’s belief in the trajectory of the regime. The first variable measuring specific support is 
trust in government. This variable is a scale made of four questions asking whether or not a 
person trusts their country’s government, political parties, legislature, and local government 
(alpha = .77). The second variable is satisfaction with the economy, which is made from a 
question that asks how a person would judge the current state of their national economy. The 
third measure of specific support comes from a question asking a person to evaluate whether the 
national economy will be better, worse, or the same in 12 months. The final measure of specific 
support comes from a person’s evaluation of which direction (right or wrong) their country is 
headed in.  
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables From Eurobarometer 78.1 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
Deviation N 
      
Trust in 
Government 25.26  32.23 8,617 
      
Political 
Knowledge 66.86 31.82 9,859  
      
Satisfaction 
with 
Democracy  35.31 26.49 9,672 
      
Satisfaction 
with the 
Economy 27.86 22.71 9,859 
      
Economic 
Expectations 39.01 36.11 9,502  
      
Direction of 
the Country 30.9 40.4 9,498  
 
Independent Variables 
 Chapter Four contains several main independent variables that measure how differential 
use of the internet may impact a person’s support for democracy. The first, which is contained in 
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the European Social Survey dataset, is an interaction variable combining a person’s political 
interest with internet use (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006) 16. The rest of the variables of 
interest will be used for the statistical tests using data from Eurobarometer. For the basic tests 
regarding the impact of social media on support for democracy, this study will utilize a question 
that asks how often a person tends to use social media websites. Once again to make this variable 
comparable with findings using the other dataset, this variable has been recoded to a binary 
variable detailing whether or not a person uses social media websites. The variable used to 
measure a person’s information seeking online comes from a question that asks whether or not a 
person uses the internet to gather information on national political affairs. This variable is coded 
by Eurobarometer as one for people who seek information about national politics online and zero 
for those who do not.  
 Aside from the main independent variables, this chapter will also control for a host of 
variables that could also influence a person’s support for democracy. The control variables 
utilized in the statistical tests using ESS data will mirror the control variables in Chapter Three. 
As discussed at length there, these variables include measures of basic socio-economic status 
such as age, gender, education, and income. Additionally, the control variables contain measures 
of political and civic interests17, news consumption on other mediums18, as well as dummy 
variables controlling for country and year specific effects.  
 Chapter Four also contains a new set of control variables that are specific to the 
Eurobarometer dataset. While the variables age, age squared, and gender are coded the same in 
the Eurobarometer data as they were in the ESS data, there are several differences in the 
measurement of education and income. In the Eurobaraometer data the measure for education is 
                                                 
16 The interaction variable ranges from zero to three. 
17 i.e. religion, political interest, member of a political party and ideological self-placement 
18 A dummy variable for news consumption from television, newspaper, and radio. 
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a continuous variable that notes the age that a person completed his or her education. Since there 
are several outliers as well as a significant portion of the sample that claims to be in the process 
of completing their education, this study recodes the variable into a zero to three scale that 
coincides with ages that a person normally reaches a new level of educational attainment19. 
Furthermore, the study places all of those who answered that they are currently studying into the 
group that coincides with their current age. The variable measuring a person’s income in the 
Eurobarometer data is based on a person’s social class. The variable ranges from zero to two and 
details whether a person is a member of the working class, middle class or upper class. This 
study also controls for the type of community a person resides in. This is done through a trio of 
dummy variables coded to measure if a person lives in a rural area, a medium sized town, or a 
city. Finally, as with the ESS data, this study controls for country specific effects through a series 
of dummy variables.  
Table 4.2: Usage Summary of Online News and Social Media In Central and Eastern 
Europe  
  Use  Do Not Use 
      
Internet News 3,559 6,300 
  36.1% 63.9% 
     
Social Media 4,600 5,166 
  47.1% 52.9% 
                                                 
19 This study contains a grouping for people with no formal education as well as groups for people who ceased 








Table 4.3: Conditional Effect of Internet Use and Political Interest on Support for Democracy20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 















         
Internet Use 7.006*** 2.149*** 3.038*** 3.635*** 3.481*** 3.066*** 4.351*** 3.925*** 
 (0.467) (0.386) (0.448) (0.407) (0.450) (0.367) (0.574) (0.400) 
Internet Use X -1.508*** -0.737*** -1.122*** -0.230 -0.274 -0.176 0.764** 0.259 
Political Interest (0.283) (0.238) (0.276) (0.251) (0.277) (0.226) (0.355) (0.246) 
Political  9.403*** 3.598*** 3.141*** 1.145*** 2.158*** 1.279*** 0.471* 1.844*** 
Interest (0.192) (0.178) (0.202) (0.183) (0.203) (0.165) (0.262) (0.182) 
Education 2.605*** 0.611*** 0.687*** 1.556*** 1.069*** 1.418*** 1.258*** 1.757*** 
 (0.126) (0.108) (0.125) (0.113) (0.125) (0.102) (0.160) (0.111) 
Women -5.978*** 1.793*** 0.787*** -0.389* -0.466** 1.443*** 5.947*** 0.146 
 (0.227) (0.198) (0.229) (0.208) (0.230) (0.188) (0.294) (0.204) 
Religion -0.501*** 1.037*** 0.760*** 0.375*** 0.712*** 0.409*** -3.444*** -0.0196 
 (0.0901) (0.0786) (0.0906) (0.0822) (0.0907) (0.0742) (0.116) (0.0807) 
Partisanship 3.090*** 3.768*** 2.312*** 0.258 1.460** 0.0385 -0.383 -0.513 
 (0.602) (0.511) (0.600) (0.545) (0.601) (0.494) (0.771) (0.532) 
Ideology 0.193*** 0.675*** 0.891*** 0.959*** 1.318*** 0.399*** -0.239*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0453) (0.0522) (0.0474) (0.0523) (0.0429) (0.0671) (0.0469) 
Age 0.135*** -0.386*** -0.358*** -0.518*** -0.445*** -0.335*** -0.0450 -0.0931** 
 (0.0477) (0.0409) (0.0470) (0.0428) (0.0472) (0.0386) (0.0606) (0.0420) 
Constant 37.87*** 19.17*** 28.31*** 25.49*** 27.90*** 32.17*** 71.13*** 51.43*** 
 (1.161) (0.978) (1.153) (1.050) (1.157) (0.947) (1.484) (1.038) 
         
Observations 30,523 36,549 41,676 42,119 41,461 41,873 40,439 38,091 
R-squared 0.201 0.120 0.101 0.126 0.091 0.060 0.109 0.119 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
20 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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Table 4.3 provides us with insight into how political interest interacts with internet use to 
influence a person’s evaluations of democracy. As in Chapter Three, internet use has an overall 
positive and statistically significant relationship with a person’s support for democracy. 
However, there are several measures where people who are highly interested in politics that use 
the internet are actually less supportive of democracy than their less politically interested 
counterparts. The results show that politically interested people who use the internet have lower 
internal efficacy as well as less trust and satisfaction with government. Tolerance of 
homosexuals is the lone measure of democratic support where politically interested people that 
use the internet have higher levels of support than those who are less politically interested. Form 
these empirical results, it seems that political interest is not a necessarily a precursor for the 
internet to foster support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. This stands in direct 
contrast to studies in advanced democracies that contend political interest is a prerequisite for 
political engagement online (Prior 2007; Xenos and Moy 2007;Gronlund 2007). Instead, these 
findings support the hypothesis that politically interested individuals do not become more 
supportive of democracy than those who are less interested. This is interesting when we look 
back to Chapter Three and consider that the internet also does not produce gaps in support for 
democracy between people with high and low levels of education. These findings certainly show 
optimism that the internet may be able to provide a broad base of support for democracy by 
providing a plethora of ways to engage citizens. From the findings above, we can gather that 
even uninterested citizens are able to learn to support democracy through general internet use.   
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Table 4.4: Effect of Online News on Support for Democracy21 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













       
Internet News -0.0909 5.495*** -0.481 0.576 -0.781 0.0382 
 (0.842) (0.723) (0.642) (0.526) (0.887) (1.017) 
Social Class 5.439*** 3.854*** 5.671*** 4.771*** 4.946*** 8.078*** 
 (0.823) (0.706) (0.628) (0.514) (0.869) (0.994) 
Women -1.430* -5.455*** -0.643 -2.567*** 0.0130 -4.858*** 
 (0.824) (0.707) (0.628) (0.515) (0.867) (0.994) 
Age -0.0776 0.471*** -0.295** -0.204* -0.893*** -0.395* 
 (0.168) (0.144) (0.128) (0.105) (0.177) (0.202) 
Age Squared 0.00202 -0.00277 0.00140 0.00191 0.00752*** 0.00432* 
 (0.00197) (0.00169) (0.00150) (0.00123) (0.00208) (0.00237) 
Education 2.266*** 4.506*** 0.927 2.166*** 1.893** 4.194*** 
 (0.812) (0.693) (0.616) (0.505) (0.854) (0.975) 
Constant 8.445** 43.50*** 26.85*** 20.09*** 56.88*** 14.60*** 
 (4.062) (3.455) (3.069) (2.514) (4.244) (4.847) 
       
Observations 5,952 6,728 6,625 6,728 6,551 6,516 
R-squared 0.055 0.093 0.089 0.136 0.106 0.089 
Standard errors in parentheses 
























                                                 
21 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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Table 4.5: Effect of Social Media on Support for Democracy22 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













       
Social Media 2.914*** 4.184*** 3.627*** 0.416 1.525** 1.607* 
 (0.738) (0.646) (0.570) (0.470) (0.776) (0.890) 
Social Class 5.335*** 5.478*** 5.035*** 5.791*** 5.897*** 8.163*** 
 (0.713) (0.624) (0.553) (0.455) (0.754) (0.861) 
Women -0.728 -6.814*** -0.872 -1.488*** -0.448 -5.813*** 
 (0.724) (0.633) (0.559) (0.461) (0.761) (0.873) 
Age -0.347** 0.258* -0.0510 -0.345*** -0.525*** -0.127 
 (0.155) (0.133) (0.118) (0.0969) (0.161) (0.183) 
Age Squared 0.00570*** -0.000381 -0.000231 0.00353*** 0.00401** 0.00158 
 (0.00184) (0.00158) (0.00140) (0.00115) (0.00191) (0.00218) 
Education 2.825*** 5.076*** 0.373 1.566*** 1.350* 5.119*** 
 (0.706) (0.616) (0.545) (0.448) (0.742) (0.850) 
Constant 9.005** 45.92*** 20.77*** 25.97*** 47.68*** 7.485* 
 (3.579) (3.089) (2.736) (2.249) (3.723) (4.248) 
       
Observations 7,654 8,690 8,547 8,690 8,472 8,425 
R-squared 0.063 0.093 0.085 0.136 0.102 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show us the effects of online news and social media websites on a 
person’s support for democracy. Contrary to Hypothesis 4.2, internet news does not have a 
significant effect on a person’s evaluations of democratic governance. It does however have a 
positive and significant effect on political knowledge. These findings become even more 
interesting as we find that the use of social media websites increases specific and diffuse support 
for democracy along with political knowledge. The only measure of democratic support that 
social media use does not have an effect on is a person’s satisfaction with the current state of the 
economy. However, and maybe more importantly for the prospects of democracy, social media 
                                                 
22 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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use does have a positive effect on a person’s evaluation of the economy’s trajectory23. Thus, 
even if social media does not influence a person’s evaluation of the current economy, it does 
influence support for democracy and the economy based on prospective evaluations.  
The finding that social media websites increase a person’s knowledge as well as attitudes 
regarding democracy fits with our earlier predictions. Theoretically, social media may increase a 
person’s support for the regime through interactive discussion and inadvertent exposure to 
political information. This in turn affects a person’s awareness of public affairs as well as offers 
an open forum for political discourse. Both of which have been found to increase citizen support 
for democracy (Nisbet et al. 2012; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Nisbet 2008; Coleman and Blumler 
2009). While consumers of internet news must actively seek out political information, users of 
social media may be inadvertently exposed through posts from friends and acquaintances on 
social media websites. By lowering costs of interpersonal communication, social media can 
provide enhanced opportunities for individuals to be informed about politics and discuss the 
implications of political events without actively seeking political information. Furthermore, the 
lower costs of communication also allow political elites the opportunity to connect with 
members of society. As Bajomi-Lazar (2012) notes, political parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe have increasingly used social media as a way to directly contact party members in an 
attempt to mobilize them for political action.  
However, the findings that internet news has little effect on democratic support, are 
somewhat curious. As explained above, it was expected that internet news consumption would 
lead to higher evaluations of democracy and government, but we can see that it fails to do so. 
While there are several explanations for these null effects, one could perhaps be an issue with 
                                                 
23 As Mishler and Rose (1996) note the prospective evaluations of the economy and governance can have 
implications for democratic support as trajectories of hope can signal a belief that democratic governance can 
provide future prosperity even if the current situation is viewed negatively. 
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measuring internet news as consumption rather than reliance. Theoretically, internet news 
consumption could have less of an effect on a person’s support for democracy because internet 
news consumers could be reliant on other mediums for their news.  For these people, internet 
news would be a source of secondary or confirmatory information. While it is normal for 
motivated individuals to use the internet for additional information or confirmatory information 
(Riffe et al. 2008; Sun et al. 2008), it may limit the effects of the medium that are seen in 
empirical research. As Ball Rokeach and DeFluer (1976) discuss, dependence on a certain 
medium causes changes in affect, behavior and cognition because dependency signals a person’s 
reliance on a medium to inform them of social and political realities. The theory behind this 
assertion relies on the interaction of society and communications technology. The authors note 
that in complex societies, people rely on mass media to serve as an intermediary and inform 
them of what is happening in society beyond their own observations. Therefore, when a person 
relies on one medium, they become more influenced by its messages, as this source of 
information is either the main, or in some cases, sole source of information about politics and 
society. By simply testing consumption, researchers may bias results toward the null and miss 
out on understanding the effects that media can have in a society. Therefore, people who use the 
internet as a main source of information may see the greatest effects from its use, because it is 
their main source of political and societal information. 
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Table 4.6: Effect of Dependence on Internet News on Support for Democracy24 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













       
Internet News -2.378* 4.256*** -3.066*** -0.0932 -0.994 -2.514 
Dependence (1.324) (1.143) (1.010) (0.836) (1.402) (1.627) 
Social Class 5.447*** 3.657*** 5.358*** 4.336*** 5.614*** 7.895*** 
 (1.294) (1.119) (0.990) (0.819) (1.376) (1.595) 
Women -1.080 -5.813*** -0.636 -2.694*** -0.407 -3.893** 
 (1.271) (1.096) (0.969) (0.802) (1.344) (1.561) 
Age 0.0519 0.447* -0.201 -0.146 -0.934*** -0.295 
 (0.268) (0.230) (0.203) (0.168) (0.283) (0.327) 
Age Squared 0.000474 -0.00273 -7.99e-05 0.00112 0.00800** 0.00295 
 (0.00327) (0.00281) (0.00248) (0.00205) (0.00345) (0.00399) 
Education 2.138* 4.664*** 1.886** 3.419*** 1.227 4.562*** 
 (1.242) (1.069) (0.945) (0.783) (1.316) (1.526) 
Constant 4.034 43.13*** 23.45*** 17.22*** 58.18*** 12.21 
 (6.325) (5.400) (4.773) (3.951) (6.647) (7.677) 
       
Observations 2,464 2,788 2,747 2,788 2,727 2,710 
R-squared 0.059 0.089 0.093 0.145 0.124 0.092 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                 
24 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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Table 4.7: Effect of Dependence on News From Specific Mediums on Support for 
Democracy25 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













       
Television 6.060*** 9.720*** 2.221 3.233*** 0.652 0.457 
 (1.920) (1.693) (1.473) (1.197) (1.974) (2.256) 
Newspaper 7.347*** 11.33*** 4.093** 6.456*** 2.814 5.117* 
 (2.482) (2.202) (1.898) (1.557) (2.550) (2.926) 
Radio 5.374** 7.872*** 2.819 4.977*** 0.206 -0.196 
 (2.399) (2.132) (1.845) (1.507) (2.481) (2.833) 
Internet 3.911* 11.68*** -0.254 3.612*** 0.381 -0.930 
 (2.094) (1.853) (1.607) (1.310) (2.152) (2.466) 
Social Class 5.703*** 4.610*** 5.701*** 4.924*** 5.694*** 8.801*** 
 (0.712) (0.636) (0.542) (0.449) (0.736) (0.845) 
Women -0.353 -6.719*** -0.0590 -1.503*** -0.198 -2.903*** 
 (0.710) (0.634) (0.541) (0.449) (0.734) (0.843) 
Age -0.128 0.694*** -0.452*** -0.242*** -0.904*** -0.358** 
 (0.121) (0.106) (0.0910) (0.0752) (0.124) (0.141) 
Age Squared 0.00256** -0.00644*** 0.00340*** 0.00218*** 0.00789*** 0.00376*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00107) (0.000917) (0.000757) (0.00125) (0.00142) 
Education 2.071*** 8.009*** 1.325*** 1.753*** 1.255* 3.548*** 
 (0.654) (0.580) (0.496) (0.410) (0.674) (0.773) 
Constant 7.494** 20.66*** 29.26*** 19.72*** 60.56*** 19.22*** 
 (3.717) (3.265) (2.807) (2.309) (3.797) (4.340) 
       
Observations 8,077 9,193 9,039 9,193 8,882 8,879 
R-squared 0.055 0.101 0.084 0.133 0.104 0.072 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 detail the effects of dependence on news from the internet and other 
mediums on a person’s support for democracy26. The findings from the two tables provide mixed 
results regarding how dependence on internet news affects support for democracy. Table 4.6 
                                                 
25 Entropy balancing not used before this analysis. 
26 The measure for dependence on internet news is created from a categorical variable, which asked respondents 
which news medium they used firstly to receive information on national political matters. Respondents then chose 
between: television, internet, newspaper, radio, none, other, and don’t know. To accurately compare dependency 
across different mediums, I first dropped the other and don’t know categories.26 Following this, I created dummy 
variables for each of the remaining mediums.  
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shows that people dependent on internet news have less trust in government and satisfaction with 
democracy than people not dependent on internet news. However, people dependent on internet 
news are more politically knowledgeable than their non-dependent counterparts.  
In Table 4.7 where we control for dependence on other mediums and use people who do 
not seek information from any mediums as the comparison group, we see dependence on internet 
news has a positive and significant effect on trust in government, satisfaction with the economy, 
and political knowledge. While these findings are curious, they signal that dependence on 
internet news has positive effects on a person’s support for democracy in relation to not seeking 
any information at all, but not in relation to seeking information on other mediums. That is to 
say, internet news does not have as great an effect on a person’s support for democracy as 
dependence on other mediums does.  
Also of note, it seems that internet news has very similar effects on a person’s support for 
democracy as dependence on television news. These findings mirror those from Chapter Three 
that show internet news consumption has similar effects on support for democracy as 
consumption of television news. When we consider the content of most online and television 
news, we can see why there might be similarities in effects on behavior. Qualitative research in 
Central and Eastern Europe has noted that both television and internet news in the region tends 
towards a pattern of information through entertainment and soft news (Bajomi-Lazar 2012; 
Salovaara-Moring 2012). Because of this, it is not at all surprising that television and internet 
news have similar effects on a person’s support for democracy.  
The above findings present mixed results for the hypothesis that people who are 
dependent on internet news would have higher levels of support for democracy. While internet 
news does have a positive effect on a couple measures of support for democracy, a well as 
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political knowledge, these findings are not found for all measures of support for democracy. 
Furthermore, when we do not control for dependence on other mediums, we actually see a 
negative influence on a couple measures of support for democracy. From these mixed findings, 
we can discern that online news has the same effects for those who use it as television and radio 
news have. Only reading newspapers as a main source of political information consistently 
increases a person’s support for democracy. While these mixed findings provide some insight 
into how internet news may influence a person’s evaluations of government and democracy, we 
must continue by piecing apart these effects by website type as a one-size fits all measure of 
internet news may miss out on some effects that the medium provides.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The above findings paint an interesting picture of how the internet matters in influencing 
a person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The first, and perhaps most 
surprising, finding is that internet news has very little effect on a person’s support for 
democracy. In fact the only concept on which internet news has a consistent effect is political 
knowledge. Other than this, internet news had little to no effect on all measures of democratic 
support. While this was initially unexpected, the results section listed two theoretical reasons for 
these findings. First of all there could be significant variation between what is being presented on 
different news websites. As Salovaara- Moring (2012) notes online news has variation between 
websites as some present the news in a traditional hard news format while others may be more 
relatable to tabloids with entertainment and gossip mixed in with political information. The 
second possibility is that there is a difference in the effects of internet news in different 
countries. Conceivably, there could be differences between countries that would lead internet use 
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to be more or less influential. To be sure, these notions will be further investigated in Chapter 
Five.  
On the other side of the spectrum, the results show that social media use conforms to 
expectations and increases a person’s support for the democratic regime. This shows that the 
most important factor that makes the internet different from traditional media is its interactive 
capabilities. Through simple interaction on social networking websites, people have more 
support for democracy as well as higher political knowledge. Of further note, the regression 
estimates these effects are similar to reading a newspaper. That is to say using social media have 
similar effect on support for democracy as reading a newspaper does. This is certainly interesting 
because social media use has many different functions that are unrelated to politics and political 
discourse. Most notably social networking websites are used in order to keep up with friends or 
make new ones (Raacke and Raacke 2008; Wilson et al. 2012). While this may be disconnected 
from political life in theory, the ability to retain social ties and form weak ties that would 
otherwise be non-existent may increase the likelihood that a person is exposed to political 
information even if they are not seeking it.  
Furthermore, it may be that exposure to directly political media is not even needed to 
inform people on society and its governance. As Curran (2005) discusses, mass media plays an 
important role in serving democracy when it serves as an open forum of debate that reflects 
society’s diversity. The author also notes that soft news can also serve democracy by providing 
an important discussion on the state of society and the rules that govern it. Seemingly, social 
media can play both of these roles and may even do so better than traditional mediums. Sukosd 
and Bajomi-Lazar (2003) describe many of the problems regarding the relationship between 
media and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe as being couched in the same roles Curran 
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(2005) says that media should perform. The authors note that the biggest problems revolve 
around political pressure on the media, low minority access to media, and weak news 
competition. By providing an open space in which people can discuss anything from 
entertainment to hard news, social media offers a distinct opportunity to alleviate some of these 
problems. In doing so, social media allows connections across groups and access to news or 
information relevant to society that they may not be regularly exposed to on other mediums.  
This may be especially true for people who would try to opt out of political life 
completely. As Baum and Jamison (2006) show, people who are largely inattentive to politics 
who are exposed to soft news or entertainment oriented information are better able to apply their 
preferences in voting for political candidates. By simply allowing societal commentary or 
political information to flow across trusted channels of communication, social media may allow 
people to become informed consumers of democracy and thus more efficacious towards it.  
Finally, connections with other members may in itself diffuse democratic norms and 
ideas of political community. In doing so, social media may be able to diffuse norms regarding to 
altruistic behavior over self-interest, as well as the monitoring of those who would not abide by 
these rules (Coleman 1988). Therefore, social media may help keep the young democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe from the trap that happens to many new democracies in which 
corrupt leaders attempt to fix the rules of the game for their own good (Svolik 2013). This means 
the public space provided by social media can serve the role of a watchdog by disseminating 
politically relevant information to a largely inattentive public. By providing this role, social 
media may lead to better representatives by diffusing democratic norms and making corruption 
and other self-serving behavior more costly for political elites. By providing an interconnected 
social structure, social media could lead to higher evaluations of the regime through better 
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governance or citizen feelings of being represented. Thus, social media may increase the ability 
of civil society to provide the attentive and democratically supportive role that is ascribed to it 
(Lipset 1959;1994). 
While the above theoretical connections are important, we must not also forget to 
mention the limitations of this study. First of all, the data provided simply measures the use of 
social media or internet news. Therefore, it does not allow for direct testing of how different 
news or social content affects a person’s support for democracy. While there are theoretical 
reasons to infer that social media influences support for democracy through building social 
capital, providing political information, and providing a public space in which to discuss society 
and the rules that govern it, it is impossible to know whether one or all of these reasons influence 
support for democracy. To truly untangle these effects, researchers would need to conduct 
experiments in which online content is explicitly monitored or controlled.  
Despite the limitations, this study does provide baseline information that social media 
does indeed foster support for democratic governance. Furthermore, it shows that consumption 
of internet news does not have a direct effect on a person’s support for democracy. From the 
findings, this chapter is able to connect previous theory on political socialization to social 
media’s impact on support for democracy. Additionally, the chapter discussed possible reasons 
for the null findings regarding internet news’s effect on support for democracy. In Chapter Five, 
this discussion will be expanded in an attempt to understand whether or not country level 
differences and the type of website where a person gets their news online have any effect on how 
online news influences support for democracy. 
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CHAPTER V: DIFFERENCES IN ONLINE NEWS: THE EFFECTS OF WEBSITE TYPE 
AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES 
 
While the theory presented in Chapter Two discussed two ways that the internet could 
influence a person’s support for democracy, the empirical results in Chapter Four supported only 
one of these theoretical paths. The findings from Chapter Four showed consuming internet news 
has largely no effect on a person’s support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe while 
use of social media has a positive and significant effect. Although the findings pertaining to 
social media met the expectations outlined at the beginning of Chapter Four, the findings 
regarding the effect of online news on support for democracy were rather surprising. These 
findings warrant further discussion, as it is imperative this study to further understand how 
online news can influence a person’s support for democracy. This chapter will advance the 
discussion from previous chapters by exploring the effects that different sources of online news 
can have on a person’s support for democracy. Furthermore, it will continue by exploring 
whether or not country-level differences influence the ability of online news to socialize 
democratic norms.  
 The first reason for the null findings in Chapter Four considers that there may be a 
problem with measuring internet news as a general concept due to the variety of websites that 
could be considered news. The Eurobarometer data used in this study allows us to take apart 
some of these pieces and see if news consumed from certain websites categories may have 
different effects that would result in an overall null effect when we measure internet news 
consumption as a single entity. While content will certainly vary within online news categories, 
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the data from Eurobarometer 78.1 does contain more nuanced measures of what online news 
people consume. Therefore, the more nuanced measures may allow us to better understand how 
different types of online news influence a person’s support for government and democracy.  
 While the theory sections in the previous chapters were able to compensate by drawing 
on existing literature on the effects of internet in western democracies, theories of internet uses 
and gratifications research, and qualitative research on mass media in Central and Eastern 
Europe, this chapter faces stark limitations in the available research from which it can draw. This 
is because there are very few studies that seek to explore the effects of internet news from 
specific website categories. Furthermore, there is a distinct lack of empirical studies of this 
nature for new democracies, where any research on the effects of internet is qualitative in nature 
and focuses on commercial news outlets with an online presence. Because of the lack of previous 
scholarship that this study can draw from, this section of research will take a different approach 
from the previous chapters. Rather than making explicit hypotheses about how each type of 
website is believed to influence the various measures of support for democracy, this section will 
provide more of an inductive analysis of the effects that different website categories have on 
support for democracy. Therefore, this chapter will use the empirical section to explore the 
effects that news from various types of websites have on support for democracy. After the 
empirical investigation, the findings will be used to begin theorizing about how different types of 
websites may influence support for democracy.   
 To begin this process, we will start by exploring the different websites categories and 
their possible effects on the measures of support for democracy. The data from Eurobarometer 
78.1 contains measures asking respondents if they tend to get their online news from five 
different types of websites. The websites are governmental and official websites, online news 
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outlets, blogs, social media websites, and video hosting websites. While all of these have distinct 
characteristics, these forms of online news can be considered theoretically in three groups. The 
first group contains government and official websites. These websites are distinct from others in 
that they are directly controlled, or at the very least highly influenced, by the government and 
governing officials. Thus, the information provided comes primarily from politicians or 
government officials rather than journalists or citizens. The content of these websites usually 
takes the form of press releases, biographies of politicians, and information on government 
projects and initiatives. The second group focuses on online news outlets.  While the websites in 
this category vary, they can be termed as the online versions of offline news media or online 
specific news outlets. Their content can range from sensationalized, tabloid-style presentation to 
media that follows a more traditional hard news presentation (Salovaara-Moring 2012; Parrish-
Sprowl 2012). Despite differences in content, these websites are drawn together by the business 
driven model that they follow to provide news. Online news outlets do not directly present 
information from government officials as with official governmental websites, nor do they rely 
on user-generated content as websites in the third grouping. Therefore, online news outlets are 
different because professional journalists and editors decide what is newsworthy and generate 
content. The final group of websites differs from the other two because of their reliance on user-
generated content. This group contains social media websites, blogs, and video hosting websites. 
While these websites will be tested separately in the empirical section, they can be drawn 
together theoretically because of their reliance on members of society to either create, or share 
information. Therefore, these websites do not rely on journalistic norms or standards to produce 
information.  
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 Now that we have an outline of the types of websites in this study we can begin to 
develop a picture of how they may influence the measures of support for democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Governmental websites should provide support for both diffuse and specific 
support for the regime. This is because they provide a direct mode of communication from 
governed to citizen that avoids journalistic interpretation. This is an important distinction 
because direct communication allows politicians to avoid uncomfortable questions from 
journalists (see Bajomi-Lazar 2012), and present a more positive view of government and 
democracy. This positive presentation of government members and their activities should 
produce positive evaluations of government and democracy. Furthermore, these websites may 
offer opportunities to interact directly with government officials, something that is not available 
in the other categories (Coleman and Blumler 2009; Charles 2009). Therefore, people may not be 
simply consuming information on government and official websites, but they may also be 
participating in e-government (Coleman and Blumler 2009; Salovaara-Moring 2012). With 
findings from previous chapters showing that online interaction has the ability to socialize 
support for the regime, it would seem likely that this trend would continue. While this is a 
possibility, we must acknowledge that there is a chance that self-selection may influence who 
views these pages. While it is likely that supporters of the current regime and those highly 
interested in government and politics are more likely to visit these websites, self-selection does 
not eliminate the likelihood that the content they will receive will likely lead to support, or at 
least re-enforcement of support, for the regime and democracy.  
 The second grouping of online news outlets provides an interesting cross-section of 
possible content. While a measure that splits hard news websites from websites that present 
political stories in a manner similar to tabloids would have been ideal, the present data affords no 
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such luxuries. Be that as it may, this measure does allow us to better understand the role of 
commercial news online. Perhaps the most relevant discussion on the nature of these websites in 
Central and Eastern Europe comes from Inka Salovaara-Moring (2012). In her qualitative study, 
she sets out to describe how technological innovation, namely the advent of the internet, has 
influenced the media system and political discourse in the region. In doing so, she discusses the 
content and popularity of online news outlets. She notes that the most popular type of online 
news come from news portals. News portals in Central and Eastern Europe often carry a variety 
of content ranging from hard news to sensationalized journalism and pure entertainment. As 
previous studies note, soft news has been able to increase political engagement and knowledge 
(Baum 2002; Baum 2003; Baum and Jamison 2006) Furthermore, Curran (2005) notes that soft 
news can influence support for democracy through inadvertent means. However, other studies 
contend that news packaged as entertainment can make people more cynical of politics and 
public actors (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Despite the focus on the production of soft news 
online, we must not forget the hard news produced by online news outlets. As mentioned in 
earlier, research in established democracies as shown that internet news consumption increases 
political engagement, knowledge, and evaluations of government actors (Norris 2001; 
Mossberger et al. 2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006). Therefore, it is possible for online news to 
increase support for democracy. 
That being said, there are inherent difficulties in using these studies as a basis for an 
informed hypothesis. First of all, the fact that these countries are new democracies makes 
extrapolation from earlier studies difficult as these countries face a distinct set of challenges not 
found in established democracies. Specifically, much of the region has been affected by the 
deflationary crisis that began in 2008. Additionally, Hungary has seen the media restricted and 
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attempts to consolidate power by Viktor Orban and the Fidesz party (Freedom House 2013). 
Therefore, it may be the case that honest reporting online could lead to dissatisfaction with the 
economy and with government in countries that have seen economic decline or political crisis. 
Furthermore, the variation of content within online news websites increases the difficulty in 
predicting their effect on citizen attitudes. Certainly, these two complications make it difficult to 
make a firm prediction of the effects of online news websites on citizen support for democracy.    
 The final group of websites that we will explore is websites that rely on user-generated 
content. This group is vastly different from the other two groups of websites as there has not 
been much research into their possible effects. It should come as no surprise that this is 
especially true for new democracies. The research we do have from established democracies 
does little to enhance our knowledge of the effects of these types of websites27. However they do 
provide us with a background of how these websites function in those societies (see Hindman 
2008). Once again the difficulty lies in trying to use findings from these studies as direct 
predictors of what we will see in Central and Eastern Europe as the political realities of the 
countries studied are far different from those of older democracies.  
 Another thing we must account for in websites that rely on user generated content is the 
source and content produced in these websites. As previous research notes, the sources of content 
can range from political parties, politicians, and other political experts to members of society in 
general (Parrish- Sprowl 2012; Bajomi-Lazar 2012; Hindman 2008). Furthermore, websites that 
allow for sharing posts and stories from other websites will largely vary based on a person’s 
social network. Therefore, it would seem that people who “friend” the more politically motivated 
in society would receive a greater amount of politically relevant information in their newsfeed. 
                                                 
27 Although Baumgartner and Morris (2010) find that news from social networking websites, by and large, does not 
have an effect on a person’s political knowledge.  
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Certainly, these possibilities make it difficult to predict the exact direction and significance of 
effects that can be seen in survey research. Because of this, the current study will use the 
empirical results below to discern if any patterns appear that can aid in understanding the 
influence that these websites can have on a person’s support for democracy.   
 Aside from looking at how different online news websites influence support for 
democracy, this chapter will also begin to look at how country level differences can alter the 
influence of internet on support for democracy. As previous research has shown, outliers do exist 
in the study of media effects (see Aarts et al. 2012), so researchers must take care not to over 
generalize between types of countries or regions. Therefore, the empirical investigation will also 
explore the effects of online news in each country to see if any outliers exist between countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
Data and Methods 
 The data used to perform the exploratory analysis will once again come from 
Eurobarometer 78.1, which was conducted in November of 201228. This data offers two key 
elements to the current study. First of all, it allows researchers to break up measures of news 
consumption online from generic internet news consumption to news consumption from specific 
types of websites such as blogs, governmental websites, and video hosting websites. 
Furthermore, the cross-national survey allows researchers to explore the effects of online news in 
each country and compare them to each other in an attempt to better understand the role that new 
media plays in new democracies.   
 Once again this chapter will continue several methodological practices from the previous 
chapters. First, this chapter will employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and entropy 
                                                 
28 Once again this survey contains data from the following 10 post-communist Central and Eastern European 
countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
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balance reweighting to empirically test the above hypotheses. As with Chapter Four, the 
variables that internet use is balanced on in the Eurobarometer data are a person’s age, education, 
gender, social class, and their place of residence (urban or rural). Furthermore, this chapter will 
also normalize all dependent variables on a 0 to 100 scale29. Once again, this is done to enhance 
comparability across dependent variables.  
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables used in Chapter Five are the same as those used in Chapter Four 
to test the effects of internet news consumption and social media use on a person’s support for 
democracy. The lone variable used to measure diffuse support for democracy is based off of a 
question asking how satisfied a person is with democracy. While this is the only variable used to 
measure diffuse support we are able to enhance our understanding of various online news 
websites effect on political awareness and engagement with a variable measuring political 
knowledge. If you recall from Chapter Four, the measure is a scale created from a person’s 
response regarding three true or false statements about the European Union. Additionally, the 
survey data includes four measures of specific for support for the regime. Trust in government is 
a scale made up of four questions asking whether or not a person trusts their country’s 
government, political parties, legislature, and local government (alpha = .77). Satisfaction with 
the economy should tap into a person’s support for regime performance through citizen 
evaluation of the national economy (Booth and Seligson 2009). This variable is constructed from 
a question that asks how a person would judge the current state of their national economy. The 
last two dependent variables relate to how a person prospectively views the direction of their 
                                                 
29 This is done because the different data used in the study have varying scales of measurement. By normalizing the 
scale of the dependent variables we can easily compare and interpret the empirical results across datasets and 
chapters.  All changes are cosmetic in nature and any dependent variables that would require statistical tests other 
than OLS regressions had those methods employed and their results compared against the findings presented here 
for any significant differences.   
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country and national economy. These measures are important as prospective evaluations, 
especially of the economy, can signal strong support for the regime (Rose and Mishler 1994).  
Table  5.1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
Deviation N 
      
Trust in 
Government 25.26  32.23 8,617 
      
Political 
Knowledge 66.86 31.82 9,859  
      
Satisfaction with 
Democracy  35.31 26.49 9,672 
      
Satisfaction with 
the Economy 27.86 22.71 9,859 
      
Economic 
Expectations 39.01 36.11 9,502  
      
Direction of the 
Country 30.9 40.4 9,498  
 
Independent Variables 
 The empirical investigation in this chapter will focus on six main independent variables. 
The first relays a person’s dependence on the internet for news. This variable is binary, and is 
coded as one for dependent on internet news and zero for dependent on other mediums. The 
other independent variables of note all measure a person’s consumption of political news on 
certain types of websites. These variables all come from a categorical variable that asked 
respondents who answered that they consumed news online which websites they visited for 
information on national political affairs. To include people who were excluded from the question 
because they answered that they did not consume news online in an earlier question, I recoded 
the missing values to zero to represent that they do not use the website type in question. From 
this coding we can measure a person’s news consumption from governmental and official 
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websites, websites from news media outlets, social media, blogs, blogs and video hosting 
websites.  
 Finally the statistical tests in this chapter will control for a variety of factors that could 
also contribute to a person’s satisfaction with democracy. Variables such as social class, women, 
age, age squared and education are used to measure a person’s socio-economic status. Social 
class is a zero to two scale and is coded zero for working class individuals, one for middle class 
and two for upper class. Women is a variable used to measure gender and is coded zero for men 
and one for women. Age is a continuous variable that measures the age of a respondent, and age 
squared is the square of this value. The variable education measures a person’s educational 
attainment by reporting the year they ceased formal education. It was then recoded into four 
groups in an attempt to keep outliers from skewing the measure.30 Finally, this study controls for 
a person’s community through a series of dummy variables detailing the size of community a 
person lives in, as well as the country in which they reside.   
Table 5.2: Usage Summary of Online News  
  Use  Do Not Use 
     
Official Government 831  9,028 
 Websites 8.4% 91.6% 
     
Online News  2,465 7,394 
Outlets  25% 75% 
     
Social Media  956 8,903 
  9.7% 90.3% 
     
News Blogs 384 9,475 
  3.9% 96.1% 
     
Video Hosting 336 9,523 
  3.4% 96.6% 
 
 
                                                 
30 The four groups are no formal education, 15 and under, 16 to 19, and 20 and older. 
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Results 
 
 Table 5.3: Effect of Internet News on Support for Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe31  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














       
Government 4.791*** 5.227*** 1.239 2.378*** 2.438* 3.384** 
Websites (1.333) (1.148) (1.020) (0.837) (1.407) (1.617) 
Online News  -0.251 5.242*** -0.799 0.193 -0.933 0.732 
Outlets (0.917) (0.789) (0.702) (0.575) (0.967) (1.112) 
Social Media  -3.165** 1.478 0.0838 0.556 -1.113 -2.287 
 (1.291) (1.109) (0.985) (0.809) (1.352) (1.563) 
News Blogs -1.676 1.790 -1.664 -3.890*** -5.831*** -2.983 
 (1.928) (1.663) (1.479) (1.212) (2.040) (2.337) 
Video Hosting 3.086 -2.596 -0.579 0.807 6.617*** 4.445* 
Websites (1.991) (1.732) (1.537) (1.263) (2.108) (2.424) 
Social Class 5.297*** 3.638*** 5.655*** 4.733*** 4.919*** 7.988*** 
 (0.823) (0.706) (0.629) (0.514) (0.869) (0.995) 
Women -1.389* -5.394*** -0.676 -2.595*** 0.0455 -4.785*** 
 (0.824) (0.706) (0.629) (0.515) (0.867) (0.995) 
Age -0.108 0.427*** -0.299** -0.213** -0.895*** -0.421** 
 (0.168) (0.144) (0.128) (0.105) (0.177) (0.202) 
Age Squared 0.00224 -0.00234 0.00142 0.00197 0.00749*** 0.00453* 
 (0.00197) (0.00169) (0.00150) (0.00123) (0.00208) (0.00237) 
Education 2.119*** 4.163*** 0.929 2.121*** 1.893** 4.058*** 
 (0.813) (0.693) (0.618) (0.505) (0.855) (0.977) 
Constant 9.432** 45.36*** 26.97*** 20.50*** 56.88*** 15.35*** 
 (4.065) (3.455) (3.078) (2.519) (4.253) (4.861) 
       
Observations 5,952 6,728 6,625 6,728 6,551 6,516 
R-squared 0.058 0.098 0.089 0.139 0.109 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 5.3 presents the results of statistical tests that were performed to uncover whether 
or not news consumption from certain types of websites provide significant effects on a person’s 
support for democracy while others do not. From the results presented here we can see that 
government and official websites have a positive and significant effect on political knowledge 
and all measures of support for democracy except satisfaction with democracy. Other than this 
finding all other websites managed only sporadic significance on support for democracy. Of 
                                                 
31 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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these the only two noteworthy findings that present a pattern are news blogs negative and 
significant effect on current and prospective economic evaluations and video hosting websites 
positive and significant effect on prospective evaluations of the economy and country’s 
direction. Of these results perhaps the most interesting comes from the insignificance of news 
from online news outlets on a person’s support fro democracy. While the theory section 
discussed some reasons why this may occur, these null findings warrant further investigation. 
Specifically, we should begin to explore whether or not country level differences make a 
difference because it could be that country level differences could lead to null effects in the 
pooled cross-sectional data used so far. 
Table 5.4: Effect of Online News on Support for Democracy by Country32 

















       
Bulgaria -5.617 2.775 0.979 -0.176 0.539 -1.356 
 (3.566) (2.157) (2.402) (1.617) (2.827) (3.521) 
Czech Republic 3.233 6.027*** -2.120 0.668 -1.473 0.368 
 (2.006) (2.118) (2.004) (1.644) (2.413) (2.786) 
Estonia 2.077 3.376 -0.634 2.793 7.254** 2.972 
 (3.201) (2.578) (2.055) (1.809) (3.104) (3.597) 
Hungary -6.505** 6.915*** -6.900*** -3.872** -5.842* -6.060* 
 (3.147) (2.239) (2.264) (1.846) (3.141) (3.120) 
Latvia -1.416 5.268** 5.431*** 2.659* -0.729 2.226 
 (2.236) (2.477) (1.994) (1.602) (2.495) (3.261) 
Lithuania 1.786 8.125*** -2.320 -1.598 0.897 -6.163* 
 (2.672) (2.578) (1.863) (1.527) (2.899) (3.530) 
Poland 8.103*** 9.773*** 1.852 3.649** -4.725* 10.57*** 
 (2.647) (2.175) (1.791) (1.643) (2.672) (3.354) 
Romania -3.244 1.152 2.476 0.697 1.376 3.292 
 (2.529) (2.649) (2.055) (1.737) (3.278) (3.096) 
Slovakia -4.773 6.755*** -2.397 0.95 -4.695 -2.919 
 (3.048) (1.971) (1.988) (1.720) (2.925) (3.337) 
Slovenia 1.23 4.462** -0.798 0.00799 -0.246 -3.525 
  (2.099) (1.972) (2.100) (1.609) (2.796) (2.769) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
32 Entropy balancing used before this analysis. 
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Table 5.4 shows the effect that consuming news online has on support for democracy in 
each country in the sample. From the results there are several distinct patterns. First, consuming 
news online has a positive and statistically significant effect on political knowledge in every 
country except for Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria. This is interesting when we consider the 
findings from the other dependent variables. When we look for other consistent patterns in the 
table, one striking feature is that consuming online news in Hungary has a negative and 
significant effect on several measures of support for democracy. This finding may help put all of 
these results in perspective. Since Viktor Orban became prime minister in 2010, he and the 
Fidesz party have taken several steps to limit the freedom of the press. Furthermore, the regime 
has taken other steps, such as changing electoral laws, which has drawn international criticism as 
it may enhance Fidesz’s electoral fortunes (Freedom House 2013). This is important because the 
findings here may signal that online news is simply reporting events that should concern 
proponents of democracy in the country. 
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Table 5.5: Effect of News on Support for Democracy in Hungary33 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














       
Government  8.800* 3.116 -1.919 1.139 11.88** 9.787* 
Websites (4.936) (3.807) (3.638) (2.997) (4.792) (4.989) 
Online News  -2.602 7.004*** -4.551* -2.620 -6.821** -4.116 
Outlets (3.400) (2.633) (2.520) (2.073) (3.320) (3.459) 
Social Media News 2.355 5.269 -1.111 3.604 -9.115** -0.987 
 (4.314) (3.303) (3.156) (2.600) (4.138) (4.329) 
News Blogs -17.71*** -3.829 -5.176 -13.15*** -17.25*** -11.78* 
 (6.747) (5.250) (5.014) (4.133) (6.575) (6.877) 
Video Hosting 12.41 8.356 4.109 -5.389 6.374 16.55** 
Websites (7.989) (6.071) (5.798) (4.779) (7.599) (7.951) 
Television News 5.608 4.475 0.597 -1.302 7.331* 1.396 
 (3.955) (3.113) (2.973) (2.450) (3.916) (4.078) 
Newspaper 6.078** 9.324*** 4.886*** 3.157** 0.248 4.574* 
 (2.538) (1.955) (1.871) (1.539) (2.454) (2.573) 
Radio News 7.893*** 5.292*** 5.232*** 1.770 4.087* 5.955** 
 (2.554) (1.968) (1.883) (1.549) (2.474) (2.588) 
Social Class 6.299** 3.203 10.59*** 6.512*** 8.138*** 9.305*** 
 (2.662) (2.057) (1.968) (1.619) (2.585) (2.705) 
Women 5.355** -2.373 0.803 -1.776 -0.372 0.615 
 (2.465) (1.904) (1.823) (1.499) (2.392) (2.504) 
Age -1.436*** 0.528 -0.729** -0.289 -1.762*** -0.914** 
 (0.437) (0.332) (0.317) (0.261) (0.416) (0.435) 
Age Squared 0.0163*** -0.00505 0.00707** 0.00296 0.0174*** 0.0104** 
 (0.00431) (0.00325) (0.00312) (0.00256) (0.00408) (0.00427) 
Education 2.521 4.265** 1.934 0.673 4.385* 0.988 
 (2.356) (1.818) (1.741) (1.431) (2.289) (2.395) 
Constant 38.56*** 36.62*** 38.57*** 23.66*** 56.25*** 29.90** 
 (11.95) (9.152) (8.744) (7.204) (11.48) (12.02) 
       
Observations 816 905 901 905 897 898 
R-squared 0.082 0.084 0.077 0.061 0.067 0.054 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To examine this possibility further, Table 5.5 shows how news from the internet and 
traditional media influence support for the regime in Hungary. As in previous chapters, all 
independent media variables are measured binomially. Other than television news, news from 
traditional mediums tends to increase a person’s support for the regime. While we would 
                                                 
33 Entropy balancing not used before this analysis. 
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consider this a good thing in most countries in the sample, the opposite is true for Hungary. This 
is, as mentioned previously, because of the attempts to suppress freedom of the press and 
consolidate power by the ruling Fidesz party. As such, it seems that online news may be 
presenting information that attempts to hold leaders accountable, something that traditional 
media may not be able to do because of fear of being sued for libel or having the news 
organization completely shutdown (Freedom House 2013). These provisions, which took effect 
in 2011, severely limit the amount of dissent that can be transmitted to the public via traditional 
mediums. Furthermore, the attempts to centralize power by the Fidesz party signal that 
democracy is not working as it should in the country. If we revisit Dahl (1971), we see that 
competitiveness is one of the key components of working democracy, and it seems that it has 
declined in recent years. In response to this backdrop, the findings that political blogs and online 
news outlet influence dissent for the ruling party actually shows that online news may be 
promoting support for democracy. We can elaborate on this thought when we consider that for 
democracy to succeed the mass public not only needs to serve as a supportive base (Lipset 1959; 
1994), but also needs to be engaged enough to ensure that would be autocrats are unable to fix 
the rules of the game and consolidate power (Svolik 2013). Therefore, by influencing a negative 
evaluation of government in a country where the leadership is attempting to consolidate power, 
internet news may provide further support for the stability and competitiveness of democracy.   
These findings also show where the government is able to put political pressure on and 
influence support in the digital age. The findings show that while the opposition can use blogs 
and even online news outlets to curry favor with the public, governmental websites and 
traditional media outlets produce support for the political elites in power. This shows that the 
internet and communicative technology can present problems for governments that wish to 
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control the flow of information to the public. While Fidesz and the new media laws have exerted 
pressure on traditional media outlets (Bajomi-Lazar 2013; Freedom House 2013), the internet 
looks to be unaffected by these efforts.  
Despite the interesting findings presented here, the present study is not without it’s 
limitations. As with most studies of media effects, it is often difficult to control for the effects of 
medium self-selection. While the current study utilizes statistical methods such as entropy 
balancing in an attempt to control for confounding factors and add robustness to the findings, no 
empirical research can be completely sure that their findings are causal. Despite the limitations, 
this study does rely on previous literature, which shows that mass media and the internet can 
influence a person’s attitudes towards government. Therefore, while the study cannot rule out 
problems of self-selection and other causal uncertainties, it follows in a similar vein as other 
studies of media effects. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings presented here give us a little more insight into how internet news matters 
for citizens of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. If we look at dependency on 
internet as a precursor for effects, we can see that there are some mixed findings. First of all, 
internet news matters in much of the same way that television and radio news does. While they 
all lack the ability to increase a person’s support for all measures of democracy, they do 
influence some measures of support. From this, it seems that being informed, regardless of 
medium, is often better than not being informed at all. While internet news may not have the 
largest impact on a person’s overall support for democracy it does increase trust in government 
and satisfaction with the economy, two measures of specific support on which young 
democracies heavily rely (Booth and Seligson 2009; Easton 1975).  
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However the most interesting results come from the exploratory analysis of how different 
website types, and country specific differences effect the ability of online news to influence a 
person’s support for the regime. The findings show that certain website types, government 
websites and online news outlets, increase political knowledge, while websites that rely on user 
generated content do not. Furthermore, the findings show that internet news may actually 
perform one of the key roles that are normatively ascribed to media. Namely, in the face of 
increased regulations on traditional media in Hungary, online news and political blogs seem to 
serve as the voice of dissent. This may in the long run hold leaders accountable for their actions 
and keep them from completely consolidating power. Once again, this may serve an important 
role in preventing an authoritarian backslide. The previous literature notes that democracy is 
consolidated when it is seen as the “only game in town” by elites and the mass public (Linz and 
Stepan 1996). Furthermore, political elites who attempt to fix the rules of the game and 
consolidate power at the top, much like what the Fidesz party has done in recent years, are able 
to do so easily when society does not oppose these moves (Svolik 2013). By providing an outlet 
that is difficult for the government to control, the internet and the news produced in it may be 
able to serve as a sphere of influence that allows society the ability to retain some control over 
political information. In doing so, the internet provides a powerful tool that can aid in holding 
leaders accountable through increasing dissatisfaction with political elites who may try to fix the 
rules of the game.  
When we look at the findings of this chapter in relation to findings from previous 
chapters we can begin to see the ways that internet news matters for these new democracies. 
Although the findings in Chapter Four showed that the consumption of internet news had null 
effects on a person’s support for democracy, the findings in this chapter show that online news 
  107 
does have an effect, but it is very nuanced. First of all, these findings did follow some of the key 
tenants of dependency theory. While the findings that people who consume online news as their 
main source of information on politics yielded mixed results, others show that online news does 
have more influence on people more when their society is in transition (see Ball- Rokeach 1976; 
Loveless 2008). The findings show that the most consistent influence on a person’s support for 
governance and democracy is on people in Hungary. Arguably this could be so because their 
society has seen great change in the recent years while others have had more stability in 
governance. While we have discussed this at length above, it does bear mention again as it shows 
that online news may serve more as a siren rather than a medium to socialize democratic values.  
When we consider this notion with the findings from Chapter Four that show social 
media use tends to increase support for democracy, we can begin to see the varying roles that 
certain websites may have in democratic society. While social media can instill ideas of 
community and offers the ability to build social capital through interaction with other members 
of society, online news may provide ways to hold leaders accountable. With this in mind we can 
begin to understand why internet use generally and social media use would positive effects on 
support for democracy, but online news consumption would produce null effects. This is 
especially true when we consider who uses online news. As previous literature shows, people 
who seek out news in fragmented media environments are usually highly politically interested 
and motivated (Prior 2007). Because of this, we could theoretically see electoral winners and 
losers self-selecting into certain websites that reinforce support or dissatisfaction with those in 
power (see Anderson 2005). Given the exception of Hungary, this seems the most likely 
explanation for the null findings in the previous two chapters. To be certain, future research 
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should attempt to uncover the conditional effects of electoral success and online news 
consumption on a person’s support for political actors.  
This chapter has shown several different ways that online news consumption can 
influence a person’s support for democracy. As mentioned above, the most interesting is the way 
the online news seems to serve as a siren to the mass public when the country is not functioning 
as a true competitive democracy should. In light of these findings, we should further explore the 
possibility that the relationship between internet use and support for democracy may be 
conditional on how well the government works. As mentioned above it seems likely that 
interaction through social media and other websites would increase democratic values such as 
tolerance regardless of government outputs, but measures of specific support may be conditional 
on government output (Easton 1975; Lipset 1994). In the next chapter, we will further investigate 
this possibility by revisiting some of the results from previous chapters in relation to how a 
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CHAPTER VI: DOES INTERNET USE HAVE THE SAME EFFECTS IN DEMOCRACIES 
AND NON-DEMOCRACIES? 
 
Up until now, this study has largely focused on how internet use and individual website 
usage influences support for democracy. However, Chapter Five showed the effects online news 
has on support for democracy are conditional on the national context. While it is important to 
understand the role that online news plays in this process, it is also important to revisit some of 
the findings from previous chapters and see whether or not general internet use’s influence 
support for measures of democracy is dependent on the national context. Specifically, this 
chapter will revisit some of the findings from Chapter Three. The findings presented in Chapter 
Three established that internet use increases support for democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, the findings from Chapter Five show that further analysis is needed as the 
pooled data used in Chapter Three contained countries that vary across measures of national and 
media freedom. Therefore, the pooled data may hide interesting findings that would help in 
understanding the nuances in internet use’s influence on support for democracy. Furthermore, the 
European Social Survey data used in Chapter Three contains better measures of democratic 
norms, which should aid in helping us understand the dissemination of democratic values via the 
internet in different national contexts.  
To be sure, the idea that the influence mass media has on a person’s attitudes and 
opinions is conditional on the context of society and the media system is not new or novel (see 
Ball Rokeach and DeFluer 1976; Mughan and Gunther 2000; Pfetsch and Esser 2004). However, 
most studies that account for how national context conditions media use’s influence on 
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individual level cognition or political behavior are qualitative in nature and focus on traditional 
mediums. The lone exception of note comes from Nisbet et al (2012) in which the authors note 
that internet use correlates with greater citizen demand for democracy in Africa and Asia. 
Because of the lack of scholarship on this subject, this chapter looks to forward the discussion of 
how national context interacts with internet use to produce support or dissatisfaction with 
government and democracy.   
If we look back to Chapter Three, we see general internet use increases a person’s diffuse 
and specific support for the democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the 
pooled, cross-sectional data might hide some interesting findings as there is certainly national 
context that is unaccounted for in the previous chapters. While Freedom House lists eight of the 
ten countries as free for the entirety of the study, Russia and Ukraine are outliers in this measure. 
Russia is listed as not free for ever year it is included in the study and Ukraine alternates between 
free and partly free ratings. When we consider this in conjunction with the findings regarding 
Hungary in Chapter 5, we can see there is a distinct possibility that internet use will not have the 
same effects in the partly free and not free regimes in Russia and Ukraine. As noted in Chapter 
Five, this is because online news seems to serve as an outlet for dissent when democratic 
governance is lacking.  
When we consider these variances with the findings from Chapter Five there is reason to 
believe that measures of specific support are likely to be impacted by poor governance. The 
reasoning for this comes from considering the two pathways that the internet has to influence 
specific and diffuse support. As theorized in the previous chapters, the internet is able to increase 
support for the regime by providing increased opportunities for citizens to interact with other 
citizens and government officials. This in turn, provides a basis for disseminating democratic 
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norms through society. Therefore, we should expect that this process should continue regardless 
of how well the government functions. 
This is because citizen interaction provides the conditions for people to become trusting 
of one another. Furthermore, technology such as the internet allows people to meet people who 
are outside of their social group, which can cultivate weak ties (Parrish-Sprowl 2012; Ellison et 
al. 2007). Because of this, the interaction with other members of society can increase trust in 
others, as well as tolerance for other lifestyles (Coleman 1988; Paxton 2002). Because of social 
interaction online, it seems likely that democratic norms of tolerance and trust could be built in 
societies that are non-democratic.  
On the other hand, the previous chapters demonstrated that online news helps to inform 
the citizenry and serve as a mechanism to hold leaders accountable. While traditional media can 
also provide this function in societies where the press is free of political pressure or control, the 
internet can provide this function in societies that are not afforded this luxury. This is evident 
from our findings regarding Hungary in 2012. As Chapter Five shows, consuming news from 
online news outlets and blogs makes Hungarians less supportive of the regime. We can reason 
that this is the case because increased political pressure on the press has resulted in the internet 
being a medium that is used for political opposition to discuss the shortcomings of the regime. 
Therefore, in regimes that are having difficulties consolidating democracy, or that are even non-
democratic, and have considerable control over the press, we should see the online news serve as 
the voice of political opposition. This notion is seconded by Bratton et al. (2005), who claim 
mediums such as the internet, with low government regulation and a high plurality of content, 
has the greatest impact in getting an audience to reject authoritarian rule. This happens because 
online content is able to break from crafted messages on traditional media that enable autocratic 
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leaders to consolidate power and create a public that is incapable of challenging the status quo 
(Howard 2009; Nisbet et al. 2012). By providing people with an outlet to challenge the status 
quo in a society where political pressure is placed on the traditional press, internet use should 
lead citizens to be less trusting and satisfied with the regime, all while social interaction online 
increases support for democratic norms.  
When we look at the ten countries in the European Social Survey that are used in this 
study, Russia and Ukraine stand out as cases that are different from the other eight. Both 
countries have been rated by Freedom House as either partly free or not free at some point 
between 2002 and 2010. Furthermore, Figure 6.1 presents the average level of press freedom 
from 2002-2010 in the democracies and non-democracies in our sample34. The scale runs from 0 
to 100 where 0 is the freest press and 100 is the least free. In this graph we can see that the press 
in Ukraine and Russia is dramatically less free than in the eight democracies in our sample. 
Indeed in all years from 2002-2010, the media system in these two countries was rated as either 
partly free or not free. Further differences between Russia and Ukraine and the other countries in 
the study come from their relationship with the European Union (EU). Of the ten countries in the 
study, only Russia and Ukraine are neither full EU members nor EU candidate countries during 
the time period studied.  
 
 
                                                 
34 This is calculated using Freedom House Freedom of the Press data. The Freedom House Freedom of the Press 
rankings account for legal restrictions, political control over media, and the economic environment, which accounts 
for the structure and transparency of media ownership as well as the economic pressure that a state puts on the 
media. Using these criteria, Freedom House then assigns each country a score from zero to 100 where zero 
represents a media system that is completely free and 100 represents one that has no freedom.  
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Figure 6.1: Freedom of the Press in Central and Eastern Europe 
  
 
The differences between Ukraine and Russia and the rest of the sample do not end here. 
Table 6.1 shows the top five websites used in each country, excluding search engines (e.g. 
Google35), along with the category that each website fits in. This data comes from alexa.com, a 
website company that specializes in collecting global website traffic data and estimating a 
website’s global and national ranking based on a proprietary methodological system. As we can 
see, social media and video hosting websites are very popular in every country, as Facebook or 
the local equivalent VK are the top visited website in each country. However, the table shows 
that there are significant differences in the popularity of news portals across countries. News 
portals, which are online news outlets that often provide a mixture of hard news, soft news, and 
                                                 
35 Search engines were not counted in the top five as they are used to reach specific websites rather than used to 
interact or gain information directly. While Google was a top five website in each of the ten countries in the sample, 
its inclusion into Table 6.1 offers little insight into what content is viewed by internet users, and how the internet is 
used in each country.  
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in some cases social media and video hosting elements (see Salovaara-Moring 2012), are more 
popular in democracies than in Russia and Ukraine. This is evidenced by every democracy other 
than Bulgaria having at least two news portals in their top five visited websites while Russia and 
Ukraine both only have one. Furthermore, the content of the one news portal that makes Ukraine 
and Russia’s top five visited websites is far different than many of the top visited news portals in 
the democratic countries. While the news portals in democracies present information as their 
main purpose, Mail.ru is an email service with news on the landing page. Therefore, most of the 
top news portals in the Central and Eastern European democracies are more akin to websites 
from tabloids and newspapers, the top news portal in Russia and Ukraine is more closely related 
to websites like Yahoo!.  
The other difference portrayed in Table 6.1 is the percentage of households in that have 
access to the internet in each country. The data for this portion of the table comes from the 
International Telecommunications Union, which is a United Nations agency that specializes in 
information and communication technologies. All of the data comes from 2012, with the 
exception of Russia, whose last available data came from 2011. The table shows that the internet 
has diffused to many households in the Central and Eastern European democracies as several of 
the countries have access rates that are just slightly below advanced democracies in Western 
Europe. However, the diffusion of internet technology has lagged behind in Russia and Ukraine. 
As Norris (2001) notes, “Metcalf’s law suggests that the value of a network is proportional to the 
square number of the people using it: the more people link to the internet, the greater the utility, 
the more it attracts” (5).  Furthermore, Norris (2001) notes that technological development 
interacts with the level of democracy and socioeconomic development of a nation to structure the 
opportunities of mediation between citizens and the state. Because of this, it seems that access to 
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the internet could have an impact on how many people are using the internet in a given society 
and thus its utility in that society. Furthermore, the basic theme of the interaction of technology 
with society fits with the above discussion on how level of democracy could impact the effects 
produced by internet use. 
As the above discussion shows, Russia and Ukraine are outliers in both internet use and 
democratization. Thus, it is likely that internet use in these countries will have different effects 
than in the other eight countries in the sample. Research on internet use and support for 
democracy predicts that internet use should increase a person’s efficacy and support for 
democratic norms in Russia and Ukraine (see Nisbet et al. 2012). As mentioned earlier, this is 
because social interaction online can build social capital (Burke et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2010; 
Steinfield et al. 2008), which in turn can increase a person’s trust in and tolerance of others 
(Paxton 2002). Internet use in these countries should also have either negative or null effects on 
support for the political regime. As seen in previous chapters, certain conditions can raise the 
tendency that online news outlets and blogs will serve as the voice of dissent and produce 
negative evaluations of government. However, we also see that the differences in where people 
get their news online may provide different effects. Because of this, we may see people who 
receive news from pro-government news outlets in Russia and Ukraine become more supportive 
of the government, which may lead to null overall effects of internet use on specific support in 
these countries. Furthermore, the lack of internet access in both Russia and Ukraine could lead to 
a relative unimportance for the internet in their societies. Because of the uncertainty involved, 
this chapter will take a similar approach as the previous one and refrain from making definitive 
hypotheses. Instead, it will present the findings in an inductive manner, and discuss how they fit 







Table 6.1: Percentage of Households with Access to the Internet and Most Viewed Websites in Central and Eastern Europe  
Bulgaria Access- 51% Croatia Access- 66% Czech Republic Access- 62% Estonia Access- 75% 
1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 
2. YouTube Video Hosting 2. YouTube Video Hosting 2. Seznam  
News Portal/ 
Link Catalog 2. YouTube Video Hosting 
3. ABV 
News Portal/ 
Email 3. Index News Portal 3. YouTube Video Hosting 3. Delfi News Portal 
4. Wikipedia Encyclopedia 4. Jutarnji News Portal 4. Idnes News Portal 4. Postimees News Portal 
5. OLX 
Online 
Shopping 5. 24sata News Portal 5. Novinky News Portal 5. Wikipedia Encyclopedia 
Hungary Access- 69% Poland Access- 70% Slovakia Access- 77% Slovenia Access- 74% 
1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 1. Facebook Social Media 
2. YouTube Video Hosting 2. YouTube Video Hosting 2. YouTube Video Hosting 2. YouTube Video Hosting 
3. Index News Portal 3. Allegro 
Online 
Shopping 3. Sme News Portal 3. 24ur News Portal 
4. Origo News Portal 4. Onet News Portal 4. Azet 
News Portal/ 
Link Catalog 4. RTV Slo News Portal 
5. Wikipedia Encyclopedia 5. WP News Portal 5. Topky News Portal 5. Planet Siol News Portal 
Russia 
Access- 46% 
(2011) Ukraine Access- 36%     
1. VK Social Media 1. VK Social Media     
2. Mail.ru 
News Portal/ 
Email 2. YouTube Video Hosting     
3. YouTube Video Hosting 3. Mail.ru 
News Portal/ 
Email     
4. Facebook Social Media 4. Facebook Social Media     









Data and Methods 
 The data used in this chapter comes the European Social Survey. The data was collected 
across Europe in five bi-annual waves between 2002 and 2010. Once again, the surveys allow us 
to understand the effects of internet use on support for democracy in ten countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe36. As discussed above, the differences between Russia and Ukraine and the 
rest of the countries in the study provide the perfect opportunity to split the sample and see 
whether national context conditions the effects of the internet on support for democracy.  
To accomplish this task, this chapter will perform empirical tests similar to those found in 
Chapter Three. The main difference between the two chapters results from splitting the survey 
sample based on regime type rather than using a cross-sectional pooled sample that includes 
respondents from all ten countries. The first survey sample used will only use respondents from 
the eight countries that are democracies for the entire period from 2002 to 201037. The next 
sample utilized will contain the non-democratic regimes of Russia and Ukraine. Following these 
empirical tests, the chapter will continue by testing Russia and Ukraine separately. Finally, the 
empirical testing will split Ukraine’s sample based on years Freedom House rated the country as 
partly free (2004 and 2010) and years it was rated as free (2006 and 2008). Also, as with 
previous chapters, this empirical investigation will begin by performing entropy balance 
reweighting in order to add robustness to the findings (Hainmueller 2012). As was previously 
done in this study, the variables that internet use is balanced on in the European Social Survey 
data are religiosity, political ideology, education, age, and gender.  
                                                 
36 The countries included in the study are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine. 










 The dependent variables in this chapter are the same variables utilized for the statistical 
tests in Chapter Three. Once again, these variables can be grouped into three categories that 
underlie a person’s political attentiveness, specific support for the governing regime, and diffuse 
support for democracy. The variable used to test a person’s political attentiveness and 
engagement is a measure of internal efficacy. The variables used to measure diffuse support 
come from several categories that measure a person’s satisfaction with democracy and attitudes 
toward other members of society. The final concept to be tested will be specific support. The 
variables utilized to test this concept will be trust in, and satisfaction with the government as well 
as a person’s satisfaction with the economy. 
As in all previous chapters, all of the dependent variables are scaled from zero to 100. In 
this scale, zero relates to having the lowest efficacy or support for democratic governance and 
100 relates to having the highest efficacy or support for democratic governance. This is 
performed to help in comparing results across dependent variables (see Booth and Seligson 
2009). This change is simply cosmetic, and is done to normalize the range of all dependent 
variables.  This aids in interpretation by allowing us to compare the effects of internet use across 
dependent variables and datasets. 
Independent Variables 
 The main independent variable that this chapter focuses on is internet use. The variable 
comes from a survey question asking how often an individual uses the internet for personal use. 
The seven-point scale of use was then recoded to a binary measure detailing whether person uses 
or does not use the internet. This is done for practical reasons, as the data used does not provide 







the Eurobarometer data used in Chapter Four and Chapter Five also contain a different coding 
for use of the internet and the use of specific websites. Because of the difference in measurement 
across mediums and datasets, this study utilizes measures of use and non-use rather than scales 
relating to the amount of time spent consuming media.  
  The control variables utilized this chapter will also mirror the control variables in 
Chapter Three. If you recall the discussion from that chapter, these controls can fit into three 
groups. The first group of control variables includes measures of basic socio-economic status 
such as age, gender, and education. The second group contains measures of a person’s political 
and civic interests38, while the third controls for country and year specific effects. 
Table 6.2: Usage Summary of Internet Use By Regime Type  
  Use  Do Not Use 
      
Democracies 22,829 30,822 
  42.55% 57.45% 
     
Non- 3,401  11,408 
Democracies  23% 77% 
     
Russia  2,176 5,056 
  30.1% 69.9% 
     
Ukraine 1,225  6,352 
  16.2% 83.8% 
 
                                                 








Table 6.3: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Democracies39 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















         
Internet Use 4.750*** 1.003*** 1.631*** 3.412*** 3.452*** 3.274*** 5.141*** 4.257*** 
 (0.257) (0.227) (0.259) (0.240) (0.260) (0.212) (0.327) (0.225) 
Political  8.234*** 3.047*** 2.111*** 1.198*** 1.939*** 0.994*** 0.765*** 2.062*** 
Interest (0.159) (0.137) (0.156) (0.144) (0.156) (0.127) (0.196) (0.135) 
Education 3.178*** 0.910*** 0.841*** 1.855*** 1.388*** 1.682*** 1.153*** 1.989*** 
 (0.122) (0.106) (0.121) (0.112) (0.121) (0.0982) (0.152) (0.105) 
Women -6.223*** 1.296*** 0.481** -0.627*** -0.742*** 1.038*** 6.333*** 0.458** 
 (0.240) (0.211) (0.238) (0.221) (0.239) (0.194) (0.300) (0.206) 
Religion -0.732*** 0.966*** 0.842*** 0.530*** 0.551*** 0.553*** -3.640*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0951) (0.0833) (0.0941) (0.0871) (0.0942) (0.0766) (0.119) (0.0815) 
Partisanship 3.239*** 4.827*** 2.421*** 0.313 1.846*** -1.411*** -1.768** -0.450 
 (0.662) (0.558) (0.645) (0.599) (0.648) (0.528) (0.816) (0.552) 
Ideology 0.266*** 0.618*** 0.503*** 0.796*** 1.092*** 0.416*** -0.493*** 0.0712 
 (0.0543) (0.0473) (0.0534) (0.0496) (0.0536) (0.0437) (0.0675) (0.0468) 
Age 0.234*** -0.350*** -0.310*** -0.498*** -0.423*** -0.436*** 0.0321 -0.0238 
 (0.0512) (0.0438) (0.0494) (0.0459) (0.0496) (0.0404) (0.0625) (0.0429) 
Age Squared -0.00230*** 0.00331*** 0.00353*** 0.00489*** 0.00349*** 0.00484*** -0.00286*** -0.000583 
 (0.000608) (0.000512) (0.000580) (0.000539) (0.000582) (0.000474) (0.000736) (0.000505) 
Constant 35.88*** 19.42*** 29.79*** 25.44*** 28.80*** 34.28*** 69.17*** 50.57*** 
 (1.170) (0.996) (1.145) (1.062) (1.148) (0.934) (1.444) (0.998) 
         
Observations 28,122 31,213 37,468 37,691 37,505 37,624 36,679 34,326 
R-squared 0.205 0.115 0.067 0.112 0.082 0.069 0.086 0.115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                 







Table 6.3 presents the results of statistical tests that show internet use’s effect on support 
for democracy in the stable democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. As the findings show, 
internet use has a positive and significant effect on all measures of support for democracy. This 
mirrors the findings from previous chapters and shows that internet use does increase citizen 
support for democracy. Given the findings in Chapters Three and Four, this should come as no 
surprise. When we revisit the theory and previous findings it is likely that the social interaction 
provided by internet use aids in socializing democratic norms while online news increases 
political knowledge and efficacy. While online news may offer little support for attitudes toward 
democracy, the findings from previous chapters show that it only seems to decrease support for 
the regime when the conditions dictate it. For these countries, during the time period these 
surveys were taken, it seems highly unlikely that online news would serve as a detriment to 






Table 6.4: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Non-Democracies40 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 4.230*** 0.925 0.806 1.542** 1.738** 1.180* 5.729*** 2.977*** 
 (0.757) (0.662) (0.749) (0.666) (0.787) (0.651) (1.071) (0.744) 
Political  9.405*** 2.110*** 1.853*** -0.270 0.479 1.013*** -0.395 0.853* 
Interest (0.471) (0.392) (0.443) (0.393) (0.467) (0.383) (0.633) (0.440) 
Education 0.475 0.386 0.836** 1.269*** 0.745* 0.192 0.565 1.312*** 
 (0.413) (0.346) (0.390) (0.347) (0.411) (0.339) (0.560) (0.392) 
Women -5.720*** 2.612*** 2.193*** 0.533 0.606 2.251*** 4.339*** -0.167 
 (0.732) (0.621) (0.705) (0.625) (0.739) (0.610) (1.003) (0.698) 
Religion 0.266 1.178*** 0.440 0.115 1.208*** 0.135 -2.234*** 0.727** 
 (0.316) (0.266) (0.300) (0.266) (0.316) (0.258) (0.425) (0.296) 
Partisanship 2.127 3.908*** 3.538** 0.740 1.766 2.320* 3.587 0.726 
 (1.666) (1.418) (1.616) (1.428) (1.681) (1.399) (2.288) (1.623) 
Ideology -0.0132 0.963*** 1.712*** 1.351*** 1.864*** 0.450*** 0.412 0.735*** 
 (0.188) (0.163) (0.186) (0.164) (0.193) (0.161) (0.266) (0.186) 
Age 0.162 -0.413*** -0.201 -0.278** -0.328** -0.146 -0.0358 -0.141 
 (0.165) (0.139) (0.157) (0.139) (0.164) (0.136) (0.226) (0.159) 
Age Squared -0.00237 0.00400** 0.00167 0.00154 0.00232 0.00208 -0.00310 0.000771 
 (0.00207) (0.00173) (0.00194) (0.00172) (0.00202) (0.00167) (0.00281) (0.00197) 
Constant 32.47*** 30.85*** 34.91*** 34.70*** 33.10*** 40.23*** 45.96*** 30.15*** 
 (3.206) (2.799) (3.154) (2.798) (3.303) (2.725) (4.509) (3.159) 
         
Observations 2,881 4,207 4,375 4,450 4,268 4,388 4,132 3,971 
R-squared 0.180 0.107 0.224 0.138 0.062 0.017 0.038 0.056 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 







Table 6.4 gives us our first look at how internet use effects support for democracy in 
Russia and Ukraine. Internet use generally has a positive and significant effect on a person’s 
diffuse support, efficacy, and surprisingly support for the economy. However, it also has null 
effects on a person’s satisfaction with and trust in government. As noted previously, the positive 
effects on a person’s support for democratic norms is likely due to the effects of social 
interaction online. The null effects likely result from online news. As we found in Chapter Five, 
online news, especially from commercial news outlets and blogs serve as a means to educate the 
public on why they should be unsupportive of an illiberal or authoritarian regime (see also 
Toepfl 2013). While some may question why specific support would not become negative under 
these conditions, we should also consider that illiberal and authoritarian regimes have 
considerable influence over state run media that can also influence a person’s support for 
governance. This may lead to null effects due to the mixed messages that people receive online 
from state run and oppositional media (see Zaller 1992). However, it is possible that self-
selection can occur in which supporters of the regime and the opposition select into online news 
outlets that reinforce their beliefs on the current regime. While both possibilities are likely, the 
findings that internet use still increases support for democratic norms in partly free and autocratic 
regimes warrants further exploration as there could be differences between Russia and Ukraine 
due to Russia being a fully autocratic country and Ukraine fluctuating between free and partly 






Table 6.5: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Russia41 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















         
Internet Use 3.642*** 0.348 -0.771 1.274 0.423 1.121 4.926*** 3.267*** 
 (0.927) (0.871) (0.951) (0.871) (0.963) (0.794) (1.253) (0.888) 
Political  9.149*** 2.215*** 1.893*** -0.0817 -0.578 1.089** -0.409 0.615 
Interest (0.575) (0.513) (0.557) (0.509) (0.565) (0.463) (0.734) (0.518) 
Education 0.127 0.325 0.851* 1.413*** 1.171** 0.348 1.114* 1.334*** 
 (0.488) (0.440) (0.478) (0.439) (0.484) (0.400) (0.635) (0.449) 
Women -6.886*** 3.233*** 2.489*** 0.224 1.971** 2.488*** 4.493*** 0.465 
 (0.907) (0.833) (0.909) (0.834) (0.920) (0.759) (1.197) (0.847) 
Religion -0.245 0.934** 0.0700 0.133 0.655 -0.00164 -1.155** 0.633* 
 (0.402) (0.366) (0.395) (0.363) (0.404) (0.328) (0.517) (0.368) 
Partisanship -0.218 7.005*** 3.905* 2.400 4.182* 1.492 -0.0425 2.237 
 (2.254) (2.038) (2.235) (2.040) (2.224) (1.860) (2.961) (2.125) 
Ideology 0.324 1.619*** 2.283*** 1.959*** 2.143*** 0.655*** 1.266*** 0.942*** 
 (0.249) (0.230) (0.251) (0.230) (0.252) (0.211) (0.335) (0.238) 
Age -0.144 -0.516*** -0.204 -0.398** -0.447** -0.541*** -0.384 -0.186 
 (0.203) (0.190) (0.205) (0.188) (0.206) (0.170) (0.273) (0.196) 
Age Squared 0.00134 0.00526** 0.00125 0.00237 0.00318 0.00644*** 0.000307 0.00157 
 (0.00254) (0.00237) (0.00255) (0.00233) (0.00256) (0.00211) (0.00340) (0.00244) 
Constant 38.80*** 29.14*** 32.87*** 33.46*** 35.66*** 46.00*** 46.77*** 29.21*** 
 (3.890) (3.730) (4.042) (3.705) (4.069) (3.362) (5.317) (3.795) 
         
Observations 1,701 2,679 2,835 2,837 2,715 2,794 2,673 2,604 
R-squared 0.192 0.056 0.052 0.045 0.052 0.017 0.046 0.021 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 







Table 6.5 presents the results of internet use’s effect on support for democracy in Russia. 
The data for these empirical tests was collected across three bi-annual waves from 2006 to 2010. 
As mentioned earlier, Freedom House rated Russia as not free for all years that the survey was 
taken. Furthermore, their media was also listed as not free for all years surveyed. These are 
important distinctions as they change the expectations of the effects the internet should have on 
support for democracy. In Russia, more democratically supportive citizens should support the 
norms of democratic societies, but not the governing regime since it is non-democratic. This is 
the opposite of the democratic countries in the sample as support for the governing regime and 
for democratic norms shows commitment to democracy in multiple dimensions (see Easton 
1975).  
The table shows internet use has a positive and significant effect on a person’s efficacy 
and support for democratic norms. The lone outlier in this was that internet use does not produce 
a significant effect on trust in others in society. Also, internet use has null effects for all 
measures of specific support, as well as support for democracy. These findings are interesting in 
light of the Russian experience during this time period. Most notably, internet use increases 
tolerance of homosexuals and immigrants, two groups that have faced discrimination from both 
the regime and society (Freedom House 2011). Furthermore, even though the government has 
attempted to increase pro-regime propaganda online (Freedom House 2011), they are unable to 
produce support for the regime. When we take these two things together, we can see how the 
internet provides the opportunity to increase citizen demand for democracy. In Russia, we can 
see that the internet increases citizen support for democratic norms of tolerance without 
increasing support for the regime itself. While increasing citizen demand for democracy may not 







government may be unable to retain control over mass society simply through political 
information. Furthermore, as internet use becomes more prevalent, the discrimination of various 
out-groups could become more costly as videos and news of repressive action can spread online 
even if the government continues to suppress and control traditional mediums. This combined 
with internet use increasing citizen tolerance for these groups could lead to social unrest.  
Despite the ability of the internet to provide a space for dissent to take place, there are 
still several steps that would need to connect dissent to political action. Furthermore, even online 
dissenters have not been immune to repression (Freedom House 2011). Given these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that internet use could lead to change in the actual governance of 
Russia at this point. However as internet use tends to rise, the ability to increase support for 
norms of democracy and perhaps dissatisfaction with the regime could weaken legitimacy and 
make it vulnerable to liberalization if the country were to experience economic or political crisis.  
Table 6.6 shows the effects of internet use on support for democracy in Ukraine. From 
the results provided, we can see that internet use has a positive and significant effect on all 
measures of support for democracy except for trust in people. While it was expected that internet 
use would have a positive effect on diffuse support, it is a little surprising to see that internet use 
increases specific support for the regime. However, this unexpected finding is likely explained 
by the fluctuation that Ukraine sees over the course of the years surveyed. As mentioned earlier, 
from 2004 to 2010 Ukraine fluctuated between a free and partly free country. Because of this, the 
following tables will show the results of Ukraine after the sample is split to match the differences 






Table 6.6: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Ukraine42 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 4.846*** 1.841* 3.156*** 2.147** 3.883*** 1.371 6.151*** 2.813** 
 (1.237) (0.972) (1.167) (0.994) (1.285) (1.081) (1.861) (1.272) 
Political  9.501*** 2.308*** 2.256*** -0.580 1.935** 1.156* 0.540 1.302* 
Interest (0.789) (0.599) (0.721) (0.615) (0.795) (0.666) (1.154) (0.791) 
Education 0.779 -0.146 0.373 1.076* -0.127 0.0620 0.353 0.860 
 (0.777) (0.593) (0.708) (0.606) (0.789) (0.661) (1.143) (0.806) 
Women -4.566*** 1.540* 1.706 0.761 -1.311 1.979* 3.229* -0.927 
 (1.222) (0.929) (1.123) (0.953) (1.234) (1.035) (1.781) (1.221) 
Religion 0.647 1.684*** 0.997** 0.0639 1.947*** 0.433 -3.065*** 1.154** 
 (0.493) (0.373) (0.447) (0.379) (0.493) (0.412) (0.706) (0.484) 
Partisanship 2.355 0.792 3.229 -1.540 -1.115 3.532 4.567 -0.937 
 (2.564) (1.942) (2.352) (1.993) (2.587) (2.178) (3.680) (2.580) 
Ideology -0.245 0.178 0.941*** 0.727*** 1.361*** 0.166 -0.302 0.439 
 (0.288) (0.226) (0.273) (0.231) (0.298) (0.251) (0.434) (0.298) 
Age 0.387 -0.297 -0.227 -0.177 -0.182 0.349 0.228 -0.0531 
 (0.279) (0.203) (0.244) (0.208) (0.269) (0.226) (0.392) (0.269) 
Age Squared -0.00513 0.00258 0.00222 0.00116 0.00117 -0.00351 -0.00524 -0.000589 
 (0.00348) (0.00248) (0.00299) (0.00254) (0.00328) (0.00277) (0.00483) (0.00332) 
Constant 28.18*** 21.96*** 14.72*** 20.98*** 22.63*** 30.18*** 47.60*** 37.96*** 
 (5.437) (4.245) (5.087) (4.325) (5.620) (4.705) (8.224) (5.706) 
         
Observations 1,142 1,524 1,559 1,610 1,549 1,587 1,470 1,389 
R-squared 0.172 0.107 0.135 0.073 0.065 0.018 0.035 0.025 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 






Table 6.7: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Ukraine: 2004 &20104344 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 6.566*** 2.279 1.404 0.834 2.647 0.718 6.285** 4.564*** 
 (1.949) (1.403) (1.760) (1.426) (1.815) (1.419) (2.510) (1.763) 
Political  10.27*** 2.705*** 2.506** -0.942 1.887* -0.242 1.026 1.298 
Interest (1.187) (0.841) (1.063) (0.862) (1.101) (0.854) (1.519) (1.068) 
Education 0.745 -0.112 0.529 0.573 -0.669 0.233 0.892 0.507 
 (1.150) (0.836) (1.041) (0.851) (1.096) (0.845) (1.540) (1.107) 
Women -5.275*** 0.783 2.704* 1.649 -1.587 2.785** 2.758 -1.982 
 (1.747) (1.273) (1.617) (1.302) (1.662) (1.295) (2.291) (1.616) 
Religion 0.732 2.108*** 1.275** -0.231 2.185*** 0.494 -3.601*** 0.735 
 (0.724) (0.510) (0.645) (0.518) (0.663) (0.515) (0.914) (0.641) 
Partisanship 2.903 -1.092 1.599 -3.005 -3.111 2.694 4.152 -2.148 
 (4.085) (2.799) (3.593) (2.877) (3.737) (2.886) (4.977) (3.611) 
Ideology 0.121 0.408 1.108*** 0.717** 1.172*** 0.757** -0.490 0.422 
 (0.401) (0.311) (0.396) (0.317) (0.405) (0.316) (0.561) (0.396) 
Age 0.474 -0.158 -0.220 -0.210 -0.0879 0.521** -0.108 0.220 
 (0.363) (0.260) (0.327) (0.264) (0.337) (0.263) (0.471) (0.332) 
Age Squared -0.00657 0.00113 0.00196 0.00138 0.000143 -0.00551* -0.00158 -0.00368 
 (0.00439) (0.00308) (0.00387) (0.00312) (0.00398) (0.00312) (0.00562) (0.00396) 
Constant 23.47*** 16.40*** 13.35* 25.37*** 24.53*** 24.97*** 53.98*** 34.18*** 
 (7.398) (5.714) (7.170) (5.786) (7.449) (5.762) (10.41) (7.476) 
         
Observations 462 877 876 931 893 926 863 806 
R-squared 0.218 0.115 0.120 0.035 0.061 0.024 0.045 0.031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
43 These two years are the years that Freedom House ranked Ukraine as partly free.  






Table 6.8: Effect of Internet Use on Support for Democracy In Ukraine: 2006 &20084546 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















         
Internet Use 4.105** 1.451 5.174*** 3.678*** 5.371*** 1.757 6.493** 1.415 
 (1.670) (1.325) (1.503) (1.370) (1.825) (1.631) (2.777) (1.836) 
Political  8.726*** 1.724** 1.923** -0.148 1.814 2.780*** 0.338 0.822 
Interest (1.084) (0.860) (0.974) (0.888) (1.180) (1.055) (1.805) (1.199) 
Education 0.881 -0.268 0.612 1.838** 0.874 0.0629 -0.651 1.363 
 (1.064) (0.846) (0.957) (0.871) (1.163) (1.049) (1.746) (1.194) 
Women -4.419** 2.273* 0.642 -0.372 -1.062 1.426 4.157 0.0953 
 (1.719) (1.363) (1.548) (1.410) (1.881) (1.676) (2.850) (1.880) 
Religion 0.373 0.963* 0.731 0.262 1.828** 0.352 -2.635** 1.440* 
 (0.683) (0.549) (0.616) (0.562) (0.748) (0.668) (1.131) (0.750) 
Partisanship 2.091 2.863 4.488 0.0890 0.722 4.139 4.435 0.227 
 (3.417) (2.728) (3.084) (2.802) (3.707) (3.342) (5.597) (3.780) 
Ideology -0.668 0.0261 0.811** 0.786** 1.589*** -0.512 0.243 0.769* 
 (0.413) (0.330) (0.373) (0.340) (0.449) (0.406) (0.692) (0.456) 
Age 0.357 -0.455 -0.118 -0.166 -0.161 -0.204 0.530 -0.745 
 (0.460) (0.365) (0.416) (0.379) (0.504) (0.448) (0.764) (0.510) 
Age Squared -0.00466 0.00404 0.000696 0.00115 0.000505 0.00367 -0.00812 0.00812 
 (0.00603) (0.00479) (0.00546) (0.00497) (0.00661) (0.00589) (0.0101) (0.00673) 
Constant 28.70*** 28.81*** 12.67* 16.49** 17.55* 38.73*** 43.59*** 47.18*** 
 (8.340) (6.697) (7.546) (6.888) (9.166) (8.202) (13.98) (9.240) 
         
Observations 653 643 674 678 654 662 611 585 
R-squared 0.136 0.042 0.055 0.070 0.053 0.026 0.024 0.022 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
45 These two years are the years that Freedom House ranked Ukraine as free 







Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present the results of internet use’s influence on support for 
democracy in Ukraine when we account for the status of the regime according to Freedom House 
rankings.  Table 6.7 shows the results for Ukraine when it was ranked as partly free regime. In 
the results we can see that internet use no longer has a significant effect on a person’s specific 
support for the regime. It does, however, retain a significant impact on a person’s support for 
democratic norms, as well as their efficacy. These findings closely mirror the findings from 
Russia as we see that people who use the internet are more likely to be supportive of democratic 
norms, but not the regime itself. On the other hand, Table 6.8 shows that when Ukraine was 
listed as free, internet use has a positive and significant effect on internal efficacy, as well as two 
out of three measures of specific support. Furthermore, internet use has a positive and significant 
effect on half of our measures of diffuse support. While we do not see an across the board 
increase in support as we saw with the other democracies in the study, the pattern presented here 
more closely resembles the findings from the other democratic regimes rather than the findings 
displayed from Russia and Ukraine when it was rated partly free.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The above findings present an interesting pattern regarding the political context of a 
country and the effect that the internet can have on its citizen’s support for democracy and the 
regime. The findings from the democracies alone tend to reinforce the findings and theory that 
have been built to this point. In the democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe, we see 
that internet use increases both specific and diffuse support for the regime. From the previous 
chapters we can reason that this happens because the internet has the ability to diffuse 
democratic norms through interaction with other members of society and political elites. 







as well as promote national and patriotic identity (see Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008). Because of 
this, internet use in democracies reinforces support for the regime amongst the public.  
Perhaps the most interesting findings from this chapter come from the effects of internet 
use in the non-democratic regimes in the region. The findings that internet use increases support 
for democratic norms, but not the regime in these countries not only gives insight into how 
internet use effects support for democracy, but also the effects an open medium in a society 
where the government places considerable restrictions on the press. The internet’s ability to 
increase a person’s support for democratic norms fits with the findings from Nisbet et al. (2012) 
that internet use is tied with more support for democracy in non-democratic regimes. It also calls 
into question the effects that internet use can have on the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. 
When the findings here are merged with those from Chapter Five, we can see that online news 
from non-government sources can lower support for the regime, while news from government 
websites increases support. Therefore, when we use general internet use as a measure, we find 
null results. However, the findings from Chapter Five make it seem likely that there is a split in 
support for the regime underneath the null effects. While we cannot fully be sure of this, the 
signs from this chapter and previous ones point to this likelihood. In order to fully test this 
possibility, future studies should look to ask more detailed questions about a person’s internet 
use and their support for democracy and the current regime. With better data that combines 
measures of support for democracy with detailed questions on internet use and the specific types 
of websites visited by users, researcher can begin to sharpen theories of internet use and 
democracy and explore nuances that are missed in this study. Specifically, researchers can begin 
to explore what types of websites lead to dissent in closed or partially free societies and which 







While there is uncertainty given the null effects of internet use on support for the regime 
in Russia and Ukraine, the findings that internet use increases support for democratic norms does 
show support for principles that are not associated with the regime. As noted earlier, Russia has 
taken several steps to ostracize ethnic minorities and homosexuals. This presents a contradiction 
to people who use the internet as they are more tolerant of both of these groups. This furthers the 
argument that for authoritarian regimes, the internet may make their ability to control society 
more difficult than it was before the rise of online communication (see Howard 2009; Nisbet et 
al. 2012). While this may offer hope to some that the internet can be used as a means to undercut 
public support of authoritarian leaders, we must temper these expectations. While this chapter 
shows that the internet increases support for democratic norms, there is much more to democracy 
than a willing society. Furthermore, internet use in Russia and Ukraine is still low even by 
Eastern European standards. While internet use is increasing, there are still significant 
roadblocks to increasing support for democracy in these countries as misinformation and self-
selection can influence what content a person will consume online.  
Also of note from the findings section was the variance in Ukrainian support for the 
regime between the years that it was rated as a free state and the years it was rated as partly free. 
The finding that internet use increased support for the regime when it was a democracy and not 
when the country was an illiberal regime has several theoretical implications for this study. First 
of all, it strengthens the argument that internet use increases support for democracy and may be 
used as a medium where the public can openly discuss societal problems and attempt to hold 
leaders accountable for their actions. Second, it contradicts Nisbet et al.’s (2012) findings from 
other democratizing regions that once democratization begins, the internet ceases influencing 







internet have the opposite effect. While the internet’s influence on support for democratic norms 
is not contingent on national context, specific support for the regime is. In democracies, internet 
use increases specific support, and it does not in non-democracies. The fact that Ukraine sees this 
process happen in the course of six years increases confidence in the theory as having these 
findings appear in a single case helps show that the effects of internet are variable with the 
workings of the government and not of some missing exogenous variable. Finally, the variation 
in Ukraine brings to mind V.O. Key’s (1966) contention that voters, or in this case the mass 
public, are not fools. The fact that the internet is able to have different effects based on how the 
regime is functioning demonstrates that new information can change evaluations of government. 
Given this finding, among others in this chapter and study, it seem likely that the internet can 
serve several roles for democratizing nations. In the final chapter, we will explore these roles as 







CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 
 
This study began as an attempt to better understand how the technological revolution of 
the internet influences democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. As noted at the 
outset of the study, we have seen consolidation stagnate in some countries, as well as social 
upheaval and returns to authoritarianism for others. Furthermore, the financial crisis of 2008 and 
corruption scandals such as the recent ones in the Czech Republic and Poland can increase 
distrust in the government and lead to waning citizen support for democracy. However, as was 
discovered in the empirical investigation, the internet provides opportunities to increase citizen 
support for democracy, while also offering opportunities to hold political leaders accountable. 
Furthermore, the findings show that the internet has the ability to increase support for democratic 
norms in countries that are struggling with consolidation or have reverted to authoritarianism. 
Because of the ability to increase citizen support for democratic regimes and democratic norms, 
it seems the internet may be able to aid democratic consolidation in the region.  
Aside from the substantive importance of this study, it also expands on the current 
knowledge regarding the effects of the internet in new democracies. As noted at the outset, 
scholars of political science and other disciplines have extensively researched the effects of mass 
media on a person’s attitudes towards political actors and institutions. However, research of the 
internet’s influence on these attitudes is still in its infancy. Furthermore, the previous literature 
has mostly focused on research in older, established democracies where opportunities to conduct 
surveys and experiments have been plentiful. While there was scant literature on which to build a 







effects, along with qualitative research on media use in the new democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and presents a theory of how the internet could influence support for democracy.  
 Following this theoretical outline, the study continued by investigating whether or not the 
internet could influence support for democracy. Chapter Three finds general internet use 
increases both specific and diffuse support for democracy. Furthermore, we find that individual 
factors such as age and education have little influence on the effects of internet use. Put more 
succinctly, internet use has largely the same effects on a person’s support for democracy 
regardless of their age or educational attainment.  
Chapter Four continues by showing that political interest does have some conditional 
effects on a person’s support for democracy. Namely, politically interested people who use the 
internet are less trusting of, and less satisfied with, the government. However, political interest’s 
effect on democratic norms and diffuse support appears to be unconditioned by internet use. 
Further on in Chapter Four, we find social media use increases both specific and diffuse support 
for democracy, while internet news consumption has no effect on either type of support for 
democracy. However, internet news consumption does increase political knowledge. When we 
use measures of dependence on internet news rather than internet news consumption, a similar 
pattern is found. While internet news consumption does increase trust in government and 
satisfaction with the economy when compared to people who do not seek information, it does not 
increase support for democracy or trust in government as much as the other mediums. The 
findings presented here show that being politically interested and consuming news online are not 
necessary conditions for a person to have their attitudes toward democratic governance 







politically interested and people who consume news online are most likely to have their attitudes 
effected by internet use (Xenos and Moy 2008; Mossberger et al. 2008). 
The null findings in Chapter Four prompted a more nuanced investigation into the effects 
of internet news in Chapter Five.  Therefore, we explored the effects that different types of 
online news have on support for democracy, as well as the effects of news in different countries. 
Chapter Five shows that government and official websites increase political knowledge and 
specific support, but not support for democracy. The other website types have sporadic 
significant findings. Chapter Five also finds that online news has an unexpected effect on support 
for democracy given the national context. When the sample was split by country, we saw several 
patterns appear. First, online news had a positive and significant effect on political knowledge 
for all countries except for Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria. However, the most prominent 
findings were that online news increases most measures of support in Poland, but has the exact 
opposite effect in Hungary. When we look at the recent history of these two countries, these 
findings show an interesting pattern. While Poland has endured problems of corruption, the 
growing economy and government’s commitment to civil liberties could retain public support for 
the regime (see Freedom House 2013). Hungary, on the other hand, has been hindered by 
political turmoil in the form of new restrictions on the media and redrawing of electoral districts, 
which some analysts posit gives a clear advantage to the ruling Fidesz party (Freedom House 
2013). Given the national context, we were able to infer that the internet may give an outlet for 
dissent when political elites constrain traditional media. This finding is particularly interesting as 
it shows that online news can be used to hold political leaders accountable in societies where 







internet can provide the tools necessary for mass publics to question whether or not  the elites in 
power are the ones who should be in power.  
Chapter Six built off of this theory and tested whether or not general internet use had 
different effects in the democracies in the sample verses the non-democratic regimes in Russia 
and Ukraine. The findings presented there show internet use increases both specific and diffuse 
support in democracies, but only increases support for democratic norms in non-democracies. 
Furthermore, the case of Ukraine provides even more robustness to this finding.  In 2004 and 
2010, when Freedom House rated Ukraine as partly free, we saw internet use increase support 
for democratic norms, but not the regime itself. However in 2006 and 2008, when Freedom 
House rated Ukraine free, we saw internet use increase measures of diffuse and specific support.  
What Do These Findings Mean? 
 From the empirical investigation, there are several conclusions we can draw about the 
internet’s influence on support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, internet 
use does influence a person’s attitudes. This finding is consistent with findings from previous 
research that shows internet use can increase support for democracy in new democracies (Nisbet 
et al. 2012). This finding in itself is interesting, as research from advanced democracies has 
shown mixed results regarding the effects that the internet can have on democratic citizenship. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the previous literature demonstrates online news can increase 
political participation and engagement (Mossberger et al. 2008; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Xenos 
and Moy 2008; Coleman and Blumler 2009). However, other researchers worried that the 
internet would simply increase the difference between the political haves and have-nots, as 
political interest and socio-economic factors were found to influence who is politically 







cannot speak to biases that may be inherent in who uses the internet (see Bonfidelli 2002), the 
findings presented here may ease some of these concerns, at least in new democracies. The 
empirical results in Chapters Three and Four show that internet use has fairly similar effects on a 
person’s support for democracy regardless of political interest or education. These findings are 
encouraging as they may enable the internet to create a broad base for support in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
The findings also show that the ability of internet to increase support for democracy is 
more nuanced than previously thought. As the results show, social media and news can have 
different effects. The findings in Chapter Four show that social media has a positive and 
significant effect on both specific and diffuse support for democracy. Theoretically, this happens 
because social media websites offer an online platform through which people can interact. While 
people can certainly interact in their everyday lives, social media increases the ability to connect 
with individuals they may not meet in their daily lives (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). Furthermore, 
social media allows people to retain ties to friends and acquaintances that could otherwise 
become dormant (Raacke and Raacke 2008).  While the interaction between people on these 
websites may not be inherently political, it can have very real implications for a person’s 
attitudes towards democracy. As Nisbet et al. (2012) contends, communication can influence a 
person’s attitudes about democracy by “teaching citizens about democratic norms, values, and 
practices and by creating spaces for open political expression”  (see also Mattes & Bratton, 2007; 
Nisbet, 2008; Voltmer and Schmitt-Beck, 2006). With this in mind, we can see how simple 
communication and interaction on social media websites can increase support for democratic 
norms.  







Four and Five show that the effect of news is nuanced, but no less important for democratic 
consolidation. The findings show that online news does not have the same consistent effect on 
support for democracy that we see in social media. While this was unexpected at first, the 
findings that online news has a negative effect on democratic support in Hungary helps us make 
sense of the null findings. In countries that are embroiled in political crisis, it seems that online 
news can perform the watchdog role that is ascribed to media in a democratic society (see Curran 
2005). Seemingly it may be better at performing this role than other mediums in society. While 
traditional news outlets have seen increased pressure from above given Hungary’s 2011 media 
laws, the internet provides a free outlet for people to express displeasure with the regime. These 
findings are strengthened in Chapter Six where we find that internet use in Russia and Ukraine 
increases support for democratic norms such as trust and tolerance, but not the government.  
These findings increase our optimism that the internet can serve as an aid to democratic 
consolidation in multiple ways. First of all, it may serve as a check on leaders in consolidating 
countries. As Martin (2008) notes, bad news about governance can often alert a usually 
inattentive public and mobilize them to political action. While mobilization is not directly tested 
in this study, the findings here do suggest that the internet can at least persuade people to 
dissatisfaction when it is warranted. Furthermore, when we look the effects of social media, we 
can see that the internet has multiple ways to influence support for democracy. Because of this, it 
seems that the ability of the internet to perform its role as a watchdog and socialize support for 
democratic norms can increase legitimacy in democracies and decrease the legitimacy of 
autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes. While there is certainly more research needed in this area, 
the ability of the internet to increase support for democratic norms, while producing 







Despite the promise that the internet displays in increasing support for democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe, there are certainly limitations when we discuss the role of internet in 
the region. First of all, internet use is still low in the certain areas, and much of the region lacks 
access to broadband internet limiting the use on online audio-visual delivery systems (Salovaara-
Moring 2012). While the findings here show that those who use the internet are more satisfied 
with democracy, it is difficult to extrapolate how much of an effect that this will have on society 
as a whole. Further complications arise when we consider society’s role in the democratization 
and consolidation process. While society and political culture can certainly influence a country’s 
level and stability of democracy, (see Lipset 1959; 1994; Easton 1975; Almond and Verba 1963; 
Inglehart 1988; Booth and Seligson 2009), it is only one part of a very complex puzzle.  
Despite these limitations in producing overall societal change, the internet does have the 
ability to aid democratic consolidation. As Gross (2002) notes, mass media in Central and 
Eastern Europe during the 1990’s was able to serve as an adjunct to democratization. While it 
did not directly change politics in the region, it provided an outlet for public discussion and was 
an effective political actor. The findings presented here show the internet can be used in a similar 
way. By increasing citizen support for democratic regimes and democratic culture, social media 
and online news can help ensure that society is able to serve as a base for democracy (see Lipset 
1994). Furthermore, by producing news content in an open public sphere it may be able to serve 
as a watchdog that checks the power of political elites and increases the public’s ability to hold 
them accountable. The internet’s ability to provide these key aspects of mass media should make 
it a valuable asset to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.   
 Another interesting finding is that the effects of the internet on support for democracy are 







countries, but from there the usage varies. In countries like Ukraine and Russia, the top websites 
are filled with social media and networking websites rather than news outlets. This is the 
opposite in democracies, where after social media, online news outlets are the most popular 
websites visited. Even in Hungary, online news remains widely popular as websites such as 
Origo have not been afraid to be critical of Fidesz and their attempt to restrict media freedom. 
Therefore, we see a major split between the democratic countries in the region and Russia and 
Ukraine. While studies cite that oppositional blogs might be used in Russia and Ukraine to 
organize people disaffected with the non-democratic system, it seems more likely that social 
networking and word of mouth or video sharing would provide greater effects as they are far 
more popular. However, in democracies, even ones where political elites can exert considerable 
influence on the press, there seems to be respect for the press and it may play a significant role in 
political life online. As we saw with the findings in Chapter Five, most democracies have null 
results, but that should be expected at a time when financial crises and political scandal has been 
seen in much of the region. However in Hungary, where the media freedom and civil liberties 
have taken a hit (see Freedom House 2013), we can see that online news provides the 
information necessary for people to be dissatisfied with leadership that would attempt to curtail 
democratic freedoms. Furthermore, in Russia and Ukraine, the internet seems to provide, at the 
very least, a space for political dissent as people who use the internet are more supportive of 
democratic norms, but are dissatisfied with the government. Therefore in countries such as 
Russia and Ukraine, the political uses of the internet have more to do with dissent and social 
networking rather than informing. However in democracies, it seems that the internet provides 







serve as an adjunct to democratization, whereas in Ukraine and Russia, it may serve as a place 
for citizens to air grievances outside of the government controlled traditional media.  
Additionally, these findings have implications for the study of democratic values in 
Central and Eastern Europe. As Easton (1975) notes, legitimacy has two distinct forms. Specific 
support, which is based on short-term outputs of government, and diffuse support, which is broad 
based support for the regime based support for the regime that is produced through socialization. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, many have argued that institutional output and experience with 
democratic institutions produce support for the regime (Mishler and Rose 2001; Rose et al. 1998; 
Rohrschneider 1999), whereas others have noted the impact of culture in the region (Klingemann 
et al. 2006). Although this study does not directly test the ability of these values as agents of 
political change, it does provide a mechanism for political change in both institutional and 
cultural values. The findings throughout the study show that internet use can increase both 
citizen attitudes towards political institutions, as well as attitudes towards other members of 
society. Because of these findings, it seems that both institutional and cultural attitudes are 
malleable.  
 These findings fit well with institutional theories of political learning as the internet 
seems to extend the experiences of others to the general public. As Mishler and Rose (2001) 
show, the main reason people trust or do not trust political institutions is due to individual 
evaluations of regime performance. By providing information to citizens as well as diffusing 
societal norms, the internet can impact how citizens consider their regime, and the societal norms 
that accompany democracy. Furthermore, the institutional theories above note that interaction 
with institutions diffuses democratic values (Rohrschneider 1999). By increasing interaction 







successful behavior in democratic society (see Geys 2006). Because studies such as this provide 
evidence that attitudes towards democracy are changeable, even during the consolidation period, 
researchers should look to understand what changes these values. Furthermore, more research is 
needed to understand if certain mediums change different values at different times in new 
democracies. While the internet increases support for democracy in the consolidating countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, we could see different effects in newer democracies as 
differences in institutional structure and historical legacies could impact the ability of the internet 
to socialize support for democracy. 
Despite the insight that this study provides for studies on political communication and the 
socialization of democratic values, it is not without limitations. One such limitation this study 
faces is methodologically proving that internet use causes support for democracy and the results 
are not the result of spurious correlation between more democratically satisfied citizens using the 
internet. While this study cannot empirically prove causation, theoretically it seems more likely 
that the internet is able to increase support for democracy, at least in the democratic countries. In 
democracies, free and open media systems allow easy access to a plethora of information that 
can influence support for the regime. This is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe where 
a limited amount of media markets limit airtime, which tends to favor mainstream parties 
(Bajomi-Lazar 2012; Sukosd and Bajomi-Lazar 2003).  This is important because mainstream 
political parties in the region tend to focus debate around the economy and remain committed to 
democracy, while smaller, niche parties focus on social issues and can sometimes be subversive 
of democracy (Rovny and Edwards 2012; Betz 1993). Thus in the democracies of Central and 







would be anti-democratic attitudes. This is because the small, niche parties in the region rely 
almost exclusively on the internet for communication (Bajomi-Lazar 2012).  
 However, it is not as easy to dismiss the idea of reverse causality in countries where anti-
government messages are constrained. In countries like Russia and Ukraine, the freedom of the 
press is heavily constrained, but yet the internet provides an open method of communication that 
allows political opposition to disseminate messages (see Toepfl 2013). Therefore, in these 
countries, it could be possible that people who are more supportive of democracy would take to 
the internet to become informed. While this is a distinct probability in countries that constrain the 
freedom of the traditional press, we should not overlook the likelihood that the internet could 
reinforce support for democracy. As the findings and descriptive statistics in Chapter Six show, 
social media socializes support for democracy and social media websites are among the most 
popular in these countries. This leads to the belief that people in Russia and Ukraine are more 
likely to have support for democratic norms socialized or reinforced through interaction with 
other members of society. Furthermore, even if people who support democracy are more likely to 
use the internet in Russia and Ukraine, they should be more likely to seek out information that 
conforms to rather than challenges their beliefs (see Stroud 2008). Therefore, even in countries 
where causality could be called into question the most, there are several reasons to believe that 
the internet increases, or at the very least reinforces support for democracy and democratic 
norms. 
Although this study has its limitations, the findings presented here have implications for 
future research in the discipline. First of all studies of the internet’s effects on political attitudes 
should dig further into how content matters for socializing support for the regime. While this 







person could consume news, there is certainly a large variance in content within these categories. 
As Salovaara-Moring (2012) notes online news outlets can come in the form of hard news or 
tabloid style news. As the previous literature has shown, these differences can have a substantial 
effect on the outcomes researchers see in political attitudes. Future research should take care to 
ask specific questions about the websites visited for information as they can then utilize content 
analysis to better understand how soft news and hard news influence support for democracy. 
Also, researchers should ask detailed survey questions about the online social networks of 
respondents. By developing a better understanding of how people interact on social media 
websites and online message boards, we can begin to fully trace the causal pathways that lead 
social media to increase support for democracy. Furthermore, this type of data could lead to 
inquiries into whether active or passive social media users are most effected by using the 
medium, and whether behavior is different on social media platforms where the audience knows 
a user’s identity versus websites where the user’s identity is hidden.   
 Furthermore, more research is needed on what exactly it is about the internet that makes 
it a conduit for socializing democratic norms. While the data used in this study did not allow for 
testing of causal mechanisms, the findings do provide clues that other research can use to 
understand why the internet socializes support for democracy. While research from Central and 
Eastern Europe has discussed the innate ability of mass media to socialize support for democracy 
through providing cues of nationalism through symbolism and share cultural context 
(Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008), there has been little discussion of what the internet provides that 
makes its ability to socialize democracy different from traditional media. However the findings 
from this study point to the probability that the causal effect has something to do with the social 







and direct contact with other members of society online may lead to thickening ties with people 
who a person meets through everyday life as well as the ability to create ties with people whom 
they would never meet if it weren’t for the internet (Parrish-Sprowl 2012). Because of the social 
interaction generated by internet use, there are two plausible scenarios that could lead to 
increased citizen support for democracy. The first theory is that the internet builds social capital, 
which allows people to create trusted networks to disseminate social norms of trust and tolerance 
(see Coleman 1988). As the findings show, trust in others, which is a key product of increased 
social capital, is increased by internet use in Central and Eastern European democracies. 
Furthermore, other studies have shown that the internet can increase social capital in advanced 
democracies (Burke et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2010; Steinfield et al. 2008). However, in Russia 
and Ukraine we see that democratic norms of tolerance are increased by internet use, but social 
trust is not. Therefore, it seems that social capital may only be part of the story. 
 The other possibility is that social interaction online allows people to expand their 
worldview and build consensus for how their country should be run. Once again, Coleman and 
Blumler (2009) contend the most legitimate actions taken by government are the ones that are 
understood and accepted by the public. Therefore it would seem that online discussion might be 
able to socialize norms of reciprocity and allow for people to deliberate the best course of action 
for their country in an online public sphere. This would fit with a Dewian version of what media 
should provide in a democracy by allowing the internet to serve as a town hall meeting, in which 
ideas are publically discussed and consensus is formed for the best action available (see Gross 
2002). Furthermore, since the internet connects beyond national borders, it might allow citizens 
to draw upon the experiences of other democratic nations and see that political and social life 







experiments are need to test these possibilities. Specifically, researchers need to find out what 
people use social networks and other websites for. Do they actually discuss politics with people 
they have met online? Do the read news or are they exposed to cultural dialogue from other 
countries? These are just two examples of the types of questions that need to be researched to 
understand what it is about the internet that differentiates it from other mediums.  
This study also sets up as a first step in understanding the mobilizing effects of the 
internet in new democracies. As mentioned above, online news decreases support for 
government when it is warranted, thus allowing the public to hold leaders accountable. Future 
research should see if the internet actually mobilizes dissatisfied citizens to public action. 
Furthermore, they should look into what type of political action is mobilized. Given the findings 
in Ukraine and the recent protests and political unrest there, it is possible that the internet may 
have real world implications for the stability of democratic and non-democratic regimes alike. 
This notion is supported when we consider the findings from Booth and Seligson (2009), which 
note that protest by dissatisfied citizens can be problematic for regime stability.   
Finally, this study challenges notions of how media providing support for democracy 
should be conceptualized. While other studies characterize the media producing support for 
democracy and engagement with the political system (Norris 2001; Nisbet et al. 2012), this study 
shows that we should look at the influence of media in relation to how well the government is 
working in a country.  As we see in Russia, as well as Ukraine and Hungary at various points 
during the time period studied, new information can make citizens unsupportive of government 
at times when it is warranted. However, this should not be seen as a lack of support for 
democracy, but for the government itself. The findings in this study show that people who use 







Therefore, it is possible for the internet, and mass media in general, to produce support for 
democracy, without producing support for those in power. Future studies should keep this in 
mind when examining the effects of media on support for democracy.  
This study began as an investigation on whether or not the internet increases support for 
democracy in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Using empirical research, we 
have shown that the internet does indeed increase support for democracy. Furthermore, it may 
offer chances to hold government leaders accountable in light of poor governance. While there is 
certainly more research needed, the findings presented here demonstrate the internet’s potential 














Aarts, Kees, Audun Fladmoe, and Jesper Stromback. 2012. “Media, Political Trust, and Political 
Knowledge: A Comparative Perspective.” In How Media Inform Democracy: A 
Comparative Approach, edited by Toril Aalberg and James Curran, 98–118. New York, NY, 
USA: Routledge. 
Adoni, Hanna. 1979. “The Functions of Mass Media in the Political Socialization of 
Adolescents.” Communication Research 6 (1): 84–106.  
Almond, Gabriel A, and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Anderson, Christopher. 2005. Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bajomi-Lázár, Péter. 2012. “From Political Propaganda To Political Marketing. Changing 
Patterns of Political Communication in Central and Eastern Europe.” In Media 
Transformations in the Post-Communist World: Eastern Europe’s Tortured Path to Change, 
edited by Peter Gross and Karol Jakubowicz, 49–66. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. 
Balcerowicz, Leszek. 1994. “Understanding Postcommunist Transitions.” Journal of Democracy 
5 (4): 75–89.  
———. 1995. Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation. Budapest: Central European University 
Press. 
Ball-Rokeach, S.J., and M.L. DeFleur. 1976. “A Dependency Model of Mass-Media Effects.” 
Communication Research 3 (1): 3–21.  
Banducci, Susan A., and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2003. “How Elections Change the Way Citizens View 
the Political System: Campaigns, Media Effects and Electoral Outcomes in Comparative 
Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 33 (03): 443–67.  
Banfield, Edward C. 1958. Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Bartels, Larry M. 1993. “Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure.” 
American Political Science Review 87 (2): 267–85.  
Baum, Matthew A., and Angela S. Jamison. 2006. “The Oprah Effect: How Soft News Helps 
Inattentive Citizens Vote Consistently.” Journal of Politics 68 (4): 946–59.  
Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar. 2008. “A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing 
Foundations of Political Communication.” Journal of Communication 58 (4): 707–31.  
Bernhard, Michael. 1993. “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe.” 
Political Science Quarterly 108 (2): 307–26.  
Betz, Hans-George. 1993. “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist 
Parties in Western Europe.” Comparative Politics 25 (4): 413.  
Blumler, Jay G. 1997. “Origins of the Crisis of Communication for Citizenship.” Political 
Communication 14 (4): 395–404.  
Bonfadelli, Heinz. 2002. “The Internet and Knowledge Gaps A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation.” European Journal of Communication 17 (1): 65–84.  
Booth, John A, and Mitchell A Seligson. 2009. The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: 
Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding Interaction 
Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14 (1): 63–82.  
Brundidge, Jennifer, and Ronald E. Rice. 2009. “Political Engagement Online: Do the 







Internet Politics, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 144–56. Milton Park, 
UK; New York: Routledge. 
Burke, Moira, Robert Kraut, and Cameron Marlow. 2011. “Social Capital on Facebook: 
Differentiating Uses and Users.” In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, 571–80. CHI ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM.  
Chaffee, Steven H., and Stacey Frank Kanihan. 1997. “Learning about Politics from the Mass 
Media.” Political Communication 14 (4): 421–30. . 
Chaffee, Steven H., L. Scott Ward, and Leonard P. Tipton. 1970. “Mass Communication and 
Political Socialization.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 47 (4): 647–66.  
Charles, Alec. 2009. Media in the Enlarged Europe: Politics, Policy and Industry. Intellect 
Books. 
Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 10 (1): 103–26.  
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal 
of Sociology 94 (January):  
Coleman, Stephen, and Jay G. Blumler. 2009. The Internet and Democratic Citizenship : Theory, 
Practice and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Coman, Mihai. 2000. “Developments in Journalism Theory About Media ‘Transition’ in Central 
and Eastern Europe 1990-99.” Journalism Studies 1 (1): 35–56.  
Curran, James. 2005. “What Democracy Requires of the Media.” In The Press, edited by G. 
Overholser and K.H Jamison. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Curran, James, Sharon Coen, Toril Aalberg, Kaori Hayashi, Paul K. Jones, Sergio Splendore, 
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, David Rowe, and Rod Tiffen. 2013. “Internet Revolution 
Revisited: A Comparative Study of Online News.” Media, Culture & Society 35 (7): 880–
97.  
Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. University of Chicago Press. 
Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. 
Dahlgren, Peter. 2005. “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion 
and Deliberation.” Political Communication 22 (2): 147–62. 
Diamond, Larry Jay. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul, Eszter Hargittai, W. Russell Neuman, and John P. Robinson. 2001. “Social 
Implications of the Internet.” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (1): 307. 
Downey, John, and Natalie Fenton. 2003. “New Media, Counter Publicity and the Public 
Sphere.” New Media & Society 5 (2): 185–202.  
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. 
Druckman, James N. 2001. “On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?” Journal of 
Politics 63 (4): 1041–66.  
Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” British Journal of 
Political Science 5 (04): 435–57.  
Ekman, Joakim, and Jonas Linde. 2005. “Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of 
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics 21 (3): 354–74.  
Ellison, Nicole B., Charles Steinfield, and Cliff Lampe. 2011. “Connection Strategies: Social 
Capital Implications of Facebook-Enabled Communication Practices.” New Media & 







Eltantawy, Nahed, and Julie B. Wiest. 2011. “The Arab Spring| Social Media in the Egyptian 
Revolution: Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory.” International Journal of 
Communication 5 (0): 18. 
Erbring, Lutz, Edie N. Goldenberg, and Arthur H. Miller. 1980. “Front-Page News and Real-
World Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media.” American Journal of Political 
Science 24 (1): 16–49.  
Faris, Robert, and Bruce Etling. 2008. “Madison and the Smart Mob: The Promise and 
Limitations of the Internet for Democracy.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 32: 65. 
Farrell, Henry, and Daniel W. Drezner. 2008. “The Power and Politics of Blogs.” Public Choice 
134 (1-2): 15–30.  
Finkel, Steven E., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Civic Education, Political Discussion, and the 
Social Transmission of Democratic Knowledge and Values in a New Democracy: Kenya 
2002.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 417–35.  
Geys, Benny. 2006. “‘Rational’ Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review.” Political Studies Review 
4 (1): 16–35.  
Graber, Doris. 2003. “The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 6 (1): 139–60.  
Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology, no. 6: 
1360.  
Grönlund, Kimmo. 2007. “Knowing and Not Knowing: The Internet and Political Information.” 
Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (3): 397–418.  
Gross, Peter. 2002. Entangled Evolutions: Media and Democratization in Eastern Europe. 
Washington : Baltimore, Md. ; London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Hainmueller, Jens. 2012. “Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Reweighting 
Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies.” Political Analysis 20 (1): 
25–46.  
Hindman, Matthew. 2008. The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton University Press. 
Howard, Philip N. 2010. The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information 
Technology and Political Islam. Oxford University Press. 
“Hungary.” 2014. Accessed April 20. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/hungary#.U1QA5F4dtaN. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political Science 
Review 82 (4): 1203.  
Inglehart, Ronald, and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the 
Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review 65 (1): 19.  
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1989. News That Matters: Television and American 
Opinion. University of Chicago Press. 
Jackman, Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. 1998. “Social Capital and Politics.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 1 (1): 47–73.  
Jakubowicz, Karol, and Miklós Sükösd. 2008. “Twelve Concepts Regarding Media System 
Evolution and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies.” In Finding the Right Place 
on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective, edited by 







Jebril, Nael, Vaclav Stetka, and Matthew Loveless. 2013. “Media and Democratisation: What Is 
Known About the Role of Mass Media in Transitions to Democracy”. Reuters Institute for 
the Study of Journalism: University of Oxford. 
Kaye, Barbara K., and Thomas J. Johnson. 2004. “A Web for All Reasons: Uses and 
Gratifications of Internet Components for Political Information.” Telematics and 
Informatics 21 (3): 197–223.  
Kenski, Kate, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2006. “Connections Between Internet Use and Political 
Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50 
(2): 173–92. 
Key, V. O. 1966. The Responsible Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Kleinnijenhuis, Jan. 1991. “Newspaper Complexity and the Knowledge Gap.” European Journal 
of Communication 6 (4): 499–522.  
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Dieter Fuchs, and Jan Zielonka. 2006. Democracy and Political 
Culture in Eastern Europe. London; New York: Routledge. 
Kopstein, Jeffrey S., and David A. Reilly. 2000. “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation 
of the Postcommunist World.” World Politics 53 (01): 1–37.  
Kunioka, Todd, and Gary M. Woller. 1999. “In (a) Democracy We Trust: Social and Economic 
Determinants of Support for Democratic Procedures in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
Journal of Socio-Economics 28 (5): 577–96.  
Kyj, Myroslaw J. 2006. “Internet Use in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Business Horizons 49 
(1): 71–80.  
Linz, Juan J, and Alfred C Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.  
Lippmann, Walter. 1922. Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 (01): 69–105.  
———. 1994. “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address.” 
American Sociological Review 59 (1): 1.  
Loveless, Matthew. 2008. “Media Dependency: Mass Media as Sources of Information in the 
Democratizing Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Democratization 15 (1): 162–83.  
———. 2010. “Understanding Media Socialization in Democratizing Countries: Mobilization 
and Malaise in Central and Eastern Europe.” Comparative Politics 42 (4): 457–74.  
Martin, Paul S. 2008. “The Mass Media as Sentinel: Why Bad News About Issues Is Good News 
for Participation.” Political Communication 25 (2): 180–93.  
Matay, Monika, and Ildiko Kaposi. 2008. “Radicals Online: The Hungarian Street Protests of 
2006 and the Internet.” In Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern 
European Media Change in a Global Perspective, edited by Karol Jakubowicz and Miklós 
Sükösd, 277–96. Bristol, UK: Chicago, IL: Intellect Books. 
Mattes, Robert, and Michael Bratton. 2007. “Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, 
Performance, and Experience.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 192–217.  
McCann, James A., and Chappell Lawson. 2006. “Presidential Campaigns and the Knowledge 







McLeod, Jack M., Dietram A. Scheufele, and Patricia Moy. 1999. “Community, 
Communication, and Participation: The Role of Mass Media and Interpersonal Discussion in 
Local Political Participation.” Political Communication 16 (3): 315–36.  
Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. The Race Card : Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm 
of Equality. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press. 
Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations 
of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies.” The Journal of Politics 59 
(02): 418–51.  
———. 2001. “What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural 
Theories in Post-Communist Societies.” Comparative Political Studies 34 (1): 30–62.  
Mossberger, Karen, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Ramona S. McNeal. 2008. Digital Citizenship: The 
Internet, Society, and Participation. MIT Press.  
Mughan, Anthony, and Richard Gunther. 2000. “The Media in Democratic and Nondemocratic 
Regimes; A Multilevel Perspective.” In Democracy and the Media: A Comparative 
Perspective, edited by Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan. Cambridge University Press. 
Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. “Civic Culture and Democracy: The 
Question of Causal Relationships.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 635.  
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2012. “Freedom Without Impartiality. The Vicious Circle of Media 
Capture.” In Media Transformations in the Post-Communist World: Eastern Europe’s 
Tortured Path to Change, edited by Peter Gross and Karol Jakubowicz, 33–48. Plymouth, 
UK: Lexington Books. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice.” 
American Political Science Review 96 (01): 111–26. 
Mutz, Diana C., and Byron Reeves. 2005. “The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised 
Incivility on Political Trust.” American Political Science Review 99 (01): 1–15.  
Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. “Media Framing of a Civil 
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.” American Political Science Review 91 (3): 
567–83.  
Newton, Kenneth. 1999. “Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?” British Journal 
of Political Science 29 (04): 577–99. 
Nisbet, Erik C. 2008. “Media Use, Democratic Citizenship, and Communication Gaps in a 
Developing Democracy.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 20 (4): 454–82.  
Nisbet, Erik C., Elizabeth Stoycheff, and Katy E. Pearce. 2012. “Internet Use and Democratic 
Demands: A Multinational, Multilevel Model of Internet Use and Citizen Attitudes About 
Democracy.” Journal of Communication 62 (2): 249–65.  
Norris, Pippa. 2001. Digital Divide : Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet 
Worldwide. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Park, Namsu, Kerk F. Kee, and Sebastián Valenzuela. 2009. “Being Immersed in Social 
Networking Environment: Facebook Groups, Uses and Gratifications, and Social 
Outcomes.” Cyberpsychology & Behavior 12 (6): 729–33.  
Parrish-Sprowl, John. 2012. “The Intersection of Two Revolutions: The Role of New Media in 
the Development of Post–Socialist Europe in the First Twenty Years.” In Media 
Transformations in the Post-Communist World: Eastern Europe’s Tortured Path to Change, 
edited by Peter Gross and Karol Jakubowicz, 85–98. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. 
Paxton, Pamela. 2002. “Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship.” 







Pfetsch, Barbara, and Frank Esser. 2004. “Comparing Political Communication: Reorientations 
in a Changing World.” In Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and 
Challenges, edited by Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch. Cambridge University Press. 
“Poland.” 2014. Accessed May 20. http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/poland#.U3uV914dtaN. 
Prior, Markus. 2007. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in 
Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge University Press. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton 
University Press. 
———. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 1st ed. 
Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster. 
Raacke, John, and Jennifer Bonds-Raacke. 2008. “MySpace and Facebook: Applying the Uses 
and Gratifications Theory to Exploring Friend-Networking Sites.” Cyberpsychology & 
Behavior 11 (2): 169–74.  
Riffe, Daniel, Stephen Lacy, and Miron Varouhakis. 2008. “Media System Dependency Theory 
and Using the Internet for in-Depth, Specialized Information.” Web Journal of Mass 
Communication Research 11: 1–14. 
Robinson, Michael J. 1976. “Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The 
Case of ‘The Selling of the Pentagon.’” American Political Science Review 70 (2): 409–32. 
Rohrschneider, Robert. 1999. Learning Democracy Democratic and Economic Values in Unified 
Germany. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.  
Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. Democracy and Its Alternatives: 
Understanding Post-Communist Societies. The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Rose, Richard, and William T. E. Mishler. 1994. “Mass Reaction to Regime Change in Eastern 
Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards?” British Journal of Political Science 24 (02): 
159–82.  
Rovny, Jan, and Erica E. Edwards. 2012. “Struggle over Dimensionality Party Competition in 
Western and Eastern Europe.” East European Politics & Societies 26 (1): 56–74.  
“Russia.” 2014. Accessed April 20. http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2011/russia#.U1QI-F4dtaM. 
Salovaara-Moring, Inka. 2012. “Digital (R)evolutions? Internet, New Media and Informed 
Citizenship In Central and Eastern Europe.” In Media Transformations in the Post-
Communist World: Eastern Europe’s Tortured Path to Change, edited by Peter Gross and 
Karol Jakubowicz, 99–114. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books. 
Schaffner, Brian F. 2005. “Priming Gender: Campaigning on Women’s Issues in U.S. Senate 
Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 803–17.  
Schedler, Andreas. 1998. “What Is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (2): 
91–107.  
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2007. “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and 
Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe.” East European Politics & Societies 21 (1): 
126–41.  
Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is... and Is Not.” Journal 
of Democracy 2 (3): 75–88.  
Sekhon, Jasjeet S. 2009. “Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference.” 







Steinfield, Charles, Nicole B. Ellison, and Cliff Lampe. 2008. “Social Capital, Self-Esteem, and 
Use of Online Social Network Sites: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Journal of Applied 
Developmental Psychology 29 (6). Social Networking on the Internet Developmental 
Implications: 434–45.  
Stetka, Vaclav. 2012. “From Multinationals to Business Tycoons Media Ownership and 
Journalistic Autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe.” The International Journal of 
Press/Politics 17 (4): 433–56.  
Stroud, Natalie. 2008. “Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of 
Selective Exposure.” Political Behavior 30 (3): 341–66.  
Sükösd, Miklós, and Péter Bajomi-Lázár. 2003. Reinventing Media: Media Policy Reform in 
East-Central Europe. Central European University Press. 
Sun, Shaojing, Alan M. Rubin, and Paul M. Haridakis. 2008. “The Role of Motivation and 
Media Involvement in Explaining Internet Dependency.” Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media 52 (3): 408–31.  
Svolik, Milan W. 2013. “Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success 
of Democracy.” American Journal of Political Science 57 (3): 685–702.  
Teorell, Jan. 2006. “Political Participation and Three Theories of Democracy: A Research 
Inventory and Agenda.” European Journal of Political Research 45 (5): 787–810.  
Toepfl, Florian. 2013. “Making Sense of the News in a Hybrid Regime: How Young Russians 
Decode State TV and an Oppositional Blog.” Journal of Communication 63 (2): 244–65.  
Tworzecki, Hubert, and Holli A. Semetko. 2012. “Media Use and Political Engagement in Three 
New Democracies Malaise versus Mobilization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 17 (4): 407–32.  
Voltmer, Katrin, and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck. 2006. “New Democracies Without Citizens?: Mass 
Media and Democratic Orientations–a Four-Country Comparison.” In Mass Media and 
Political Communication in New Democracies, edited by Katrin Voltmer 228–45. Milton 
Park, UK; New York, NY: Routledge 
Whitefield, Stephen. 2002. “Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics.” Annual Review 
of Political Science 5 (1): 181–200.  
Wilson, Robert E., Samuel D. Gosling, and Lindsay T. Graham. 2012. “A Review of Facebook 
Research in the Social Sciences.” Perspectives on Psychological Science 7 (3): 203–20.  
Wojcieszak, Magdalena E., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Online Groups and Political Discourse: 
Do Online Discussion Spaces Facilitate Exposure to Political Disagreement?” Journal of 
Communication 59 (1): 40–56.  
Wolchik, Sharon L., and Jane Leftwich Curry. 2011. “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to 
Europe: From Communism to the European Union and NATO.” In Central and East 
European Politics: From Communism to Democracy, edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane 
Leftwich Curry. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Xenos, Michael, and Patricia Moy. 2007. “Direct and Differential Effects of the Internet on 
Political and Civic Engagement.” Journal of Communication 57 (4): 704–18.  

















Measurements Used:  
 
Efficacy and Engagement: 
Efficacy 
Questions Used: 
 European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: efficacy1: 2002-2008 (N=46,526) 
o How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand 
what is going on?: Never, Seldom, Occasionally, Regularly, Frequently. How 
difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues ?: Very 
Difficult, Difficult, Neither Difficult nor Easy, Easy, Very Easy. Cronbach’s 
alpha (scale reliability coefficient): 0.66. 
Political Knowledge 
Questions Used: 
- Eurobarometer: polknowlidge: 2012 (N= 9,859) 
o For each of the following statements about the EU could you please tell me 
whether you think it is true or false: The EU currently consists of 27 Member 
States. The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the 
citizens of each Member State. Switzerland is a member of the EU. True, False, 
Don’t Know.  
Specific Support: 
Trust in Government 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: trustgov1: 2002-2010 (N=56,712) 
o Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally 
trust each of the institutions I read out. means you do not trust an institution at 
all, and 10 means you have complete trust: [country’s] parliament/legal 
system/police/politicians/political parties. Cronbach’s alpha (scale reliability 
coefficient): 0.89.  
- Eurobarometer: trustgovernment1: 2012 (N= 8,617) 
o I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it: Political parties/ The (NATIONALITY) 
Government/ The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT)/ Regional or local 
public authorities. Cronbach’s alpha (scale reliability coefficient): 0.77. 
Satisfaction With Government 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: gov_satisfy1: 2002-2010 (N=65,513) 
o Now thinking about the [country’s] government, how satisfied are you with the 
way it is doing its job?: (0) Extremely Dissatisfied- (10) Extremely Satisfied. 
Satisfaction With The Economy 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: econsatisfy1: 2002-2010 (N= 66,176) 
o On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in 
[country]?: (0) Extremely Dissatisfied- (10) Extremely Satisfied. 







o How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?: The 
situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy. Very Good, Rather Good, Rather 
Bad, Very Bad.  
Economic Expectations 
Questions Used: 
- Eurobarometer: economyexpectations1: 2012 (N= 9,502) 
o What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve 
months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? The economic situation 
in (OUR COUNTRY). Better, Worse, Same.  
 
Direction of the Country 
Questions Used: 
- Eurobarometer: countrydirection1: 2012 (N= 9,498) 
o At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right 
direction or in the wrong direction, in our country? Things are going in the right 




Satisfaction With Democracy 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: demsatisfy1: 2002-2010 (N= 63,547) 
o And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
[country]?: (0) Extremely Dissatisfied- (10) Extremely Satisfied. 
- Eurobarometer: satisdem1: 2012 (N= 9,672) 
o On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
 
Trust In People 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: trustppl1: 2002-2010 (N= 66,685) 
o Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a 
score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most 
people can be trusted. Using this card, do you think that most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?: (0) 
Most people try to take advantage of me- (10) Most people try to be fair. Would 
you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves?: (0) People mostly look out for themselves- (10) 
People mostly try to be helpful. Cronbach’s alpha (scale reliability coefficient): 
0.76. 
Tolerance of Immigrants 
Questions Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: immigranttol1: 2002-2010 (N=56,781) 
o Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people 







the economy. And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is 
generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries?: (0) Cultural life undermined- (10) Cultural life enriched. Is [country] 
made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other 
countries?: (0) Worse place to live- (10) Better place to live. Cronbach’s alpha 
(scale reliability coefficient): 0.85. 
 
Tolerance of Homosexuals 
Question Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: hmslive1: 2002-2010 (N= 61,498) 
o Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish. Agree 
Strongly, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Disagree Strongly.  
 
Media Use Variables: 
Internet Use 
Question Used: 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: internetuse: 2002-2010 (N= 68,460) 
o Now, using this card, how often do you use the internet, the World Wide Web or 
e-mail - whether at home or at work - for your personal use? No access at home or 
work, Less than once a month, Once a month, Several times a month, Once a 




- Eurobarometer: natnews_internet: 2012 (N= 9,859) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? And 
Then? Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not 
look for news on national political matters (spontaneous). Note: Automatically 
recoded by Eurobarometer so the variable measures the number of people who 
use the medium for news on national political matters.  
- Eurobarometer: newsdependentdummy4: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? 
Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not look 
for news on national political matters (spontaneous). 
 
Online News from Specific Websites 
Questions Used: 
- Eurobarometer: natwebnews_official: 2012 (N= 9,672)  
o On the Internet, which of the following websites do you use to get news on 
national political matters? Institutional and official websites (governmental 
websites, etc.), Information websites (websites from newspapers, news 
magazines, etc.), Online social networks, Blogs, Video hosting websites, Other 
(spontaneous), None (spontaneous).  







o On the Internet, which of the following websites do you use to get news on 
national political matters? Institutional and official websites (governmental 
websites, etc.), Information websites (websites from newspapers, news 
magazines, etc.), Online social networks, Blogs, Video hosting websites, Other 
(spontaneous), None (spontaneous).  
- Eurobarometer: natwebnews_social: 2012 (N= 9,672) 
o On the Internet, which of the following websites do you use to get news on 
national political matters? Institutional and official websites (governmental 
websites, etc.), Information websites (websites from newspapers, news 
magazines, etc.), Online social networks, Blogs, Video hosting websites, Other 
(spontaneous), None (spontaneous).  
- Eurobarometer: natwebnews_blog: 2012 (N= 9,672) 
o On the Internet, which of the following websites do you use to get news on 
national political matters? Institutional and official websites (governmental 
websites, etc.), Information websites (websites from newspapers, news 
magazines, etc.), Online social networks, Blogs, Video hosting websites, Other 
(spontaneous), None (spontaneous).  
- Eurobarometer: natwebnews_video: 2012 (N= 9,672) 
o On the Internet, which of the following websites do you use to get news on 
national political matters? Institutional and official websites (governmental 
websites, etc.), Information websites (websites from newspapers, news 
magazines, etc.), Online social networks, Blogs, Video hosting websites, Other 
(spontaneous), None (spontaneous).  
Social Media 
- Eurobarometer: smediause: 2012 (N= 9,766) 
o Could you tell me to what extent you use online social networks? 
Everyday/Almost everyday, Two or Three Times a Week, About Once a Week, 
Two or Three Times a Month, Less Often, Never, Do Not Have Access to This 
Medium (spontaneous. 
Television News 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: tvpoluse: 2002-2010 (N= 65,753) 
o And again on an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is 
spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs? No time at 
all, Less than 0.5 hour, 0.5 hour to 1 hour, More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours, 
More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours, More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours, More than 
2.5 hours, up to 3 hours,  More than 3 hours.  
- Eurobarometer: natnews_tv: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? And 
Then? Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not 
look for news on national political matters (spontaneous). Note: Automatically 
recoded by Eurobarometer so the variable measures the number of people who 
use the medium for news on national political matters.  
- Eurobarometer: newsdependentdummy1: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? 
Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not look 








- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: nwsppoluse: 2002-2010 (N= 47,620) 
o And how much of this time is spent reading about politics and current affairs? No 
time at all, Less than 0.5 hour, 0.5 hour to 1 hour, More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 
hours, More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours, More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours, 
More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours, More than 3 hours.  
- Eurobarometer: natnews_press: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? And 
Then? Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not 
look for news on national political matters (spontaneous). Note: Automatically 
recoded by Eurobarometer so the variable measures the number of people who 
use the medium for news on national political matters.  
- Eurobarometer: newsdependentdummy2: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? 
Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other(spontaneous), You do not look 
for news on national political matters (spontaneous). 
 
Radio News 
- European Social Survey (ESS) 1-5: radiopoluse: 2002-2010 (N= 48,188) 
o And again on an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio 
is spent listening to news or programmes about politics and current affairs? No 
time at all, Less than 0.5 hour, 0.5 hour to 1 hour, More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 
hours, More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours, More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours, 
More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours, More than 3 hours. 
- Eurobarometer: natnews_radio: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? And 
Then? Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other (spontaneous), You do not 
look for news on national political matters (spontaneous). Note: Automatically 
recoded by Eurobarometer so the variable measures the number of people who 
use the medium for news on national political matters.  
- Eurobarometer: newsdependentdummy3: 2012 (N= 9,782) 
o Where do you get most of your news on national political matters? Firstly? 
Television, The press, Radio, The internet, other (spontaneous), You do not look 
for news on national political matters (spontaneous). 
 
Data Referenced: 
ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 3.1. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.2. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data (2006). Data file edition 3.4. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data (2004). Data file edition 3.3. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.3. Norwegian Social 
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